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Esteban P. Argudo
ESSAYS ON THE MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM
My thesis studies the effect of financial frictions on the monetary policy transmission
mechanism in four chapters.
The first chapter, Credit Constraints in a New Keynesian Framework: A Simple
Theoretical Analysis, studies how financial frictions alter equilibrium outcomes. I show that
collateral borrowing constraints have general equilibrium effects that operate via four channels;
borrowers' collateral value, savers' portfolio reallocation, wage adjustments, and wealth effects
due to changes in firms' profits. 
In the second chapter, Monetary Policy and Credit Constraints, I present an extension of
the model in the first chapter and calibrate the baseline version of this model to the U.S.
economy. I show that a monetary expansion leads to a smaller increase in aggregate output in the
New Keynesian model where the collateral borrowing constraints are included relative to the
standard model without constraints. As the fraction of credit constrained agents becomes larger,
the increase in aggregate output becomes smaller.   
In the third chapter, An Empirical Assessment of the Transmission of Monetary Policy, I
conduct a study of the transmission of monetary policy via three credit costs components; risk-
free rate (conventional channel), spread over the risk-free rate (credit spread channel), and non-
spread factors such as credit limits (non-spread credit channel). I find that financial frictions are
relevant for monetary policy transmission; the credit channel accounts for about 20% - 30% of
the change in consumption expenditures. Additionally, non-spread factors play a non-trivial role.
In the final chapter, Monetary Policy Revisited: Heterogeneous Bank Pass-Through of
Credit Expansions, I relax the assumption that the central bank directly impacts
vi
borrowing/lending rates by explicitly modeling the pass-through from banks to households. In my
model, banks offer differentiated credit contracts to households as a consequence of financial
frictions. Following monetary expansions, the relaxation of credit conditions is about three times
larger for households at the top of the wealth/income distribution relative to those at the bottom.
Incorporating this heterogeneous pass-through mechanism reduces the response of aggregate
consumption to a monetary expansion by about five times. 
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CHAPTER 1
Credit Constraints in a New Keynesian Framework: A Simple Theoretical Model
Abstract
Using a simple two-period, two-agent version of the baseline two-sector New Key-
nesian model, I provide a theoretical illustration on how financial frictions alter equi-
librium outcomes. I introduce the financial friction as a collateral constraint faced only
by one type of agents; the borrowers. The other type of agents, the savers, don’t face
a collateral constraint and they have some ownership of the firms in the economy. I
show that under this set up, borrowing constraints have general equilibrium effects that
operate via four channels; borrowers’ collateral value, savers’ portfolio reallocation,
wage adjustments, and wealth effects due to changes in firms’ profits.
JEL Codes: E21, E44
1
1.1 Introduction
The basic New Keynesian model has become the workhorse for analyzing and understanding the
effects of different monetary policy interventions in the macroeconomy. Various authors have ex-
tensively studied the macroeconomic implications of the monetary authority in simple versions of
the New Keynesian model, which includes authors such as Christiano and Evans (2005), Clarida,
Galı´ and Gertler (2000), Galı´ (2008), Woodford (2001), and Woodford (2003), just to mention a
few.
However, after the 2008 financial crisis, several authors have brought into attention some short-
comings of the original simple New Keynesian framework. This literature has come to emphasize
the increasing importance of the financial sector in the macroeconomy; the interactions between the
financial sector and monetary policy can no longer be ignored.
Motivated by these observations, I provide a theoretical illustration of the effect of financial
frictions on equilibrium outcomes within a simple two-period, two-sector, standard New Keynesian
model. The model features two types of agents who differ on their degree of patience, durable and
non-durable consumption goods, nominal pricing frictions a` la Calvo in the production sector of
each good, a nominal bond, and a monetary authority which is introduced via a Taylor rule. The
financial friction is introduced as a collateral constraint that limits borrowing via the nominal bond;
the relatively more impatient agents must use the durable good as collateral to back their borrowing.
I show that borrowing constraints have general equilibrium effects that operate via four chan-
nels; borrowers’ collateral value, savers’ portfolio reallocation, wage adjustments, and wealth ef-
fects due to change in firms’ profits. When the constraint is binding, the no-constraint allocation is
no longer feasible for the less patient agents (borrowers). The adjustment in their allocation affects
firms’ profits. To the extent that the more patient agents (savers) have some ownership of the firms,
the change in profits generates a wealth effect; they too must adjust their allocation. Given the ad-
justment in both agents’ allocations, the wage rate, relative durable price, and nominal interest rate
adjust as well to ensure markets clear.
For the borrowers, the general equilibrium price changes are relatively unimportant; they adjust
their allocation mostly to ensure it is feasible given the constraint. However, for the savers, the
general equilibrium price changes lead to a significant adjustment in their allocation. For instance,
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the adjustment in firms’ profits, the durable’s relative price, and the nominal interest rate are respon-
sible for the savers’ increase in the initial period’s durable consumption. Furthermore, this increase
in savers’ durable consumption is the main driver of the increase in the initial period’s aggregate
durable output.
Thus, the main takeaway of the chapter is really simple; the credit constraint (and financial
frictions for that matter) have important indirect general equilibrium effects. Furthermore, this
indirect general equilibrium effects are not only important to the extent that they affect individual
agents in the economy; they can also have an impact on aggregate outcomes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 specifies in detail each of the com-
ponents of the model. In Section 1.3 the model’s equilibrium is defined and a characterization of
the equilibrium solution is presented. Section 1.4 presents the main results of the paper. It first pro-
vides a theoretical characterization of the partial equilibrium effects of the credit constraint and then
provides a numerical characterization of the general equilibrium effects. Finally, the concluding
remarks are presented in Section 1.5.
1.2 Model
The basic framework consists of a two-period, two-sector, New Keynesian model with price ad-
justments as in Calvo (1983). The economy is populated by two types of agents who differ along
three key dimensions: their degree of patience, the ownership of firms, and their ability to access the
financial market. Agents work, consume, and accumulate wealth using two instruments; a durable
good and a nominal risk free bond. The agents with the smallest time preference discount parameter
(borrowers), face a collateral credit constraint on their nominal debt holdings.1 The agents with the
largest time preference discount parameter (savers) can freely access the financial market.2 The
savers are the owners of the firms that produce the intermediate varieties. The intermediate firms
use labor as the only input in production. There are two final consumption goods, durables and
non-durables, which are produced using the intermediate varieties. Monetary policy is conducted
through a nominal interest rate rule of the type first introduced by Taylor (1993). Finally, I assume
1This constraint is of the type proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
2Note that despite the use of the terms borrowers and savers, both types of agents can choose to borrow or save using
a nominal bond. I use this terminology given that in the model’s solution the more patient agents will lend resources to
the impatient agents.
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there are no aggregate stochastic shocks.
1.2.1 Producers of Final Goods
Denote the consumption goods by j ∈ {c, d}; where c stands for non-durable good and d for
durable. Firms in sector j operate under a perfectly competitive environment. For each period
t ∈ {0, 1}, a firm in sector j produces the final good using as inputs a continuum of differentiated
goods; which it buys from the intermediate firms. Let these intermediate goods be indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]; yj,t(i) is the ith intermediate variety to be used in the production of the consumption
good Yj,t at period t. The price a producer must pay for the intermediate variety yj,t(i) is just
Pj,t(i).
All firms within sector j have access to the same technology, which is given by the CES pro-
duction function
Yj,t =
(∫ 1
0
yj,t(i)
j−1
j di
) j
j−1
, (1.2.1)
where j > 1 is the sector specific elasticity of substitution between differentiated varieties. Firms
sell the final good Yj,t to the borrower and the saver at price Pj,t.3 Therefore, for a firm producing
the final good for sector j, the profits at period t are given by:
ΠFj,t = Pj,tYj,t −
∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)yj,t(i)di (1.2.2)
For each t ∈ {0, 1}, given the consumption good prices {Pj,t} and the intermediate varieties
prices {Pj,t(i)}i∈[0,1], a firm producing the final good Yj,t must solve the problem of choosing the
intermediate varieties
{
yj,t(i) ≥ 0
}
i∈[0,1]
to maximize (1.2.2) subject to (1.2.1).
1.2.2 Producers of Intermediate Goods
There is a continuum of mass one of intermediate firms. Each intermediate firm manufactures a
different variety to be used in the production of the final consumption good of sector j. Let these
firms be indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]; then yj,t(i) refers to the intermediate variety manufactured by firm i
used in the production of consumption good j at period t.
3Note that from the firms’ perspective, this price is exogenous. The zero-profit condition that arises due the the
perfectly competitive environment is what determines the price index Pj,t.
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The only input in the production of varieties is labor. It is assumed that all intermediate firms
within sector j have access to the same production technology. Furthermore, to keep the analysis
tractable, such production technology is assumed to be linear in the labor input:
yj,t(i) = Ajnj,t(i), (1.2.3)
where Aj is a constant that measures the sectorial labor productivity.4 Since labor is perfectly
mobile across sectors, and given that the labor market is perfectly competitive, all intermediate firms
must pay the same nominal wage rateWt. Note also that, from the perspective of the individual firm,
this wage rate is exogenously given.
The intermediate firms operate under monopolistic competition; each firm chooses to charge a
price Pj,t(i) to the producers of the consumption good j given their demand for the variety yj,t(i).
However, it is assumed that there is a random variable, Sj ∼ Bernoulli (φj), which governs whether
firm i in sector j is able to charge its price optimally or if it must charge the same price it charged
the previous period.5 This random variable is i.i.d. across both, intermediate firms (i) and time
periods (t). Simply put, for any time period t, an intermediate firm within sector j may not reset its
price with probability φj .
Finally, solely for tractability purposes, it is assumed that the intermediate firms are entirely
owned by the savers and shares of these firms can not be traded. Given this assumption, the in-
termediate firms discount the future nominal profits at t = 1 using the savers’ nominal stochastic
discount factor:
Λs1 =
λs1
λs0
= βs
cs0
cs1
Pc,0
Pc,1
, (1.2.4)
where λst is the shadow price of a unit of the nominal asset for the savers at period t ∈ {0, 1}.6
Given this specification, for an intermediate firm i in sector j that is able to reset its price at the
4In the current analysis, this constant is set to one in both sectors: Ad = Ac = 1.
5As in Calvo (1983).
6This shadow price is obtained by taking the FOC’s of the saver’s problem.
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initial period, the present discounted value of the firm’s profits are given by:
ΠIj (i) = Pj,0(i)yj,0|0(i)−W0nj,0|0(i)
+ Λs1
{
φj
[
Pj,0(i)yj,1|0(i)−W1nj,1|0(i)
]
+ (1− φj)
[
Pj,1(i)yj,1|1(i)−W1nj,1|1(i)
]}
,
(1.2.5)
where yj,t|τ (i) is j sector’s demand for variety i at time t given the price set by the intermediate
firm at time τ ∈ {t, t− 1}. When τ = t, the demand reflects the fact that the firm is able to reset
its price at period t. When τ = t− 1, the demand for the variety is determined by the price the firm
charged the previous period (i.e. the firm can’t reset the price in the current period). Additionally,
nj,t|τ (i) refers to labor input needed to meet the demand yj,t|τ (i), as determined by the production
technology (1.2.3).
Given the nominal wage rates {W0,W1} and demand functions
{
yj,0|0(i), yj,1|0(i), yj,1|1(i)
}
,
an intermediate firm i in sector j chooses the optimal prices {Pj,0(i), Pj,1(i)} and labor inputs{
nj,0|0(i), nj,1|0(i), nj,1|1(i)
}
to maximize (1.2.5) given the production technology (1.2.3).
Note that conditional on being able to change the price at period t = 0, any two firms in sector
j face an identical problem. Therefore, all resetting firms within sector j choose the same optimal
price, Pj,t(i) ≡ P ∗j,t, ∀ i ∈ Υj,t; where Υj,t ⊂ [0, 1] denotes the set of firms in sector j that are able
to reset their price at period t. .
1.2.3 Borrowers and Savers
The economy is populated by two types of agents: borrowers and savers. Let a ∈ {b, s} denote
whether an agent is a saver (s) or a borrower (b). One of the main distinctions between these types
of agents is their time preference discount parameter; βs > βb. That is, savers are assumed to
be more patient than borrowers. As it will be discussed shortly, both types of agents are allowed
to borrow or lend via a nominal bond. I use the terminology borrowers and savers because the
more patient agents lend resources to the impatient agents through the nominal bond in the model’s
solution.7 The mass of agents of type a is denoted by Ωa, and the total population in the economy
is normalized to have mass 1; hence Ωs + Ωb = 1.
7This is under the baseline calibration.
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An agent of type a derives utility from consumption of the non-durable good (ca), the durable
good (da), and disutility from supplying work (na) to the intermediate firms. In supplying work,
the agent is limited by a fixed endowment of Ha units of time.8 I assume a utility function of the
form u (c, d, n) = α log (c)+(1− α) log (d)+νa (1 + θ)−1 n1+θ, where I set θ = 1 for tractability.
Therefore, the lifetime utility of an agent of type a is given by
Ua ≡ u(c0, d0, n0) + βa
[
u(c1, d1, n1) + κa log
(
(1− δ) d1
)]
. (1.2.6)
Since the storable nature of the durable good is not well captured in the two-period horizon, I
incorporate the last term in the lifetime utility (1.2.6) which is governed by the ad hoc parameter
κa. For any model with more than two periods (think for instance of an infinite horizon model),
the storability of the durable good implies that this good can potentially provide a utility flow every
period after it was initially acquired. In this sense, the parameter κa controls the agents’ incentive
to store durable good at the end of the second period. Additionally, this parameter is also important
for technical reasons. If the agents’ incentive to store durable good in the second period is not large
enough, aggregate output of the durable good at t = 1 might not be positive.
In order to finance the consumption of the durable and non-durable goods, agents have the fol-
lowing sources of income: a nominal wage rate per hour of labor supplied (W ), the share of profits
from ownership of the intermediate firms
(
Π̂a
)
, and the holdings of the undepreciated durable good
carried on from the previous period. Moreover, the agents have access to a nominal risk free bond
(B) which can be used to transfer resources intertemporally.
Given these sources of income, the nominal budget constraint that an agent of type a faces at
period t ∈ {0, 1} is given by:
Pc,tc
a
t + Pd,t
(
dat − (1− δ) dat−1
)
+Rt−1Bat−1 = B
a
t +Wtn
a
t + Π̂
a
t , (1.2.7)
where Pc,t and Pd,t refer to the price index of non-durable and durable goods, respectively, and δ is
the depreciation rate of the durable good. The nominal rate on borrowing/lending bond contracts,
agreed upon at time t − 1, is denoted by Rt−1. Note that since it is assumed that labor is perfectly
8In the current model, it is assumed that both types of agents are identical in their total time endowment: Hs = Hb.
Furthermore, this total time endowment is normalized to one.
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mobile across the two productions sectors, the nominal wage rate is the same regardless of the sector
to which the agent supplies her labor.
I assume that agents can not endogenously trade shares of their ownership of the intermediate
firms. In particular, I assume that borrowers don’t own shares of the intermediate firms. Savers are
the sole owners and each of them has an equal share. With this in mind, let Saj (i) denote the share
of firm i in sector j owned by agent of type a, so that
Sbj (i) ≡ Sbj = 0, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
Ssj (i) ≡ Ssj =
1
Ωs
, ∀i ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, the share of profits from ownership of the firms for an agent of type a in period t can be
written as
Π̂at =
∑
j∈{c,d}
(
Saj Π
I
j,t
)
. (1.2.8)
Finally, although borrowers and savers both have access to the nominal bond market, I assume
that the extent to which each of the them has access is different. While nominal lending is unre-
stricted for both agents (i.e. Bat can be as large as agent a desires); nominal borrowing is restricted.
Neither type of agent can borrow in the second period (Ba1 ≥ 0).9 However, savers can borrow
as much as they want in the initial period while borrowers face a collateral constraint of the type
proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). In principle, such borrowing limit is motivated by the ob-
servation that the relatively less patient agents are more likely to default on their debt. The provision
of collateral results in enough incentive for the borrowers to endogenously choose to repay the debt
according to the contract. The particular form of the constraint is given by
R0B
b
0 ≤ (1− χ) (1− δ) db0 Pd,1. (1.2.9)
For a borrower’s loan amount, Bbt , the left side of the inequality is just the repayment amount that is
due at period t = 1. The expression to the right of the inequality sign is the collateral requirement.
The agent is allowed to pledge only a fraction (1− χ) of its holdings of the non-depreciated durable
9This is just a technicality given the two-period nature of the model.
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good as collateral. However, what is important for the provision of collateral is not the amount of
the durable good that the agent holds, but its market value db0 Pd,1. The constraint then simply
requires that the repayment value of a given loan does not exceed the collateral’s market value in
the repayment period.
With this specification, given initial durable good holdings
{
da−1
}
, nominal bond holdings{
R−1Ba−1
}
, prices of the consumptions goods {Pc,0, Pd,0, Pc,1, Pd,1}, nominal wage rates {W0,W1},
interest rate {R0}, and intermediate firms’ profits
{
ΠIc,0,Π
I
d,0,Π
I
c,1,Π
I
d,1
}
; an agent of type a must
solve the problem of choosing non-durable good consumption {ca0, ca1}, durable good consump-
tion {da0, da1}, labor supplied
{
na0, n
1
1
}
, and nominal bond holdings {Bat }, to maximize the lifetime
utility (1.2.6) subject to the budget constraint (1.2.7), the time endowment nat ∈ [0, Ha], and the
borrowing constraints (1.2.9) (only for agents of type borrower).
1.2.4 Monetary Authority
I assume that monetary policy is conducted via an interest rate rule of the type proposed by Taylor
(1993). Given a nominal interest rate target R˜ and inflation target p˜i, the monetary authority follows
the interest rate rule given by
Rt
R˜
=
pit
p˜i

φpi
zt, (1.2.10)
where Rt is the interest rate on nominal bond contracts and pit is a composite inflation index that
weights the inflation in the durable
(
pid,t ≡ Pd,tPd,t−1
)
and non-durable
(
pic,t ≡ Pc,tPc,t−1
)
sectors ac-
cording to pit = pi
γ
c,tpi
1−γ
d,t . The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) controls the relative weight that the monetary
authority gives to each of the two sectors in the economy.10
Furthermore, I assume that the interest rule follows the Taylor principle with φpi > 1. I impose
this assumption given that it is standard in the literature; where it is used for two main reasons. First,
the empirical evidence suggests that the failure of the monetary authority to follow this principle
has led to episodes of greater macroeconomic instability in the US.11 Second, the Taylor principle
usually arises as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique stable solution in
10For the baseline model, γ is set to 0.5 so that the monetary authority weights the two sectors equally.
11See Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galı´ and Gertler (2000).
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a class of infinite horizon New Keynesian forward looking models.12
The component zt captures some of the exogenous factors to which the monetary authority
might react. In my model, this component is deterministic and follows the process
log (z0) = 
z
0
log (z1) = ρ log (z0)
Note that z0 is known to the agents and firms in the initial period when they make their optimal
decisions.
Finally, given the two-period nature of the model, the nominal interest rate in the last period
(R1) plays no role in the agents’ decisions. Therefore, I assume it is fixed and set R1 = 1 for
convenience.
1.3 Solution
Since the goal of the chapter is to understand how credit constraints affect the equilibrium outcome
within this New Keynesian framework, I consider two versions of the model outlined in Section
1.2. The first version refers to the economy exactly as described in Section 1.2 and is denoted by
E = C; where C stands for constrained. The second version just assumes that the borrowers do not
face credit constraints and is denoted by E = NC; where NC stands for non-constrained.
1.3.1 Agents’ Optimization Problems
Let E ∈ {NC,C} denote whether we are considering an economy without credit constraints (NC)
or an economy with credit constraints (C), a ∈ {s, b} denote an agent’s type, j ∈ {c, d} denote a
firm’s sector, and t ∈ {0, 1} denote the period.
12See Woodford (2001) and Woodford (2003).
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For an agent of type a the problem can be formulated as
max
{cat ,bat ,dat ,nat }1t=0
u(ca0, d
a
0, n
a
0) + βa
[
u(ca1, d
a
1, n
a
1) + κa log
(
(1− δ) da1
)]
(1.3.1)
s.t. cat + qt
(
dat − (1− δ) dat−1
)
= bat + ωc,tn
a
t −Rt−1bat−1pi−1c,t + Πat
R0b
b
0 ≤ (1− χ) (1− δ) q0pid,1db0, if E = C
cat , d
a
t , n
a
t , b
a
1 ≥ 0
where the budget and credit constraints are written in real terms. Therefore, bt ≡ BtPc,t denotes bond
holdings in non-durable units, ωc,t ≡ WtPc,t is the real wage rate in non-durable units, Πt ≡ Π̂tPc,t are
real profits in non-durable units, and qt ≡ Pd,tPc,t is the relative price of durables.
Similarly, for an intermediate firm, the problem can be written as
Period t = 0 : Πj,0 = max
pˆj,0≥0
{
Yj,0Pj,0 (pˆj,0)
−j
[
(pˆj,0 − ωj,0) + βsφjDjpijj,1pi−1c,1 (pˆj,0 − ωj,1pij,1)
]}
(1.3.2)
Period t = 1 : Πj,1 = max
pˆj,1≥0
{
Yj,1Pj,1 (pˆj,1)
−j (pˆj,1 − ωj,1)
}
where pˆj,t ≡ P
∗
j,t
Pj,t
is the relative price chosen by the resetting firms, ωj,t ≡ WtPj,t is the real wage rate
in units of j sector’s good, and Dj ≡ c
s
0
cs1
(
Yj,0
Yj,1
)−1
is a factor that captures the firm’s intertemporal
discounting.
For both of the economies E ∈ {NC,C}, the solutions to the problems (1.3.1) and (1.3.2)
are completely characterized by the first order conditions. To see this, note that the utility function
u (c, d, n) is concave and satisfies the Inada conditions limc→0 uc (c, d, n) =∞ and limd→0 ud (c, d, n) =
∞. Additionally, the constraints are continuously differentiable convex functions, so that the first
order conditions (FOC’s) are necessary and sufficient to characterize an interior solution to (1.3.1).
Similarly, it can be easily seen that the objective functions in (1.3.2) are strictly concave in pˆj,t
and the only constraint is the non-negativity constraint. Hence, the FOC’s associated with these
problems are also necessary and sufficient to characterize the solution.
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1.3.2 Aggregate Variables
In addition to the aggregate sectorial output (Yj,t), price index (Pj,t), and inflation (pij,t); one can
define two additional aggregate variables: sectorial labor employed (Nj,t) and sectorial price dis-
persion (∆j,t).
For each period t ∈ {0, 1}, aggregate labor employed in sector j is given by
Nj,t ≡
∫ 1
0
nj,t(i) di
Nj,t = Yj,t
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
di, (1.3.3)
where the second expression follows given an intermediate firm’s production function and the final
producer’s demand for variety yj,t(i). Equation (1.3.3) states that one can think of a representative
firm in each sector. This representative firm produces the final sectorial good using aggregate labor
according to a production function of the form
Yj,t = ∆
−1
j,t ·Nj,t,
where
∆j,t ≡
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
di. (1.3.4)
Note that ∆j,t is a measure of sectorial price dispersion; it captures the extent to which the
price of each intermediate variety i deviates from the sectorial price index. For the remainder of
the paper, equation (1.3.3) will be called the aggregate production function and (1.3.4) the sectorial
price dispersion.
In light of the price adjustment friction in the intermediate sectors, the inflation index and price
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dispersion can be written as
∆Pj ,t =
∫
Υj,t
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
di+
∫
[0,1]\Υj,t
 Pj,t
Pj,t−1(i)

j
di
pi
1−j
j,t =
∫
Υj,t
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t−1

1−j
di+
∫
[0,1]\Υj,t
Pj,t−1(i)
Pj,t−1

1−j
di;
where Υj,t ⊂ [0, 1] refers to the set of resetting firms. These two expressions summarize the
aggregate price dynamics of the economy. They relate the relevant aggregate pricing variables in
the current period to the distribution of intermediate firms’ prices in the previous period.
Given the i.i.d. nature of the stochastic price resetting process and the observation that all
resetting firms face the same problem so that Pj,t(i) ≡ P ∗j,t, ∀ i ∈ Υj,t, the previous expressions
can be manipulated to obtain the following
pi
1−j
j,t = (1− φj)
 pˆj,t
pij,t

1−j
+ φj (1.3.5)
∆j,t =
[
(1− φj)−1
(
1− φjpij−1j,t
)j]1/(j−1)
+ φjpi
j
j,t∆j,t−1, (1.3.6)
where pˆj,t ≡ P
∗
j,t
Pj,t
. Note that although the set of resetting firms is random, the measure of such set is
deterministic and equal to 1−φj . With this in mind, equation (1.3.5) just states that a measure φj of
firms doesn’t contribute to inflation (as they are unable to reset their price). The remaining measure
1 − φj contributes to inflation whenever their adjusted price differs from the previous period price
index. Equation (1.3.6) summarizes the price dispersion dynamics for the economy. The current
period price dispersion depends on two additively separable factors. First, on the price chosen by
the firms that can change their price. Second, for the firms that are unable to reset their price, their
contribution to the current price dispersion depends on the previous period price dispersion.
Aggregate nominal profits for the intermediate firms in sector j can be compactly written as
ΠIj,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t(i)yj,t(i)−Wtnj,t(i)
)
di = Pj,tYj,t −WtNj,t. (1.3.7)
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Again, in terms of profits, one can think of a representative firm in each sector which inherits the
linear production technology from the individual firms. It produces the final good and sells it at the
aggregate price; the only input for production is aggregate labor, which must be compensated by
the nominal wage rate.
1.3.3 Equilibrium Concept
Consider the economy E ∈ {NC,C}. Given the initial monetary policy response to exogenous
events (z0), the initial asset holdings
(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,d} and prices (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), the
equilibrium is given by sequences
(i) Agents’ allocations: AE ≡
{{
c Ea,t, d
E
a,t, n
E
a,t, b
E
a,0
}
a∈{s,b}
}1
t=0
(ii) Aggregate sectorial output and labor: GE ≡
{
Y Ec,t , Y
E
d,t , N
E
c,t, N
E
d,t
}1
t=0
(iii) Sectorial profits and prices: PE ≡
{{
Π Ej,t, pi
E
j,t,∆
E
j,t, ω
E
j,t, q
E
t , R
E
0
}
j∈{c,d}
}1
t=0
;
such that:
1. Agents Optimize: Given PE and
(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
, AE satisfies the FOC’s of (1.3.1) for a ∈
{s, b}.
2. Intermediate Firms Optimize: Given GE and PE, pˆj,t as defined by (1.3.5) satisfies the FOC’s
of (1.3.2) for j ∈ {c, d}.
3. Monetary Policy: Given
(
0z
)
, PE satisfies (1.2.10).
4. Law of Motion of Aggregate Prices: Given (∆c,−1,∆d,−1), PE satisfies (1.3.6).
5. Debt Market clears: Ωsb Es,0 + Ωbb
E
b,0 = 0
6. Labor Market clears for t ∈ {0, 1}: Ωsn Es,t + Ωbn Eb,t = N Ec,t +N Ed,t
7. Non-durable market clears for t ∈ {0, 1}: Yc,t = Ωscst + Ωbcbt
8. Durable market clears for t ∈ {0, 1}: Yd,t = Ωs
(
dst − (1− δ) dst−1
)
+Ωb
(
dbt − (1− δ) dbt−1
)
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1.4 Results
The following section presents the main results of the chapter. I start by summarizing the partial
equilibrium results of introducing the credit constraint in a series of theoretical propositions. Next,
I conduct a numerical exercise to illustrate these partial equilibrium results and to provide intuition
for the general equilibrium results.13
1.4.1 Partial Equilibrium: A Theoretical Analysis
The analysis that follows focuses on understanding how the equilibrium sequences AE, GE, and
PE change when going from an economy without credit constraints (E = NC) to one with credit
constraints (E = C). In order to have a meaningful comparison, one needs to ensure the existence
and uniqueness of a solution to the agents’ problems in each one of the two economies.
Proposition 1.1 Consider the economy without credit constraints (E = NC) for an agent of type
a ∈ {s, b}. Let the initial wealth holdings be given by (R−1ba−1, da−1). Suppose the prices
(pij,t, qj,t,∆j,t, ωj,t, R0) are such that R0 − (1− δ)pid,1 ≥ 0. Then a unique interior solution
to (1.3.1) exists which is consistent with the definition of Πat .
Proposition 1.1 states that as long as the return on real debt R0 is large enough relative to the
return on the stored durable good (1− δ)pid,0, a unique interior solution to the borrower’s / saver’s
problem exists. Intuitively, if the return on real debt is not large enough, the agents would rather
store wealth in the form of durable good. However, to the extent that the durable good is also a
substitute for the non-durable good, a large durable consumption can potentially lead to zero non-
durable consumption.
Proposition 1.2 Consider the economy with credit constraints (E = C) for an agent of type a ∈
{s, b}. Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 1.1 hold. Then an interior solution to (1.3.1)
exists which is consistent with the definition of Πat . If the borrowing constraint is non-binding, then
this solution is unique and it is the same one as for the economy without credit constraints.
For the solution where the borrowing constraint is binding, define
(a) P1 ≡ βb (1 + (1− α)κb),
13The proofs of the propositions are presented in Appendix A.1.
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(b) W a−1 ≡ q0 (1− δ) da−1 −R−1ba−1pi−1c,0 ,
(c) A1 ≡ χ−1
(
R0 (1− δ)−1 pi−1d,1 − 1
)
,
(d) A2 ≡ β−1b
(
ωc,1pi
−1
c,1R
−1
0
)2
(1 +A1)
2,
(e) A3 ≡ 4 ν−1b
(
ω2c,0 +A2
)
(1 + P1).
If P1 > 1, W b−1 ≥ 0, and
(
W b−1
)2 ≥ max{A3 − 8ν−1b ω2c,0 (1 + P1) , A3 (P 21 − 1)−1}; then this
binding-solution is unique.
Proposition 1.2 is the equivalent of Proposition 1.1 for the economy with credit constraints. Again,
as long as the return on real debt is large enough compared to the return on durable goods, an interior
solution exists where agents consume positive amounts of the durable and non-durable goods.
However, there are two additional sufficient conditions required for the uniqueness of the bor-
rower’s solution when the credit constraints are binding. First, the storable nature of the durable
good must be sufficiently attractive for the borrower; the condition P1 > 1 implies that κb must be
sufficiently large. Second, the borrower’s initial wealth W b−1 must be large enough to allow positive
consumption of the durable and non-durable goods given the borrowing constraint.
As it is clear from Proposition 1.2, the equilibrium allocation in the economy with credit con-
straints is the same as that for the economy without credit constraints whenever the borrowing
constraint is non-binding. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, the only non-trivial comparison
between the two economies arises for the case of a binding borrowing constraint. The next proposi-
tion establishes the conditions under which this is the case.
Proposition 1.3 Suppose that the conditions of Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Let Â
NC
, Ĝ
NC
, and
P̂
NC
denote the equilibrium agents’ allocation, aggregate output, and price sequences for an econ-
omy without credit constraints.
Define W b−1, P1, and A1 as in Proposition 1.2 and
(a) B1 ≡ β−1b
(
ωˆ NCc,1 pˆi
NC
c,1
(
Rˆ NC0
)−1)2
,
(b) B2 ≡ 4ν−1b
(
ωˆ NCc,0
2
+B1
)
(1 + P1),
(c) B3 ≡ 4ν−1b A1 (A1P1 − (1− α))−1B1 (1 + P1)2.
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Then Â
C 6= ÂNC, ĜC 6= ĜNC, and P̂C 6= P̂NC, if and only if W b−1 ≤ (B3 −B2)
(
2
√
B3
)−1
whenever A1P1 > (1− α).
Proposition 1.3 provides conditions for which the equilibrium of the economy with credit constraints
is different from that of the economy without credit constraints. From the previous discussion it is
clear that the two equilibriums are different as long as the credit constraint is binding. Hence, an
equivalent interpretation of Proposition 1.3 is that it provides conditions under which the credit con-
straint is binding. To understand the intuition underlying this proposition, note that the expression
A1P1 > (1− α) is equivalent to:
(1− α)P1
(1− χ)q0db0
bb0
− 1
 > (1− α)χ,
where I have used the fact that
(1− χ)q0db0
bb0
=
R0
(1− δ)pid,1 ≥ 1 (the last inequality follows from
the assumption in Proposition 1.1). The left hand side of the inequality can be interpreted as a
marginal cost of holding real debt given the binding constraint. The agent is now forced to hold
some durable good in the form of collateral. The term in brackets captures the value of collateral
durable holdings required per unit of real debt. In the second period, the agent uses this collateral to
repay the debt instead of consuming it to derive utility. The factor (1−α)P1 captures the discounted
marginal utility of durable consumption in the second period and its continuation value. Thus this
term represents the foregone marginal utility due to the binding constraint. The right hand side is
the marginal benefit of holding debt. For every additional unit of debt, the agent must now increase
her holdings of durable good, but only the fraction (1− χ) can be pledged as collateral while the
remaining fraction χ is consumed. The right hand side term captures the marginal utility associated
with this consumption.
Thus Proposition 1.3 states that, whenever the marginal cost of holding debt is larger than its
marginal benefit, the agent’s initial wealth holdings must be sufficiently low for the constraint to be
binding. The low initial wealth holdings provide enough incentive for the agent to acquire debt to
the point where the constraint becomes binding. When the marginal cost of holding debt is at most
equal to its marginal benefit, A1P1 ≤ (1− α), the agent will acquire debt to the point where the
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constraint is binding regardless of her initial wealth holdings.
To understand the effect that the binding constraint has on the economy’s equilibrium, I con-
duct the following thought experiment. Consider the economy without binding constraints, whose
equilibrium is given by the allocation Â
NC
, aggregate output Ĝ
NC
, and prices P̂
NC
. Suppose now
that the credit constraint for the borrowers is introduced. If the conditions of Proposition 1.3 hold,
we know
{
Â
NC
, Ĝ
NC
, P̂
NC}
is not an equilibrium of this economy. To see how this equilibrium
changes, I proceed in two steps. First, I consider the new partial equilibrium of the economy with
credit constraints given the aggregate variables Ĝ
NC
and prices P̂
NC
. That is, I focus on how the
borrowers’ allocation changes once the constraint is introduced assuming the prices and aggregate
output remain fixed. I denote this partial equilibrium allocation by A˜
C
. Next, I allow for general
equilibrium effects. That is, starting with the allocation A˜
C
, I study how it changes as prices adjust
in order for markets to clear. The resulting sequence
{
Â
C
, Ĝ
C
, P̂
C}
corresponds to the equilibrium
of the economy with (binding) credit constraints.
Proposition 1.4 summarizes the result from the first step in the procedure; the partial equilibrium
effects on the borrowers allocation when the credit constraint is introduced.
Proposition 1.4 Given P̂
NC
, suppose
(
cˆ NCb,t , dˆ
NC
b,t , nˆ
NC
b,t , bˆ
NC
b,0
)
∈ ÂNC ∈ is the borrower’s equi-
librium allocation. Let
(
c˜b,t, d˜b,t, n˜b,t, b˜b,0
)
∈ A˜C denote the corresponding borrower’s partial
equilibrium allocation in the economy with the binding constraint. Suppose that the assumptions of
Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Then
(a) d˜b,0 ≤ d NCb,0 , b˜b,0 ≤ b NCb,0 .
(b) c˜b,0 ≤ c NCb,0 , n˜b,0 ≥ n NCb,0
(c) c˜b,1 ≥ c NCb,1 , d˜b,1 ≥ d NCb,1 , n˜b,1 ≤ n NCb,1
The intuition behind Proposition 1.4 boils down to recognizing that the introduction of the credit
constraint has two effects; a wealth effect and a substitution effect.
Consider first the wealth effect on consumption. Given the prices and the binding credit con-
straint, for any level of durable good the borrower has access to less debt. Relative to the economy
without credit constraints, this implies that the borrower’s non-labor wealth in the initial period must
be smaller while the final period non-labor wealth must be larger. As consumption of the durable
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and non-durable goods is an increasing function of non-labor wealth, this would tend to decrease
overall consumption in the initial period while increasing it in the final period. This is the wealth
effect.
The substitution effect is a consequence of the restriction that a fraction χ ∈ (0, 1) of the
durable good cannot be pledged as collateral. Given that only a fraction of the durable good can be
collateralized, the relative price of the durable good is larger when the constraint is binding. For
the economy without credit constraints, the effective relative price of the durable good is given by
qNC0,eff ≡ q0
(
1− (1− δ)pid,1R−10
)
. For every unit of the durable, the borrower is giving up less
than q0 units of the non-durable. This is because the borrower can always sell the durable, net of
depreciation, at its market price in the next period an then transfer that wealth back to the current
period, via debt, and use it to buy non-durable. This is feasible since there is no financial frictions
and markets are complete. For the economy with a binding credit constraint, the effective relative
price of the durable good is now qC0,eff ≡ q0
(
1− (1− χ) (1− δ)pid,1R−10
)
. Again, for every unit
of durable the borrower gives up less than q0 units of the non-durable. However, when the borrower
tries to use debt to transfer the wealth gained by selling the non-depreciated durable in the next
period, he faces the constraint that for every unit of durable, he can only transfer back the fraction
(1− χ). Hence, when the constraint is binding, the borrower has an incentive to substitute durable
with non-durable consumption in the initial period as the durable good is now relatively more costly.
Thus the results in Proposition 1.4 (a) follow immediately. The wealth and substitution effects
imply consumption of the durable good in the initial period must decrease; it is both less affordable
and less attractive. In turn, this implies that the debt holdings also decrease as the constraint is
binding and less of the durable good is consumed. Note that these results are independent of the
functional form of the utility and they rely only on the assumption of monotonicity and concavity.
The remaining results (b) and (c) in Proposition 1.4 depend on the particular functional form
of the utility. For non-durable consumption and labor supplied in the initial period, the wealth
and substitution effects operate in opposite directions. Thus whether they increase or decrease
depends on which one of these two effects dominates. For the assumed log-linear and separable
utility function, the wealth effect is always dominant. Similarly, for the second period variables,
the wealth effect dominates so that the borrower is able to consume more of both, durable and
non-durable goods while working less hours.
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Having characterized how the borrower’s partial equilibrium allocation changes due to the bind-
ing credit constraint, I now turn to the general equilibrium effects. Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 introduce
two results that make it simpler to characterize the equilibrium prices and aggregate output for the
economy E ∈ {C,NC}.
Proposition 1.5 For the economy E and given the price vector PE satisfying ωc,t, R0, pi−1c,t > 0,
consider an allocation AE that solves the borrower’s and saver’s problems as given by (1.3.1). Let
ΩbR−1bb−1 + ΩsR−1bs−1 = 0. Then the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) Ωsns0 + Ωbn
b
0 = Nc,0 +Nd,0
(b) Ωsbs0 + Ωbb
b
0 = 0
(c) Ωsns1 + Ωbn
b
1 = Nc,1 +Nd,1
Proposition 1.5 states that if an allocation solves the agents’ problems, then it is an equilibrium
allocation if and only if it clears one of three markets: labor market in the initial period, labor market
in the final period, or debt market in the initial period. In terms of computing the equilibrium for the
economy E, this proposition is useful as it implies one only needs to ensure that one of these three
markets clears and then the other two will automatically clear. Proposition 1.6 takes advantage of
this result to characterize the equilibrium of the economy E as a function of only one element of the
price vector PE .
Proposition 1.6 Fix the initial state of the economy E given by z0, (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), and(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,b}. Then
(a) AE = AE (ωc,0)
(b) GE = GE (ωc,0)
(c) PE = PE (ωc,0)
Thus, in computing the equilibrium for the economy E, all the relevant variables can be written as a
functions of only the initial period’s real wage rate. In other words, computing the equilibrium boils
down to finding the real wage rate that clears the labor market in the initial period.
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It is clear that to understand the effect of the credit constraint, it suffices to focus on its effect on
the equilibrium real wage rate. To do so, I proceed in two steps. First, Proposition 1.7 establishes the
effect of the credit constraint on the initial period’s labor market. Second, Proposition 1.8 establishes
how the real wage rate must adjust to restore this labor market to equilibrium.
Proposition 1.7 Fix the initial state of the economy given by z0, (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), and(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,b}. Consider the equilibrium price vector P̂
NC
for the economy without credit
constraints. Let c˜b,0 be the optimal consumption of an agent of type borrower in the economy with
credit constraints given the prices P̂
NC
and denote by ζ˜b,0 ≥ 0 the corresponding credit constraint
multiplier.
Define:
(a) Q0 ≡ α−1 (1− α) RˆNC0
(
RˆNC0 − (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
)−1
(b) Qa1 ≡ α−1 (1− α)
[
βa (1 + κa)− (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
(
RˆNC0 − (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
)−1]
, for a ∈ {s, b}
(c) W s−1 ≡ Ω−1s (1− δ)
[
∆ˆNCd,0ωˆ
NC
c,0
(
Ωsd
s−1 + Ωbdb−1
)− qˆNC0 Ωbdb−1]−R−1bs−1 (pˆiNCc,0)−1
(d) KaR ≡ 1 +Q0 + βa +Qa1, for a ∈ {s, b}
(e) KaC ≡ ωˆNCc,0
[
∆ˆNCc,0 +
(
qˆNC0
)−1
∆ˆNCd,0Q0
]
+ ωˆNCc,1
[
∆ˆNCc,1βa +
(
qˆNC1
)−1
∆ˆNCd,1Q
a
1
]
, for a ∈ {s, b}
(f) Ac,t ≡
(
1− ωˆNCc,t ∆ˆNCc,t
)
(g) Ad,t ≡
(
qˆNCt − ωˆNCc,t ∆ˆNCd,t
)
(h) Bζ ≡ α−1RˆNC0 c˜b,0ζ˜b,0
(i) Dζ ≡ α−1χ (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
(
RˆNC0 − (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
)−1
c˜b,0ζ˜b,0
(j) ∆K,d0 ≡ (1−Dζ)−1Dζ
(
qˆNC0
)−1
Q0
(
Ad,0 −
(
RˆNC0
)−1
pˆiNCc,1 (1− δ)Ad,1
)
(k) ∆K,c1 ≡ (1−Bζ)−1Bζ βb
[
Ac,1 +
(
α qˆNC1
)−1
(1− α) (1 + κb)Ad,1
]
(l) ∆K ≡ ∆K,d0 + ∆K,c1
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Finally, let NC0 (ωc,0) ≡ NCc,0 (ωc,0) + NCd,0 (ωc,0) −
[
Ωsn
C
s,0 (ωc,0) + Ωbn
C
b,0 (ωc,0)
]
denote the
initial period’s excess labor demand for the economy with credit constraints as a function of the
real wage rate.
Then
1. Case 1: If cˆNCb,0 ≥ c˜b,0
(
KbR −KbC
)−1 (
KbR −KbC + ∆K
)
=⇒ NC0
(
ωˆNCc,0
) ≤ 0.
2. Case 2: If cˆNCb,0 < c˜b,0
(
KbR −KbC
)−1 (
KbR −KbC + ∆K
)
=⇒ NC0
(
ωˆNCc,0
) ≤ 0 whenever
κs large enough and W
s
−1 ≥ Ω−1s cˆNCb,0
[
ΩsK
s
C + Ωb
(
KbC −KbR
)]
.
Proposition 1.7 states that, under certain conditions, the introduction of the credit constraint re-
sults in excess labor supplied at the equilibrium wage rate of the economy without credit constraints,
ωˆNCc,0 . The particular conditions are related to how the intermediate firms’ profits change once the
credit constraint is introduced. As the borrowers adjust their allocation, the intermediate firms must
adjust their production to meet demand, thus affecting profits. Given the assumption that the inter-
mediate firms are solely owned by the savers, the change in profits induces a wealth effect which
results in a change in the savers’ allocation. The extent to which the savers adjust their allocation
depends on the sign and size of the change in profits. The conditions of Proposition 1.7 ensure that
there is excess labor supplied even in the event in which the profit change induces savers to decrease
their labor supplied.
To understand the nature of the conditions imposed in Proposition 1.7, note first that the change
in profits has two components: the intensive and extensive margins. The intensive margin refers
to the change in profits per unit of non-durable consumption. The extensive margin alludes to the
change in profits due to the total change of non-durable consumption by the borrower. The net effect
on profits is determined by the combination of these two margins.
In terms of the intensive margin, an intermediate firm’s real profits for selling one unit of good
j ∈ {c, d} at period t are given by Aj,t, where ωc,t∆j,t denotes the real unit cost of good j. Now,
think of an economy without credit constraints where an agent of type a consumes the optimal
amounts of ca0, d
a
0, c
a
1, and d
a
1. That is, the borrower consumesR0pi
−1
c,1βb units of c
b
1 and q
−1
0 Q0 units
of db0 per unit of c
b
0. Given this optimal behavior, for every unit of c
a
0 the agent consumes, the non-
durable sector makes a real revenue of 1 and βb in each period while the durable sector makes a real
revenue of Q0 and Qa1. Therefore, K
a
R refers to the revenue (per unit of non-durable) generated by
22
the intermediate firms when an agent of type a behaves optimally. Similarly, KaC refers to the firms’
cost (per unit of non-durable) when supplying the optimal allocation to an agent of type a. That is,
for every unit of non-durable that an agent consumes, the intermediate firms’ total real profits in the
economy without credit constraints are given by TNCa ≡ KaR −KaC .
Consider next an economy with credit constraints where, again, an agent of type a behaves opti-
mally. For the agents of type borrower, the constraint introduces new tradeoffs in their consumption
decision. The variables 1 ≥ Dζ , Bζ ≥ 0 capture these new tradeoffs. With the constraint, the bor-
rower consumes (1−Dζ)−1R0pi−1c,1βb units of cb1 and (1−Bζ)−1 q−10 Q0 units of db0 per unit of cb0;
the constraint increases the borrowers per unit consumption of both goods. Given this change in con-
sumption, ∆K,c1 and ∆K,d0 denote the change in per unit profits in each sector when agents behave
optimally. It is clear that ∆K,c1 ≥ 0 but ∆K,d0 might be positive or negative, depending on how bor-
rowers reallocate durable consumption between the initial and final periods when the constraint is
introduced. Thus, for every unit of non-durable that the borrower consumes, the intermediate firms’
total real profits in the economy with credit constraints are given by TCb ≡ KbR −KbC + ∆K .14
While the intensive margin might result in an increase or decrease in profits per unit of non-
durable consumption, the extensive margin is always negative. From Proposition 1.4, introducing
the constraint decreases non-durable consumption for the borrowers, c˜b,0 ≤ cˆNCb,0 , thus implying a
decrease in profits for the intermediate firms. The total effect on profits is given by the combination
of these two margins. For the economy without credit constraints, the total real profits are TNC · cˆNCb,0 ;
while for the economy with credit constraints they are TCb · c˜b,0.
Case 1 in Proposition 1.7 refers to the situation where total profits decrease when the constraint
is introduced, TNC · cˆNCb,0 ≥ TCb · c˜b,0. This situation can arise in two scenarios. First, when the
intensive and extensive margins both decrease total profits (i.e. ∆K ≤ 0). Second, when the in-
tensive margin increases profits (i.e. ∆K > 0) but the extensive margin dominates. As profits
decrease, the wealth effect in the saver’s allocation implies a decrease in her non-durable consump-
tion
(
c˜s0 ≤ cˆNCs,0
)
and an increase in her labor supplied
(
n˜s0 ≥ nˆNCs,0
)
. Hence, at the prices P̂
NC
, both
agents want to consume less and are willing to work more; resulting in excess supply in the initial
period’s labor market.
Case 2 in Proposition 1.7 refers to the situation where total profits increase, TNC ·cˆNCb,0 < TCb ·c˜b,0.
14For the savers, the partial equilibrium allocation does not change, hence TNCs = T Cs .
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This situation happens only if the intensive margin increases profits (i.e. ∆K > 0) and it dominates
the extensive margin. Larger profits imply a larger lifetime wealth for the saver; which results
in larger consumption
(
c˜s0 ≥ cˆNCs,0
)
and smaller labor supplied
(
n˜s0 ≤ nˆNCs,0
)
. At the prices P̂
NC
,
the two types of agents have now opposite reactions to the introduction of the credit constraint.
The aggregate result is an excess supply of labor as long as the savers have a large enough sav-
ings motive (κs) and initial wealth
(
W
s
−1
)
. For large enough κs, most of the increase in the
saver’s lifetime wealth translates into an adjustment in future consumption and labor supplied
rather than in the current ones. The condition that the savers’ initial wealth is large enough,
W
s
−1 ≥ Ω−1s cˆNCb,0
[
ΩsK
s
C + Ωb
(
KbC −KbR
)]
, ensures that changes in profits account only for a
small portion of lifetime wealth, hence leading to small adjustments in consumption and labor sup-
plied. Given these two conditions, the increase in savers’ current consumption is moderate relative
to the borrowers’ decrease; the result is a decrease in aggregate consumption and hence in labor
demanded. Similarly, the decrease in savers’ current labor supplied is moderate relative to the bor-
rowers’ increase; the result is an increase in aggregate labor supplied. Thus these two conditions
are enough to guarantee an excess of labor supplied in the initial period at the prices P̂
NC
.
This concludes the partial equilibrium analysis. The immediate question is, how do prices
(specifically the wage rate) adjust in order to reestablish equilibrium in the labor market? The
following section provides a numerical exercise in order to illustrate this general equilibrium effects.
1.4.2 General Equilibrium: A Numerical Exercise
The following section illustrates the general equilibrium effects of introducing the credit constraint.
I first show that the theoretical Propositions 1.3 - 1.7 made in Section 1.4.1 hold in this numerical
exercise. I then proceed to illustrate the price adjustments that take place in order to bring markets
back to equilibrium. Finally, I end the section by showing the effect that the price adjustments have
on the agents’ equilibrium allocations and in aggregate output.
Calibration
The numerical exercise is conducted for a range of monetary policy shocks z0 ∈ [−1, 1]. This shock
is measured in percentage points of the nominal interest rate. Hence, z0 ∈ [−1, 1] refers to a z0
percentage points surprise decrease/increase of the nominal interest rate.
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Table 1.1: Table of Parameter Values and Initial State
Calibrated Arbitrary Initial State
Parameter Value Parameter Value Variable Value
βs 0.99 βb 0.98 R−1bb−1 3.10
δ 0.01 θ 1.00 R−1bs−1 −3.10
νs 4.92 φpi 1.50 d
b−1 4.40
νb 8.23 ρ 0.50 d
s−1 8.88
j 5.00 γ 0.50 q−1 1.00
χ 0.29 κb 12.45 ∆c,−1 1.00
α 0.69 κs 76.75 ∆d,−1 1.00
φc 0.75
φd 0.50
The model’s parameters are calibrated by imposing that several key moments match their empir-
ical counterparts.15 Table 1.1 summarizes the corresponding parameter values and the initial state
of the economy. The empirical targets are based on quarterly data for the U.S. economy. The annual
interest rate is targeted at 3%, which implies that βs = 0.99. The annual depreciation rate of the
durable good is set at 4%, which pins down the value of δ = 0.01. Both types of agents are assumed
to supply one third of their total time endowment (normalized to one); which implies labor disutility
parameters of νs = 4.92 and νb = 8.23. The other preference parameter, α = 0.69, is calibrated
so that the total share of private spending on the durable good is 20%. The parameter χ = 0.29,
which controls the fraction of the durable good that can be pledged as collateral, is determined by
requiring a loan-to-value ratio of 70% for the borrowers.
On the production side, φj is chosen to match the average price adjustment frequencies in the
durable and non-durable sectors. I assume that the durable sector can adjust prices more frequently,
with an average adjustment frequency of two quarters. The non-durable sector adjusts its prices
every four quarters.16 Therefore, φc = 0.75 and φd = 0.5. In addition, and to simplify the analysis,
both sectors are assumed to have the same price markup, which is set at 20%, implying that c =
d = 5.
The rest of the parameters are fixed at arbitrarily chosen values. I only consider the symmetric
case where the mass of borrowers and savers in the economy is equal Ωs = Ωb = 0.5. Following
15The moments used for the calibration correspond to the deterministic steady state of the infinite horizon version of
the model. Refer to Chapter 2 for the complete specification of this infinite horizon version of the model.
16This is somewhat arbitrary. There is no clear consensus in the price stickiness literature as to which sector is
relatively more sticky.
25
Krusell and Smith (1998), the preference discount factor for the borrowers is set to βb = 0.98. It
is also assumed that the monetary authority weights the durable and non-durable sectors equally
when computing the composite inflation index, so that γ = 0.5. To satisfy the Taylor principle, I set
φpi = 1.5. Finally, the persistence of the monetary policy shock is given by ρ = 0.5. This is perhaps
the only parameter value that is not within the range of standard values in the literature. In order
to match some second moments of the data, the persistence of the monetary policy shock is usually
much larger, ρ ∼ 0.95. However, the value of this parameter does not significantly impact the goal
of the chapter; highlighting the mechanisms by which credit constraints alter the equilibrium of this
economy.
Finally, the initial wealth distribution and prices are held fixed at the steady state levels for the
infinite horizon version of the model. Thus the parameters κb = 12.45 and κs = 76.75 are set in
order to ensure that the equilibrium of the two period baseline economy is as close as possible this
steady state.
Partial Equilibirum
In what follows, I define the baseline economy as the economy with credit constraint (E = C) and
with no monetary policy shock (z0 = 0). All the comparison and figures are done relative to this
baseline case.
Figures 1.1 - 1.2 illustrate the percentage deviation from the baseline economy for the bor-
rower’s and saver’s allocations as a function of the monetary policy shock. Each figure has three
lines corresponding to the equilibrium of the economy with credit constraints (the blue line labeled
“Credit Constraint”), the equilibrium of the economy without credit constraints (the green line la-
beled “No Constraint”), and the partial equilibrium of the economy with credit constraints given the
equilibrium prices of the economy without credit constraints (the red line labeled “Partial Equilib-
rium”). Thus the figures decompose the effect of the credit constraints into the partial equilibrium
effect (going from the “No Constraint” to the “Partial Equilibrium”) and the general equilibrium
effect (going from the “Partial Equilibrium” to the “Credit Constraint”).
The partial equilibrium effect of the credit constraint for the borrower’s allocation is summarized
in Figure 1.1. Given the current parameterization, the borrower’s initial wealth
(
W b−1
)
is sufficiently
small and the conditions of Proposition 1.3 hold. For any level of the monetary policy shock, the
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Figure 1.1: Borrower’s Allocation
credit constraint is binding. The extent to which the constraint is binding is illustrated in the panel
labeled “bb0”. Roughly speaking, the difference between the debt holdings in an economy with and
without credit constraints is about 20% of the baseline level of debt.
As stated in Proposition 1.4, the binding constraint introduces two effects. First, a wealth effect
due the borrower’s reduced ability to transfer wealth. Second, a substitution effect given the larger
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effective price of the durable good. The combination of these two effects determines the partial
equilibrium change in the borrower’s allocation. For the initial period’s durable good, both effects
complement each other leading to a large decrease in consumption, as show in the panel “db0”. For
the remaining variables, the wealth and substitution effects oppose each other; however, the wealth
effect dominates. In terms of consumption, this implies a decrease in the initial period’s non-durable
consumption (panel “cb0”) and an increase in consumption of both types of goods in the final period
(panels “cb1” and “d
b
1”). In terms of the labor supplied, the wealth effect leads to a decrease in the
final period’s labor supplied and an increase in current labor supplied, as evinced in panels “nb1” and
“nb0”.
From Proposition 1.7, the change in the borrower’s partial equilibrium allocation affects the
intermediate firms’ profits via two margins. The intensive margin, which in the current case leads
to an increase in the profits per unit of non-durable good sold to the borrower; and the extensive
margin, which tends to decrease the firms profits as the borrowers decrease their consumption of
non-durable good. For the current parameterization, the dominant effect is that of the intensive
margin; the saver’s non-labor lifetime wealth increases due to the increase in intermediate firms’
profits.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the effect of this increase in lifetime wealth on the saver’s allocation. The
consumption of the durable and non-durable goods increases in both periods, as shown in panels
“cs0”, “d
s
0”, “c
s
1” and “d
s
1”. This increase in consumption is rather homogeneous across all variables
and amounts to about 1% of their respective baseline levels. As for the labor supplied, panels “ns0”
and “ns1” show that the saver works less in both periods when the credit constraint is introduced.
General Equilibrium: Effect on Prices
The general equilibrium price adjustments can be understood by analyzing the labor market in the
initial period. The model’s parameterization guarantees that the conditions of Proposition 1.7 hold.
That is, the saver’s initial wealth
(
W
s
−1
)
and durable continuation value (κs) are large enough to
ensure an excess supply in the initial period’s labor market.
Consider first the total aggregate labor demanded by the firms. For the non-durable sector,
the borrowers’ decrease in current consumption and the savers’ increase in current consumption are
roughly of about 1% of their respective baseline levels. Since the savers’ baseline consumption level
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Figure 1.2: Saver’s Allocation
is larger, this implies a modest increase in aggregate non-durable demand. In turn, this increase in
production must be met by a modest increase in the labor demanded by this sector. For the durable
sector, borrowers decrease durable consumption by about 15%. Savers, on the other hand, increase
their durable consumption by a modest 1%; the durable sector experiences a substantial decrease in
aggregate demand. This decrease in production implies a large decrease in the labor demanded by
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this sector. Overall, the total labor demanded by the firms in the initial period decreases.
Similarly, the change in total aggregate labor supplied depends on the relative size of the changes
in labor supplied by the borrowers and savers. Labor supplied increases by about 0.25% for the
borrowers and decreases by about 1% for the savers, both with respect to their baseline levels.
However, given the current parametrization, the baseline level of labor supplied by borrowers is
larger than that supplied by the savers. In the end, these adjustments lead to an increase in total
aggregate labor supplied.
Given the equilibrium wage rate of the economy without credit constraints
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
, the decrease
in aggregate labor demanded along with the increase in aggregate labor supplied imply an excess
supply of labor. In a nutshell (and as pointed out in Proposition 1.7), for large enough saver’s
durable continuation value and initial wealth, the changes in the initial period’s optimal allocation
of the savers are modest compared to the changes in the borrowers’ allocation. Thus the borrowers’
decrease in consumption and increase in labor supplied are responsible for the excess supply in the
labor market.
The resulting general equilibrium price adjustments are summarized in Figure 1.3. Consider first
the initial period real wage rate; it decreases in order to clear the labor market. This situation can be
clearly seen in the top-left panel labeled “wc,0”. Given the model’s assumptions, the aggregate labor
demand is downward slopping and the aggregate labor supply is upward slopping.17 Therefore, the
excess demand NC0 (ωˆc,0) is a decreasing function of the real wage rate. That is, the real wage rate
must decrease in order to eliminate the labor market’s excess supply generated by the introduction
of the credit constraint. Although I don’t provide any formal proof for this result, I summarize it in
the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1.8 Fix z0, (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), and
(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,b}. The equilibrium real wage
rate in units of the non-durable good decreases when introducing the credit constraint: ωˆCc,0 ≤ ωˆNCc,0 .
Consider next the remaining initial period prices (which are all shown in the left panel of Figure
1.3). The lower real wage rate implies smaller real costs for the initial period in both, durable
and non-durable production. Since intermediate firms optimally set their price as a fixed mark-up
over the present discounted marginal costs, they now set lower prices. Therefore, sectorial inflation
17At least in a neighborhood of the equilibrium wage rate of the economy without credit constraints, ωˆNCc,0 .
30
Figure 1.3: Price Adjustments
decreases in the initial period. The panels labeled “pic,0” and “pid,0” illustrate this decrease. It
is obvious from the figure that the decrease in inflation is larger in the durable sector. This is a
consequence of the assumption that this sector is more flexible than the non-durable one (φc > φd).
Finally, due to the larger decrease in durable inflation, the relative price q0 decreases.
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The general equilibrium effect on final period prices is illustrated in the right panels of Figure
1.3. The intuition for the adjustments is very similar to the initial period prices; a decrease in the
real wage rate (panel “wc,1”) leads to a decrease in prices in both sectors. Given the assumption that
durable sector is more flexible, this implies a decrease in the relative price of durables (panel “q1”).
From the previous discussion it is clear that the sectorial price levels decrease in both periods.
Therefore, the change in sectorial inflation depends on the relative size of these decreases between
periods. This relative size is determined by the assumptions that the monetary authority fixes the
interest rate R1 in the second period (which effectively implies perfect inflation targeting by fixing
the composite inflation index), and the assumption that the durable sector is more flexible. For the
non-durable sector, these assumptions imply that the second period price level decrease dominates;
thus non-durable inflation decreases when the credit constraint is introduced (panel “pic,1”). For the
durable sector, the dominant price level decrease occurs in the first period; hence durable inflation
increases as shown in panel “pid,1”. Finally, note that all the price adjustments are substantially
smaller in the second period, which is a consequence of the low persistence of the monetary shock.
General Equilibrium: Price Adjustment Effect on Agents’ Allocations
The adjustment of the borrowers’ and savers’ allocations to the general equilibrium price changes is
illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. In particular, the effect can be visualized as the difference between
the “Partial Equilibrium” (red) and “Binding Constraint” (blue) lines.
Consider first the borrowers’ initial period allocation, which is a function of the real value of
the inherited wealth, the initial period’s real wage rate, and the effective durable price.18 Thus the
general equilibrium price adjustments lead to income and substitution effects. The resulting income
effect is negative, driven by a decrease in both labor earnings and inherited wealth. On one hand, the
decrease in labor earnings is a consequence of the decrease in the initial period’s real wage rate. On
the other hand, the decrease in inherited wealth is due to two factors. First, the smaller non-durable
inflation in the initial period leads to an increase in the real value of the inherited debt obligations.
Second, the smaller relative price of the durable good implies a lower market value of the inherited
durable holdings. As for the substitution effects, they operate along two dimensions; substitution
18Recall that the effective durable price is defined as qC0,eff ≡ q0
(
1− (1− χ) (1− δ)pid,1R−10
)
for the borrowers
and qNC0,eff ≡ q0
(
1− (1− δ)pid,1R−10
)
for the savers.
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between leisure/consumption and between durable/non-durable consumption. The decrease in the
real wage rate makes leisure more attractive relative to consumption, thus providing an incentive
for borrowers to decrease their labor supplied. Similarly, the decrease in the effective durable price
(which is driven by the decrease in the relative price q0 and the increase in durable inflation pid,1 in
the final period) makes durable consumption relatively more attractive than non-durable one.
Overall, the effect on the borrowers’ initial period allocation is given by the relative size of the
income and substitution effects. Non-durable consumption decreases, labor supplied increases, and
durable consumption is unaffected, as illustrated in panels “cb0”, “n
b
0”, and “d
b
0” of Figure 1.1. The
negative income effect, the substitution of leisure for consumption, and the substitution of durable
for non-durable consumption ensure that non-durable consumption decreases. The increase in the
labor supplied is a consequence of the negative income effect dominating the substitution of leisure
for consumption. Finally, there is no general equilibrium change in durable consumption given
that, under the current parameterization, the substitution and income effects end up cancelling one
another.19
Additionally, as it can be seen from panel “bb0” in Figure 1.1, the general equilibrium change in
borrowers’ debt holdings is negligible. In the economy with credit constraints, the borrowers debt
holdings are determined by the repayment interest rate and the market value of the collateral. The
later depends on two factors, the amount of durable holdings and the durable’s market price. From
the previous discussion, it is clear that the general equilibrium adjustment of durable holdings is
negligible. Hence, debt holdings are determined entirely by the relationship between the change
in the nominal interest rate and the market price of the durable good. The nominal interest rate
decreases, a consequence of the market’s response to provide savers with enough incentive to reduce
their nominal bond holdings. Similarly, the real price of the durable good decreases, which is mostly
driven by the decrease in the durable’s relative price. Thus the net effect is that the amount of debt
holdings does not significantly change and it is pretty much unaffected by the general equilibrium
price adjustments.
Consider next the borrowers’ final period allocation. As it can be seen from the panels “cb1”,
“nb1”, and “d
b
1” in Figure 1.1, the change in this allocation is negligible. The price adjustments
19If anything, the substitution effects slightly dominates, resulting in a very modest (almost negligible) increase in
durable consumption.
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are small and lead to modest income and substitution effects, which end up cancelling each other
anyways. Additionally, the wealth effects that could potentially arise from wealth transfer from the
initial to the final period are negligible as the adjustment in the borrowers asset position (durable
and debt holdings) is very modest, as discussed in the previous paragraphs.
I move now to the effect of the general equilibrium price adjustments on the saver’s allocation,
which are shown on Figure 1.2. Given savers face no credit constraints, their consumption and
labor supplied (for both periods) are functions of the agent’s lifetime wealth and the goods’ prices.
Therefore, the general equilibrium price adjustments lead, again, to income and substitution effects.
In each of the two periods, the intra-temporal substitution effects operate along two dimensions;
substitution between leisure/consumption and between durable/non-durable consumption. The de-
crease in the each period’s real wage rate (wc,0 and wc,1) makes leisure more attractive relative
to consumption. Similarly, the decrease in the each period’s effective durable price (qNC0,eff and q1)
makes durable consumption relatively more attractive than non-durable one.
In addition, one can also think of an inter-temporal substitution effect. On one hand, current
consumption become more attractive for the savers as the nominal interest rate decreases; a con-
sequence of debt market clearing. On the other hand, future consumption becomes more attractive
as non-durable inflation in the final period decreases. In the end, the interest rate adjustment dom-
inates and the result is that savers have an incentive to substitute current consumption for future
consumption.
The income effect for the savers is more complex than for the borrowers as their lifetime wealth
depends on three factors; lifetime labor earnings, effective initial wealth, and profits from the in-
termediate firms. The overall result is a negative income effect, which can be better understood
by analyzing the impact of the general equilibrium price adjustments on each of these three fac-
tors. First, the general equilibrium price adjustments lead to a decrease in lifetime labor earnings;
a consequence of the decrease in the real wage rate for each period. Second, the real value of the
inherited wealth decreases as well. Despite lower inflation increasing the saver’s real value of the
nominal bond holdings, the large decrease in the real value of the inherited durable holdings (driven
by the decrease in q0) is responsible for the smaller real value of the inherited assets. Lastly, the
general equilibrium price adjustments end up increasing the intermediate firms’ profits. Although
the general equilibrium adjustment in the borrowers allocation implies firms end up selling less of
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the goods, the increase in profits is driven by an increase in the profits per unit sold by each sector.20
The larger profits per unit sold are a consequence of the smaller real wage rate firms have to pay in
each period. In the end, the decrease in lifetime labor earnings and inherited wealth overpower the
increase in profits, leading to the negative income effect.
With the understanding of all these general equilibrium effects, consider now the savers’ initial
period allocation. On one hand, panel “cs0” of Figure 1.2 shows how non-durable consumption
decreases driven by the negative income effect and the intra-temporal substitution of leisure for
consumption and of durable consumption for non-durable consumption. On the other hand, durable
consumption increases as shown on panel “ds0” of Figure 1.2; the substitution effects, both intra-
temporal durable good for non-durable good and inter-temporal current consumption for future
consumption, are larger than the negative income effect. Lastly, labor supplied increases as evinced
on panel “ns0” of Figure 1.2. Again, this response to the general equilibrium price adjustments is
mostly a consequence of the negative income effect, which dominates the intra- and inter-temporal
substitution effects.
Finally, consider the savers’ final period allocation. The combination of the negative income
effect and the inter-temporal substitution effect implies savers react to the general equilibrium price
changes by decreasing their final period’s consumption; as shown on panels “cs1” and “d
s
1” of Figure
1.2. Additionally, the small intra-temporal consumption/leisure effect ensures the increase in leisure
is modest, thus ensuring labor supplied increases; as seen on panel “ns1”.
General Equilibrium: Overall Effect on Aggregate Output
The effect of the credit constraint on aggregate output can be understood by adding together the
partial and general equilibrium effects on the borrowers’ and savers allocations’. The total effect
of the credit constraint on the agents’ allocations is illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 as the differ-
ence between the “No Constraint” (green) and the ”Binding Constraint” (blue) lines. Overall, the
adjustment in the borrowers’ and savers’ allocations is dominated by wealth effects.
For borrowers, the constraint effectively decreases their wealth in the initial period and increases
it in the final period. This is because the binding constraint limits the amount they can borrow against
20As previously discussed, and as evinced in Figure 1.1, the general equilibrium price adjustments imply borrowers
decrease their non-durable consumption in the initial period without significantly adjusting their remaining consumption
variables.
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their future income. Therefore, consumption in the initial period decreases while it increases in the
final period; this is true for the durable good, non-durable good, and leisure.
For savers, lifetime wealth decreases. For the final period variables, this wealth effect is domi-
nant; which explains the decrease in consumption and the increase in labor supplied. For the initial
period variables, the wealth effect is dominant only for non-durable consumption. For durable con-
sumption and labor supplied, the substitution effect is larger as it is a combination of an intra- and
inter-temporal effects. The intra-temporal substitution is a consequence of the decrease in the real
wage rate and the durable’s relative price; savers favor consumption of leisure and durable good
over the non-durable. The inter-temporal substitution effect arises as a consequence of the decrease
in the nominal interest rate R0; savers favor current consumption over future one. That is, savers
find current consumption more attractive, especially leisure and durable consumption. Note that
the nominal interest rate R0 decreases in order to ensure the nominal bond market clearing; as bor-
rowers can access less debt, savers must have sufficient incentive to stop using nominal debt as a
savings channel.
The adjustment in the borrowers’ and savers’ allocations leads to an adjustment in aggregate
sectorial output, as summarized by the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1.9 Fix z0, (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), and
(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,b}. Given that ωˆ
C
c,0 ≤ ωˆNCc,0 ,
then:
(a) Y NCc,0 ≥ Y Cc,0 and Y NCd,0 ≤ Y Cd,0
(b) Y NCc,1 ≤ Y Cc,1 and Y NCd,1 ≥ Y Cd,1
These results are illustrated in Figure 1.4. As a consequence of the credit constraint, the initial
period’s output decreases in the non-durable sector while it increases in the durable one (left panels
of Figure 1.4). The former is a consequence of the decrease in non-durable consumption by both,
borrowers and savers. The later is driven by the increase in the savers’ durable consumption. Intu-
itively, since the credit constraint limits the amount of nominal debt for the borrowers, the savers
must find an alternative savings channel; the durable good. The incentive for the savers to use the
durable good is achieved mostly via the general equilibrium price adjustments; the large decrease
in the durables relative price q0 and the decrease in the nominal interest rate R0.
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium sectorial output as a percent of baseline case
For the final period’s sectorial output, the situation is somewhat reversed; non-durable output
increases while durable output decreases (right panels of Figure 1.4). In this period, savers’ and
borrowers’ have opposite reactions; savers decrease consumption of both goods while borrowers in-
crease it. Note however that given the more impatient nature of borrowers, non-durable consumption
is relatively more important in their consumption bundle. Similarly, since savers are more patient,
durable consumption is relative more important in their consumption bundle. Hence, non-durable
output increases driven by the borrowers’ consumption adjustment and durable output decreases
driven by the savers consumption adjustment.
1.5 Conclusion
Using a simple two-period, two-agent version of the baseline two-sector New Keynesian model,
I investigate the effect of credit constraints on aggregate sectorial output. I introduce the credit
constraint as a collateral borrowing constraint faced only by one type of agents, the borrowers. The
other type of agents, the savers, face no credit constraint and have some ownership of the firms in
the economy.
The aggregate effects of the credit constraint are non-trivial; they are the result of the interaction
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between the agents’ response to the credit constraint. The adjustment of the agents’ allocation is
in turn determined by competing wealth and substitution effects. Overall, the constraint affects
agents via two channels. First, the direct channel; borrowers must adjust their allocation once the
constraint is introduced as the no-constraint allocation might be unfeasible. In turn, this affects the
savers’ allocation; there is a wealth effect due to the change in firms’ profits associated with the
change in borrowers’ allocation. Second, the general equilibrium channel; prices adjust in order for
markets to clear and agents react to these prices changes.
For the borrowers, the general equilibrium price changes are relatively unimportant; they adjust
their allocation mostly to ensure it is feasible given the constraint. However, for the savers, the
general equilibrium price changes lead to a significant adjustment in their allocation. For instance,
the adjustment in the durable’s relative price and the nominal interest rate are responsible for the
savers’ increase in the initial period’s durable consumption, which is the main driver of the increase
in the initial period’s aggregate durable output.
The main takeaway of the chapter is really simple; the credit constraint (and financial frictions
for that matter) have important indirect general equilibrium effects. Despite the constraint affecting
only borrowers directly, it does have an important indirect impact on the savers’ allocation. This
indirect effect is mainly a consequence of general equilibrium price adjustments. Therefore, models
which use a representative agent to study the effects of financial frictions might not capture these
general equilibrium effects that arise due to adjustments in prices and profits. This general equi-
librium effects are not only important to the extent that they might affect particular agents in the
economy, but also given that they can have an impact on aggregate outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2
Monetary Policy and Credit Constraints
Abstract
I investigate the effect of credit constraints on the monetary policy transmission
mechanism using a standard two-sector New Keynesian model. The credit constraint
is introduced as a collateral constraint that limits borrowing via a nominal bond. There
are two types of agents; only the relatively more impatient agents face the collateral
constraint. I find that the inclusion of credit constraints can potentially lead to very dif-
ferent conclusions about the effects of a monetary expansion relative to the canonical
New Keynesian model with no financial frictions; when the mass of credit constrained
agents is sufficiently large, a monetary “expansion” can actually lead to a contraction
of total output. In the model with credit constraints, the transmission mechanism is
mostly a consequence of the general equilibrium price adjustments rather than a con-
sequence of the direct inter-temporal substitution effect. Overall, my findings highlight
the importance of the indirect effects of monetary policy transmission which operate
via the market value of the collateral, firms’ profits, and asset portfolio adjustments.
JEL Codes: E21, E44, E52
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter intends to elaborate and expand on the insights and results obtained in the first chap-
ter. Recognizing the limitations of the simple two-period model, the current chapter relaxes this
assumption and considers the infinite horizon version instead. As before, the main goal is to shed
some light on the monetary policy transmission mechanism when augmenting the standard New
Keynesian setting to incorporate financial frictions.
A vast literature has extensively studied the macroeconomic implications of standard versions of
the New Keynesian model. Authors such as Clarida, Galı´ and Gertler (2000) and Woodford (2001),
focus on the study of simple versions of the model that have price stickiness as the only nominal
friction. Some other authors, like Christiano and Evans (2005), consider slightly augmented ver-
sions that incorporate additional nominal frictions. Furthermore, extensive reviews that explain in
detail the theorical foundations of the New Keynesian framework and its applications to monetary
policy analysis are readily available, for instance Woodford (2003), and more recently, Galı´ (2008).
One of the main findings of such literature relates to the way in which monetary policy affects
total aggregate output in the economy. In particular, under the assumption that monetary policy is
conducted through a Taylor-type rule, the consensus is that surprise shocks to this rule are negatively
correlated with output. That is, a positive surprise shock to the monetary policy rule results in an
increase in the real interest rate and a decrease in aggregate output; as shown in Figure 2.1.21 The
mechanism behind such response is driven by the inter-temporal substitution effect implied by the
change in the real interest rate.
To some extent, this result is the underlying corner stone of the believe, shared by many aca-
demics, that the monetary authority can help stimulate or contract the economy through this interest
rate channel. Indeed, the term “conventional monetary policy” has been coined to refer to policy in-
terventions that try to exploit this mechanism. However, the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. forced
an entirely new perspective on this view. The so called conventional monetary policy measures
taken by the Federal Reserve did not work as expected. Since then, many authors have tried to
evaluate the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy interventions.22 This literature empha-
sizes the increasing importance of the financial sector in the transmission of monetary policy to the
21A negative surprise shock would lead to a decrease in the nominal rate and an increase in output.
22See for instance del Negro et al. (2011) and Mishkin (2009).
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Figure 2.1: Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock (Interest Rate Rule)
Note: Figure taken from Galı´ (2008).
macroeconomy, which the basic New Keynesian model completely ignores.
Motivated by these observations, the present chapter revisits the standard New Keynesian model
incorporating to it one of the most basic financial frictions; a collateral constraint. I argue that even
in this most simple setting, there is an important channel which has been largely ignored by the
literature; the indirect general equilibrium effects. In the presence of the constraint, the general
equilibrium price adjustments affect the market value of the good that is pledged as collateral; hence
the degree to which the constraint is binding. Borrowers are then forced to adjust their allocation;
this causes a change in firms’ profits which is responsible for the wealth effect that leads to an
adjustment in the savers’ allocation. Additionally, the general equilibrium price changes induce a
portfolio reallocation for the savers. The combination of all of these effects dominates the usual
inter-temporal substitution effect that drives the aggregate output response in the standard New
Keynesian model.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the effect on total output of a negative surprise shock of 25 b.p. to the
monetary policy rule for the two limiting cases of the model studied in this chapter; when none
of the agents face the collateral constraint (the case Ωb → 0), and when all of the agents face it
(the case Ωb → 1). For the case Ωb → 0, the model reduces to that presented in Galı´ (2008),
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yielding the standard result that a negative shock to the nominal interest rate rule translates into an
economic stimulus. However, in the limiting case where all agents are credit constrained, the effect
of a conventional monetary policy intervention is significantly different from that predicted by the
standard model; the negative shock to the nominal interest leads to a contraction of aggregate output
for all periods after impact.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 specifies in detail each of the com-
ponents of the model. Section 2.3 presents a characterization of the models’ solution. Section 2.4
presents the models’ calibration and the main results of the paper. Finally, the concluding remarks
are presented in Section 2.5.
2.2 Model
The model is the infinite horizon extension of the one presented in Chapter 1. The economy is
populated by two types of agents who differ along three key dimensions: their degree of patience,
the ownership of firms, and their ability to access the financial market. Agents work, consume, and
accumulate wealth using two instruments; a durable good and a nominal risk free bond. The agents
with the smallest time preference discount parameter (borrowers), face a collateral credit constraint
on their nominal debt holdings.23 The agents with the largest time preference discount parameter
(savers) can freely access the nominal bond market as long as a No-Ponzi condition is satisfied.24
The savers are the owners of the firms that produce the intermediate varieties. The intermediate
firms use labor as the only input in production. There are two final consumption goods, durables
and non-durables, which are produced using the intermediate varieties. Finally, monetary policy is
conducted through a nominal interest rate rule of the type first introduced by Taylor (1993). The
only non-trivial source of uncertainty is an exogenous stochastic process in the nominal interest rate
rule; which captures unanticipated actions by the monetary authority.
23This constraint is of the type proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
24Despite the use of the terms borrowers and savers, both types of agents are free to borrow or save using the nominal
bond. However, in the deterministic steady state solution the more patient agents lend resources to the impatient agents;
effectively the more patient agents are savers and the less patient ones are borrowers.
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2.2.1 Producers of Final Goods
There are two production sectors denoted by j ∈ {c, d}; where c refers to the non-durable sector
and d to the durable one. Firms in sector j operate under a perfectly competitive environment. Each
firm in sector j uses as inputs a continuum of differentiated goods, which it must buy from the
intermediate firms. Let i ∈ [0, 1] be the index of each intermediate firm. Hence yj,t(i) is the variety
produced by the ith intermediate firm in sector j to be used in the production of final good Yj,t at
period t and Pj,t(i) is its corresponding price.
All firms within sector j have access to the same technology, which is given by the CES pro-
duction function
Yj,t =
(∫ 1
0
yj,t(i)
j−1
j di
) j
j−1
, (2.2.1)
where j > 1 is the sector specific elasticity of substitution between differentiated inputs. Firms sell
the final good to the borrower and the saver at price Pj,t. Therefore, the per period profits of a firm
selling the final good in sector j are given by
ΠFj,t = Pj,tYj,t −
∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)yj,t(i)di (2.2.2)
Thus, given a sequence of final and intermediate good prices
{
Pj,τ , {Pj,τ (i)}i∈[0,1]
}∞
τ=0
, the
firm solves the problem of choosing an allocation
{
yj,t(i) ≥ 0
}
i∈[0,1]
to maximize (2.2.2) subject
to (2.2.1) for each t ≥ 0.
2.2.2 Producers of Intermediate Goods
As stated before, there is a continuum of intermediate firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] in each sector
j ∈ {c, d}. The firms operate under monopolistic competition; each firm chooses the price Pj,t(i)
and variety yj,t(i) to sell to the producers of the final good given the demand for the variety.
Following Calvo (1983), I assume that there is a random variable, Sj ∼ Bernoulli (Φj), which
governs whether firm i in sector j is able to reset its price in each period. This random variable is
i.i.d. across sectors, intermediate firms, and time periods. Thus, firm i within sector j at period t
may not reset its price with probability Φj .
Intermediate firms use labor as the only input for production. I assume that all firms within a
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sector have access to the same production technology. Furthermore, to keep the analysis tractable,
the production technology is linear in the labor input and given by
yj,t(i) = Ajnj,t(i), (2.2.3)
where Aj is a constant that measures labor productivity in each sector.25 The labor market is per-
fectly competitive and labor is perfectly mobile across sectors; therefore, all intermediate firms pay
workers the same nominal wage rate Wt per unit of labor supplied.
Finally, I assume that the intermediate firms are solely owned by the savers and shares of these
firms can not be traded.26 This implies that for any τ > t, the intermediate firms discount the future
nominal profits at date τ back to date t with a discount factor given by
Λsτ |t ≡
λsτ
λst
= βτ−ts
cst
csτ
Pc,t
Pc,τ
, (2.2.4)
where λsq is the savers’ shadow price of a unit of the nominal asset at period q.
Given the previous specification, for any sequence of nominal wage rates, sector specific out-
puts, and final good prices,
{
Wτ , {Yj,τ , Pj,τ}j∈{c,d}
}∞
τ=0
; an intermediate firm i in sector j that is
able to reset its price at period t solves the problem
max
{Pj,t(i)}
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
ΦkjΛ
s
t+k|t
[
Pj,t(i)yj,t+k|t(i)−Wt+knj,t+k|t(i)
]}
(2.2.5)
s.t.
yj,t+k|t(i) =
Pj,t+k
Pj,t(i)

j
Yj,t+k
yj,t+k|t(i) = Aj nj,t+k|t(i),
where, Et {·} denotes the firm’s expectation given its information set at time t. That is, the inter-
mediate firm chooses the price that maximizes its expected discounted profits given the demand for
its variety (the first equality constraint) and its production function (the second equality constraint).
25In the current analysis, this constant is set to one in both sectors: Ad = Ac = 1.
26These two assumption are made to keep the problem tractable.
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Note that yj,t+k|t(i) refers to the demand of intermediate good in period t + k provided the firm is
unable to reset its price between periods t and t+ k. It follows that nj,t+k|t(i) is the labor required
to produce the amount yj,t+k|t(i).27
Finally, note that the total profits for all intermediate firms in sector j at period t are given by
ΠIj,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t(i)yj,t(i)−Wtnj,t(i)
)
di. (2.2.6)
2.2.3 Borrowers and Savers
The economy is populated by two types of agents; borrowers and savers. Let a ∈ {b, s} denote
whether an agent is a saver (s) or a borrower (b). The main distinction between these agent types
is their time preference discount factor βs > βb; savers are more patient than borrowers. Although
both agent types are free to borrow or save as desired, in the deterministic steady state with zero
inflation the more patient agents effectively lend resources to the less patient agents. Thus the use
of the terminology borrowers and savers.
An agent of type a derives utility from consumption of the non-durable (ca) and durable (da)
goods and disutility from supplying labor (na) according to an additively separable log-linear flow
utility function. Therefore, the agent’s expected lifetime utility is given by
E0

∞∑
t=0
βta
α log (cat ) + (1− α) log (dat )− νa
 (nat )(1+θ)
1 + θ


 , (2.2.7)
where Et {·} denotes the agents conditional expectation given her information set at time t.
In order to finance the consumption of the durable and non-durable goods, agents have four
sources of income. First, labor income; the agent can supply labor to the intermediate firms in
exchange for the nominal wage rate, W . In doing so, the agent is constraint by her total time
endowed, Ha.28 Second, the share of profits from ownership of the intermediate firms, Π̂a. Third,
the market value of the durable holdings (net of depreciation δ) that the agent carries from the
previous period. Finally, the interest accrued (given the interest rate R) from holdings of a nominal
27The demand for the intermediate variety comes from solving the problem of a firm producing the final good, which
is discussed in Section 2.3.1.
28I normalize the total time endowment for both agents and make it one; Hs = Hb = 1.
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risk free bond, B. Thus the nominal budget constraint for the agent at period t is given by
Pc,tc
a
t + Pd,t
(
dat − (1− δ) dat−1
)
+Rt−1Bat−1 = B
a
t +Wtn
a
t + Π̂
a
t ; (2.2.8)
where Pc,t and Pd,t refer to the prices of the non-durable and durable goods.
As stated in Section 2.2.2, I assume that savers are the only owners of the intermediate firms
and that shares of these firms can not be endogenously traded. Since the exact distribution of
shares among savers is irrelevant, I proceed as if these shares are all equally divided among these
agents. Let Saj (i) denote the share of firm i in sector j owned by agent of type a, from the previous
discussion it is clear that
Sbj (i) ≡ Sbj = 0, ∀i ∈ [0, 1]
Ssj (i) ≡ Ssj =
1
Ωs
, ∀i ∈ [0, 1];
where Ωa denotes the mass of agents of type a.29 Hence, the share of profits from ownership of the
intermediate firms for an agent of type a in period t can be written as
Π̂at =
∑
j∈{c,d}
(
Saj Π
I
j,t
)
. (2.2.9)
Borrowers and savers also differ along another dimension; their access to the nominal bond
market. While both agents can save as much as desired using the nominal bond, they are restricted
when it comes to borrowing. On one hand, savers face a No-Ponzi condition; the can’t infinitely
roll-over debt. On the other hand, borrowers face an endogenous credit limit in the form of a
collateral constraint, as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The relatively less patient agents might be
more likely to default on debt or to refuse to honor the terms of the contract. Thus the provision of
collateral provides enough incentive for them to endogenously choose to repay the debt according
to the contract. The particular form of this credit constraint is given by
RtB
b
t ≤ (1− χ) (1− δ) dbt Et {Pd,t+1} . (2.2.10)
29The total mass of the population in the economy is normalized to be one; Ωs + Ωb = 1.
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The left side of the inequality is just the amount the borrower must repay, principal plus interest,
in period t + 1. The right hand side of the inequality is the collateral requirement; the agent is
allowed to pledge only a fraction (1− χ) of her durable holdings as collateral. The value of the
collateral is determined by the expected price of the durable good in the repayment period t + 1.
Therefore, the constraint simply requires that the repayment value of a given loan does not exceed
the collateral’s expected value.
All in all, given initial wealth holdings
(
da−1, R−1Ba−1
)
, prices {Pc,t, Pd,t,Wt, Rt−1}∞t=0, and
intermediate firms’ profits
{
ΠIc,t,Π
I
d,t
}∞
t=0
; the problem of an agent of type a ∈ {b, s} is to choose
an allocation {cat , dat , nat , Bat }∞t=0, with cat , dat ≥ 0 and nat ∈ [0, Ha], to maximize (2.2.7) subject
to (2.2.8). Additionally, if the agent is of type borrower, the problem has the additional credit
constraint (2.2.10).
2.2.4 Monetary Authority
I assume that monetary policy is conducted via an interest rate rule of the type proposed by Taylor
(1993). Given a nominal interest rate target R˜ and inflation target p˜i, the monetary authority follows
the interest rate rule given by
Rt
R˜
=
pit
p˜i

φpi
zt, (2.2.11)
where Rt is the interest rate on nominal bond contracts and pit is a composite inflation index that
weights the inflation in the durable
(
pid,t ≡ Pd,tPd,t−1
)
and non-durable
(
pic,t ≡ Pc,tPc,t−1
)
sectors ac-
cording to pit = piκc,tpi
1−κ
d,t . The parameter κ ∈ (0, 1) controls the relative weight that the monetary
authority gives to each of the two sectors in the economy.30
Furthermore, I assume that the interest rule follows the Taylor principle; φpi > 1. I impose this
assumption given that it is standard in the literature; where it is used for two main reasons. First,
the empirical evidence suggests that the failure of the monetary authority to follow this principle
has led to episodes of greater macroeconomic instability in the US.31 Second, the Taylor principle
usually arises as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique stable solution
30For the baseline model, κ is set to 0.5 so that the monetary authority weights the two sectors equally.
31See Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Galı´ and Gertler (2000).
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for some infinite horizon New Keynesian forward looking models.32
The variable zt is an exogenous stochastic component that captures the unanticipated actions of
the monetary authority.33 It is assumed that such process follows an AR(1) of the form
log(zt) = ρ log(zt−1) + σzzt , (2.2.12)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the autocorrelation coefficient which regulates the degree of persistence of the
process, zt ∼WN(0, 1) is the underlying monetary policy shock, and σz is a parameter that controls
the standard deviation of the underlying shock.
2.3 Solution
This section discusses the solution to the model presented in Section 4.3. I start by defining some
important aggregate variables. Next, I define the equilibrium concept used in solving the model
and provide a partial characterization of this solution. Finally, I consider the special case of the
deterministic steady state, which provides some useful insights about the behavior of the agents in
the model.
2.3.1 Aggregate Variables
The solution to the problem of the firms producing the final sectorial goods yields the demand for
intermediate varieties, which is given by
yj,t(i) =
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
Yj,t. (2.3.1)
In setting their prices, the intermediate firms take this demand as given; which is captured by the first
constraint in the intermediate firms’ problem (2.2.5). Additionally, given the perfectly competitive
nature of the final good’s market, the zero-profit condition implies that the aggregate price index of
each sector satisfies
Pj,t =
(∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)
1−jdi
) 1
1−j
. (2.3.2)
32See Woodford (2001) and Woodford (2003).
33For various interpretations of this monetary policy shock, refer to Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
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Another important aggregate variable, total labor employed, can be obtained by considering the
intermediate firms’ problem. Aggregating over the labor employed by each individual firm in sector
j we have
Nj,t ≡
∫ 1
0
nj,t(i) di =
Yj,t
Aj
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
di. (2.3.3)
The second equality follows from manipulating and combining the two constraints in the inter-
mediate firms’ problem (2.2.5). Equation (2.3.3) can be interpreted as stating that the final good
producers and the intermediate firms can effectively be thought of as a representative firm in each
sector. This representative firm produces the final sectorial good using aggregate labor according to
a production function of the form Yj,t = A˜j ·Nj,t; where A˜j ≡ Aj ·∆−1Pj ,t is the effective aggregate
labor productivity. In light of this observation, and for the remainder of the chapter, equation (2.3.3)
will be called the aggregate production function. Additionally, the representative firm’s profits are
equivalent to the profits made by the intermediate firms since
ΠIj,t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pj,t(i)yj,t(i)−Wtnj,t(i)
)
di = Pj,tYj,t −WtNj,t. (2.3.4)
Note that the effective aggregate labor productivity is a scaled version of the actual sectorial
labor productivity, Aj . The scaling factor, ∆Pj ,t, is a measure of the intermediate firm’s sectorial
price dispersion. It is defined as
∆Pj ,t ≡
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t
Pj,t(i)

j
di. (2.3.5)
Thus ∆Pj ,t is an indicator of the extent to which the individual firms’ prices in sector j deviate rel-
ative to the aggregate sectorial price level. Note that as the price dispersion gets large, the effective
aggregate labor productivity decreases; to produce a given amount of output the intermediate firms
in sector j need to hire more labor.
Finally, the last aggregate variable of importance is sectorial price inflation pij,t. As customary
in the literature, I define it as pij,t ≡ Pj,tPj,t−1 , j ∈ {c, d}. Note that from the relationship between the
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sectorial price index and the intermediate firm’s prices given in (2.3.2), the sectorial inflation index
can be written as
pi
1−j
j,t =
∫ 1
0
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t−1

1−j
di. (2.3.6)
That is, inflation in each sector is a function of how, on average, the prices of each individual firm
in sector j deviate from the aggregate sectorial price index in the previous period.
The aggregate price dispersion and the sectorial inflation, equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6), can be
written in a more intuitive, easy to interpret, form. To this end, note that any two intermediate firms
in sector j face an identical problem and let Υj,t ⊂ [0, 1] refer to the set of firms in sector j that are
able to reset their price in period t. It is obvious then tat the price chosen by any two resetting firms
is the same; Pj,t(i) ≡ P ∗j,t, ∀ i ∈ Υj,t. Thus these two equations can be written as
∆Pj ,t =
Pj,t
P ∗j,t

j ∫
Υj,t
1 di+ pi
j
j,t
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t−1
Pj,t−1(i)

j
1{i∈[0,1]\Υj,t} di
=
Pj,t
P ∗j,t

j ∫
Υj,t
1 di+ pi
j
j,t
∫ 1
0
 Pj,t−1
Pj,t−1(i)

j
di
∫
[0,1]\Υj,t
1 di
=
Pj,t
P ∗j,t

j
(1− Φj) + pijj,t∆Pj ,t−1Φj (2.3.7)
pi
1−j
j,t =
 P ∗j,t
Pj,t−1

1−j ∫
Υj,t
1 di+
∫ 1
0
Pj,t−1(i)
Pj,t−1

1−j
1{i∈[0,1]\Υj,t} di
=
P ∗j,t
Pj,t

1−j
pi
1−j
j,t
∫
Υj,t
1 di+
∫ 1
0
Pj,t−1(i)
Pj,t−1

1−j
di
∫
[0,1]\Υj,t
1 di
=
P ∗j,t
Pj,t

1−j
pi
1−j
j,t (1− Φj) + Φj (2.3.8)
In deriving equations (2.3.7) and (2.3.8), the i.i.d. assumption of the random variable Sj ∼ Bernoulli
(Φj) is crucial as it allows to write the integral in the first line as the product of integrals in the
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second line. In addition, although the set of firms that are able to reset their price at any time period
is random, the measure of such set is deterministic and equal to equal to 1 − Φj ; which is used to
obtain the final line of the derivations.
These two expressions completely determine the aggregate price dynamics of the economy.
Start with a known distribution of prices in the intermediate firms; which is summarized by the
price dispersion ∆Pj ,t−1. From the optimal behavior of the intermediate firms in the current period,
equation (2.3.8) pins down the sectorial inflation levels. Given the sectorial inflation, equation
(2.3.7) then determines the new price distribution of the intermediate firms within sector j; which
again is summarized by the statistic ∆Pj ,t.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Concept
Define real bond holdings bat ≡ B
a
t
Pc,t
, relative intermediate firms’ prices p∗j,t ≡
P ∗j,t
Pj,t
, real intermediate
firms’ profits ΠIc,t ≡
ΠIj,t
Pj,t
, relative price of the durable good qt ≡ Pd,tPc,t , and real wage rates wj,t ≡
Wt
Pj,t
. Given initial real wealth holdings for the agents
{
da−1, R−1ba−1
}
a∈{b,s} and sectorial price
dispersion {∆Pc,−1,∆Pd,−1}, an equilibrium for this economy is defined as sequences of
(i) Agents’ allocation: A ≡
{{
cat , d
a
t , n
a
t , b
a
t
}∞
t=0
}
a∈{b,s}
(ii) Intermediate firms’ prices: PI ≡
{
p∗c,t, p∗d,t
}∞
t=0
(iii) Aggregate Output: O ≡ {Yc,t, Yd,t, Nc,t, Nd,t}∞t=0
(iv) Aggregate Prices: P ≡ {qt, pic,t, pid,t,∆Pc,t,∆Pd,t, wc,t, wd,t, Rt}∞t=0
(v) Intermediate firms’ profits: ΠI ≡
{
Π
I
c,t,Π
I
d,t
}∞
t=0
such that the following hold:
1. Monetary Policy
• Given the exogenous process (2.2.12), the aggregate price sequence P satisfies the mon-
etary policy rule (2.2.11).
2. Agents’ optimization
• Given aggregate prices and profits (P and ΠI ), the allocation A is a solution to the
borrowers’ and savers’ problems.
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• Given aggregate output and prices (O and P), the prices PI are a solution to the inter-
mediate firms’ problems.
3. Aggregate Variables and Price Dynamics
• The aggregate output and prices (O and P) satisfy the aggregate production function
(2.3.3).
• Given aggregate output and prices (O and P), the intermediate firms’ profits ΠI satisfy
(2.3.4).
• The intermediate firms’ prices and the aggregate price sequences (PI and P) satisfy the
the price dynamics equations (2.3.7) and (2.3.8).
4. Market Clearing
• The agents’ allocation and aggregate output sequences(A and O) satisfy the market
clearing conditions
(a) Final non-durable good market: Yc,t = Ωbcbt + Ωsc
s
t
(b) Final durable good market: Yd,t =
∑
a∈{s,b}Ωa
(
dat + (1− δ) dat−1
)
(c) Nominal debt market: ΩbBbt + ΩsB
s
t = 0
(d) Labor market: Nc,t +Nd,t = Ωbnbt + Ωsn
s
t
2.3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
Given the assumed functional forms for technology and preferences, the FOC’s are both necessary
and sufficient to characterize the firms’ and agents’ problems.
Firms
Consider first an intermediate firm’s problem. From the FOC’s, a resetting firm’s optimal price is
given by
p∗j,t =
 j
j − 1
 MCj,t
M̂Rj,t
; (2.3.9)
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where MCj,t ≡ Et
[∑∞
k=0 Γj,t+k ωj,t+k
(
q
1j=d
t+k
)]
is the expected discounted real marginal cost of
all future periods, M̂Rj,t ≡ Et
[∑∞
k=0 Γj,t+k
(
Pj,t
Pj,t+k
)(
q
1j=d
t+k
)]
is the expected discounted real
marginal revenue if the firm were to sell its variety at the current aggregate price level in all future
periods, and Γj,t+k ≡ (Φjβs)k
(
Yj,t+k
cst+k
)(
Pj,t+k
Pj,t
)j
plays the role of an effective real discount factor.
To understand the discounted marginal cost MCj,t, note that given the assumption of a linear
technology with labor productivityAj = 1, producing an additional unit of sectorial output at period
t + k requires exactly one additional unit of labor. Thus the sectorial real marginal cost is the real
wage rate wj,t+k. As for the discounted marginal benefit M̂Rj,t, if the firm sells a unit of the variety
at period t + k and charges the current aggregate sectorial price level, it raises a real revenue of
Pj,t
Pj,t+k
. If the firm decides to charge the price p∗j,t instead, the real revenue is given by
p∗j,t
Pj,t+k
and
the expected discounted marginal revenue for this case can be written as MRj,t ≡ p∗j,t · M̂Rj,t.34
Therefore, equation (2.3.9) states that a resetting intermediate firm optimally chooses its price so that
its the expected discounted real marginal revenue has a mark-up of
(
j
j−1 > 1
)
over its expected
discounted real marginal cost.
From the previous discussion, it is clear that there are two driving forces behind the pricing
behavior of the intermediate firms; the expected changes in future real wage rates and the expected
changes of future aggregate prices. If firms expect large future real wages, they will choose to set a
higher price in the current period. However, for any k > 0, the expected future real wage ωj,t+k does
not only affect the current price chosen by the resetting firms; it affects all prices chosen between
periods t and t+ k. The intermediate firms choose to change prices “smoothly”; rather than having
a one time change, firms optimally adjust the prices of all the periods between the current period
and the period in which the deviation of the labor cost is expected. Therefore, only unanticipated
deviations of labor costs create sudden changes in prices.
Similarly, firms adjust their optimal price in response to expectations of future aggregate prices.
Larger future inflation provides an incentive for firms to increase the current price; firms value more
current revenue given the inflationary expectations. Again, the expected future aggregate price level
Pj,t+k has an effect on all prices chosen between periods t and t+ k; only unanticipated changes in
inflation create sudden changes in firms’ prices.
34The factor of qt for the durable sector in both the MCj,t and M̂Rj,t is just to express these quantities in units of the
non-durable good.
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Given the pricing decision of the intermediate firms, the impact on the aggregate prices (in-
flation) is given by equation (2.3.8). Since j > 1, the current sectorial inflation is an increasing
function of the price chosen by the intermediate firms. Not surprisingly, if intermediate firms choose
a higher price the current sectorial aggregate price increases, which in turn has an inflationary effect.
Finally, given the sectorial inflation and the pricing decision of the intermediate firms, the econ-
omy’s price distribution is summarized by the resulting price dispersion as given by equation (2.3.7).
Intuitively, the price dispersion is the result of a combination of two effects. On one hand, the re-
setting firms (with mass 1−Φ) affect the price dispersion given their chosen optimal price p∗j,t. On
the other hand, the non-resetting firms (with mass Φ) affect the price dispersion to the extent that
the current aggregate price differs from the previous period prices; thus their contribution is driven
by the sectorial inflation pij,t.
Putting together all the previous results, the production sector of the economy can be character-
ized by the following set of dynamic equations:
MCj,t = ωc,t
Yj,t
cst
+ ΦjβsEt {pijj,t+1 MCj,t+1} (2.3.10)
M̂Bj,t = q
1j=d
t
Yj,t
cst
+ ΦjβsEt {pij−1j,t+1 M̂Bj,t+1} , (2.3.11)
pij,t =
 1Φj −
1− Φj
Φj

j − 1
j

j−1M̂Bj,tMCj,t

j−1 , (2.3.12)
∆Pj ,t =
j − 1
j

j M̂Bj,tMCj,t

j
(1− Φj) + pijj,t∆Pj ,t−1Φj . (2.3.13)
qt =
pid,t
pic,t
 qt−1, ∀t ≥ 0; (2.3.14)
where the last one follows directly from the definition of qt.
Borrowers and Savers
Before analyzing the optimal behavior of the agents, note that the nominal budget constraint (2.2.8)
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can be written in real (non-durable) units as
cat + qt
(
dat − (1− δ) dat−1
)
+
Rt−1
pic,t
bat−1 = b
a
t + ωc,tn
a
t + Π
a
t ; (2.3.15)
where the last term stands for the share of real profits that agent a gets from the intermediate firms,
which is given by Πat ≡
∑
j∈{c,d} S
a
j
(
q
1j=d
t Yj,t − ωc,tNj,t
)
.
Consider now the intra-temporal tradeoff that agent a faces between consumption and leisure
given by  α
cat
ωc,t = νa (nat )θ , ∀t ≥ 0. (2.3.16)
This is a standard condition which states that the agent optimally equates the marginal benefit of
labor supplied (left hand side) to its marginal cost (right hand side).
Consider next the inter-temporal tradeoffs faced by the agent. Since the agent can transfer
wealth via the durable good and the nominal bond, there are two inter-temporal conditions that the
agent’s optimal allocation must satisfy. The condition related to the durable good is
α (cat )
−1 qt =
(1− α) (dat )−1 + βa (1− δ)Et
{
α
(
cat+1
)−1
qt+1
}
1− (1− χ) (1− δ) ζat Et {pid,t+1}
, (2.3.17)
where ζat ≡ ψat (λat )−1, ψat is the multiplier on the collateral credit constraint (2.2.10), and λat =
α (catPc,t)
−1 is the multiplier on the budget constraint (2.2.8).35 This condition just states that
the agent optimally equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit of durable consumption. The
marginal cost is given by the forgone consumption of the non-durable good in the current pe-
riod; valued at α (cat )
−1 qt. The marginal benefit is composed of three terms. First, the marginal
value of current durable consumption (1− α) (dat )−1. Second, the marginal value of the wealth
transferred to the next period via the durable good, βa (1− δ)Et
{
α
(
cat+1
)−1
qt+1
}
. Lastly, the
marginal value of relaxing the borrowing constraint; the extra borrowing allows the agent to con-
sume (1− χ) (1− δ) ζat Et {pid,t+1} additional units of non-durable good, each marginally valued
at α (cat )
−1 qt. Note that the third component of the marginal benefit of durable consumption is only
relevant if the credit constraint is binding (i.e. only if ζat > 0).
35Since the savers don’t face a collateral constraint, ψst = 0, ∀ t ≥ 0.
55
The condition summarizing the inter-temporal tradeoff of the nominal bond is given by
1 = Rt
ζat + βaEt

cat
cat+1
1
pic,t+1

 . (2.3.18)
On one had, the marginal benefit of nominal debt is reflected on the increase in current consumption
by P−1c,t units; each marginally valued at α (cat )
−1. On the other hand, the marginal cost of nominal
debt has two components. First, the agent must repay the borrowed amount in the next period,
thus foregoing future consumption which is valued at αβaRtEt
(
Pc,t+1c
a
t+1
)−1. Second, to the
extent that the agent is credit constrained, the additional borrowing requires an increase in collateral
holdings; the agent needs to give up current resources to increase the collateral. This additional cost
is captured by the term Rtψat . Equating these costs to the marginal benefit and rearranging one gets
(2.3.18).
Given the forward looking nature of the expressions (2.3.17) and (2.3.18), transversality con-
ditions are needed as part of the solution characterization. The general form of the transversality
condition for agent a is
lim
t→∞E0
αβta
qt (1− δ) dat−1
cat
+
Rt−1
piac,t
bat−1
cat

 = 0, (2.3.19)
where bat = B
a
t (Pc,t)
−1 is the real debt holdings of agent a in terms of the non-durable good.
Intuitively, these transversality conditions impose that the expected present value of the agents’
wealth is zero in the limit. If this was not the case, agents would accumulate infinite amounts of
wealth.
Finally, the characterization of the agent’s behavior is completed via the complementary slack-
ness conditions. Given that the nominal budget constraint (2.3.15) holds with equality for both
agents, the multiplier on this constraint (λat ) will be strictly positive for all periods t. Since the saver
faces no credit constraint, the only relevant complementary slackness condition is the one imposed
on the borrower
ψbt
[
Rtb
b
t − (1− χ) (1− δ) qtdbtEt {pid,t+1}
]
= 0. (2.3.20)
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Equilibrium Characterization
Assume the the initial state
(
R−1bs−1, R−1bb−1, ds−1, db−1,∆Pc,−1,∆Pd,−1, q−1
)
is given. The equi-
librium is characterized by an allocation
{
{cat , dat , nat , bat }a∈{b,s} , {Yj,t, Nj,t}j∈{c,d} , ζbt
}∞
t=0
and
price
{{
MCj,t, M̂Bj,t, pij,t,∆Pj ,t, ωj,t,
}
j∈{c,d}
, Rt, qt
}∞
t=0
sequences that satisfy
1. The monetary policy rule (2.2.11).
2. The aggregate production function (2.3.3).
3. The intermediate firms’ pricing behavior (2.3.10) and (2.3.11).
4. The aggregate price dynamics (2.3.12), (2.3.13), and (2.3.14)
5. The agents’ optimal behavior (2.3.15),(2.3.16), (2.3.17), (2.3.18), (2.3.19), and (2.3.20).
6. The market clearing conditions listed in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.4 Deterministic Steady State
The deterministic steady state of the model is defined as the set
S˜ ≡
{{
c˜a, d˜a, n˜a, b˜a
}
a∈{b,s}
, ζ˜b,
{
Y˜j , N˜j , M˜Cj , M˜Bj , pij , ∆˜Pj , ω˜j
}
j∈{c,d}
, R˜, q˜
}
;
where x˜ ∈ S˜ satisfies xt = xt+1 = x˜, ∀t ≥ 0. That is, in the model’s steady state all variables are
constant over time. In the analysis that follows I restrict attention to the deterministic steady state
with zero sectorial inflation; p˜id = p˜ic = 1.
The current chapter does not provide formal proofs for the existence and uniqueness of such
steady state; instead, it relies on the existing literature.36 In models with heterogenous discount rates
and perfect financial markets, the existence of a steady state is not guaranteed. If the savers’ discount
factor determines the market interest rate, the borrowers’ consumption could not remain constant
and it would asymptotically decrease over time. If the borrowers’ discount factor pins down the
interest rate, the savers’ consumption would be asymptotically increasing over time. In the current
model, the collateral constraint allows one to get around this difficulty; it creates a wedge between
36The determinacy of the steady state in models with heterogeneous agents has been studied by authors such as Becker
(1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) among others.
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the savers’ and borrowers’ effective interest rates thus ensuring both agents can sustain a constant
consumption over time. Additionally, the heterogeneity in the discount factor (βs > βb) guarantees
that this steady state is independent of the initial wealth distribution of the agents. Therefore, the
borrowing constraint and the discount factor heterogeneity ensure the existence and uniqueness of
the deterministic steady state with zero inflation.
In order to characterize the steady state, consider first the production sector. Given the assump-
tion of zero inflation, intermediate firms behave as in the case of monopolistic competition with
perfectly flexible pricing. There are two immediate implications for such behavior. First, there is
no price dispersion; ∆˜Pc = ∆˜Pd = 1. Second, firms set their prices to ensure that their marginal
revenue is equal to a constant markup of jj−1 over their marginal production cost. Recall that given
the linear production function, the marginal cost of each unit is just the wage rate; MCj = ωj . Ad-
ditionally, the marginal revenue is given by the price at which firms sell the good (which in steady
state is normalized to 1); thus M˜Bj = 1. Hence the firms’ optimal price setting behavior of equating
the marginal revenue to a markup over the marginal cost implies that
ω˜j = 1−
1
j
, j ∈ {c, d}. (2.3.21)
That is, the steady state sectorial wage rate is equal to the inverse of the firms’ markup. In turn, the
relationship between the sectorial wage rates determines the relative price of the durable good. To
see this, note that the perfect mobility of labor implies that the nominal wage rate must be the same
across both sectors in the economy; W˜ = P˜j · ω˜j for j ∈ {c, d}. Therefore
q˜ =
ω˜c
ω˜d
=
(c − 1) d
(d − 1) c . (2.3.22)
The behavior of the borrowers and savers determines the remaining steady state variables. From
the inter-temporal tradeoff for the nominal bond, equation (2.3.18), the steady state interest rate is
pinned down by the savers’ preference discount factor; R˜ = (βs)
−1. In turn, this implies that the
borrowing constraint is binding for the borrowers in steady state; ζ˜b = βs − βb > 0. To understand
the meaning of the value of ζ˜b, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose the collateral
constraint is relaxed by increasing the fraction of the durable good that can be pledged as collateral
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(i.e. a decrease in χ). Furthermore, assume this is done in such a way so that the borrowers can
increase their real debt holdings by βs units without changing their holdings of the durable good;
the borrowers can now derive an additional utility of βsλ˜bt in the current period. However, the value
of the debt that the borrowers must repay in the next period is equal to R˜ · βs = 1; foregoing this
unit of consumption implies a disutility of βbλ˜bt .
37 Therefore, the value that the borrowers attach to
relaxing the collateral constraint is given by ψ˜bt = (βs − βb) λ˜bt . The desired result follows since
ζ˜b ≡ ψ˜bt
λ˜bt
. Finally, since the borrowing constraint is binding, this implies that the ratio of debt-to-
durable holdings for the borrower is fixed and given by
b˜b
d˜b
= (1− χ) (1− δ)
q˜
R˜
. (2.3.23)
The borrowers’ and savers’ consumption allocations are obtained from the inter-temporal durable
holdings condition and the budget constraint, equations (2.3.17) and (2.3.15), and are given by
d˜s
c˜s
=
1− α
q˜α

 1
1− βs (1− δ)
 and (2.3.24)
d˜b
c˜b
=
1− α
q˜α

 1
1− βs (1− δ) + χ (1− δ) ζ˜b
 . (2.3.25)
n˜b
c˜b
=
1 + q˜ (1− χ (1− δ)− (1− χ) (1− δ)βs)
d˜b
c˜b
ω˜c
. (2.3.26)
It is clear from these expressions that the ratio of durable-to-nondurable consumption is smaller for
the borrowers; d˜
b
c˜b
≤ d˜sc˜s , with the inequality holding strictly for χ > 0 and δ < 1.
To better understand the durable-to-nondurable consumption ratios, it is useful to look at two
extreme cases; the case of full depreciation (δ = 1) and when the durable holdings can be fully
pledged as collateral (χ = 0). Consider firs the full depreciation case; the durable good effectively
looses its “storability” property. Therefore, it is no different than the non-durable good and the
ratio between the two is completely determined by their relative, static, marginal utilities. Given the
37Note that the shadow value of income is given by λbt = βtbα
(
cbt
)−1
. However, in steady state we have cbt = c˜b ∀t;
so that λ˜bt+1 = βtbλ˜
b
t .
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agents are homogeneous in this dimension, the ratio of durable-to-nondurable consumption is the
same for the borrowers and the savers.
The case where the durable good can be fully pledged as collateral is useful to illustrate the effect
of the borrowing constraint on the borrowers consumption ratio. When a fraction χ of every unit
of the non-depreciated durable good can’t be pledged as collateral, the borrowers face an additional
cost; the foregone value of these χ units whose next best use would be as collateral. Thus the term
χ (1− δ) ζ˜b on the denominator of (2.3.25) can be interpreted as the cost associated with durable
holdings that can’t be pledged as collateral.38 Given that the borrowers face this additional cost for
holding durable good, the durable-to-nondurable ratio is smaller for the borrowers compared to the
savers. For the case in which all of the durable good holdings can be pledged as collateral (χ = 0),
the borrowing constraint does not imply this additional cost for durable holdings; thus the ratio of
durables to non-durables is the same for both agents despite the borrowers facing the additional
constraint.
Lastly, equation (2.3.26) presents the ratio of labor-to-nondurable consumption for the borrow-
ers. This ratio is completely determined by the budget constraint; borrowers must use labor income
to finance the portion of durable and non-durable consumption that can’t be covered via their wealth
(durable savings net of debt obligations).39
The relationship between the borrowers’ and savers’ consumption is determined via the market
clearing conditions. In particular, the ratio of non-durable consumption between the agents is given
by
c˜s
c˜b
=
(1− Ωb)
1 + δ d˜s
c˜s


−1  n˜
c˜b
− Ωb
1 + δ d˜b
c˜b

 . (2.3.27)
which is obtained under the assumptions that Ωs + Ωb = 1 and n˜s = n˜b ≡ n˜.40 Since the ratio
of durable-to-nondurable consumption is smaller for the borrowers
(
d˜b
c˜b
≤ d˜sc˜s
)
, and as long as n˜
c˜b
is
sufficiently large, savers’ non-durable consumption is larger than that of the borrowers.41 Intuitively,
borrowers accumulate a lower level of wealth as they are relatively more impatient; consumption
38Recall that ζ˜b = (βs − βb) is the value at which the borrowers value a marginal relaxation of the credit constraint.
39Although the savers labor-to-nondurable consumption ratio is not presented here, the intuition behind how it’s
determined is completely analogous to the borrowers’ case.
40These are the same assumptions I impose when calibrating the model.
41Specifically, n˜
c˜b
≥ 1 + δ d˜
s
c˜s
.
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is mostly financed via labor income. As long as labor income is not too large (i.e. wages are
sufficiently low so that labor income is mostly driven by labor supplied), borrowers cannot afford
higher consumption levels relative to savers.
Given the previous discussion and given the parameter values α, χ, δ, βs, βb, νs and νb; expres-
sions (2.3.21)-(2.3.27) can be used to solve for the vector of steady state variables S˜.42
2.4 Results
This section presents the chapter’s main numerical results. I begin the section by discussing the
model’s calibration and then move on to discuss the results using the models’s impulse response
functions. The results are derived by solving the log-linearized system of equations (2.2.11), (2.3.3),
(2.3.10), (2.3.11), (2.3.12), (2.3.13), (2.3.14), (2.3.15),(2.3.16), (2.3.17), (2.3.18), (2.3.19), (2.3.20),
and the market clearing conditions for the non-durable good, durable good, nominal debt, and labor
markets. The system is log-linearized around the deterministic steady state presented in Section
2.3.4 and its solution is computed following the method proposed by Sims (2002).
2.4.1 Calibration
In what follows, I use the term “baseline” to refer to the version of the model where no agent is
borrowing constrained (i.e. all agents are savers); Ωs → 1 and Ωb → 0. This baseline version
corresponds to the canonical New Keynesian model.
The model is specified at a quarterly frequency and it is calibrated so that certain variables of the
deterministic steady state of the baseline version match specific targets. Table 2.1 summarizes the
parameter values that result from the calibration of the baseline version of the model. The annual
interest rate is targeted at 3%, which implies a time discount factor βs = 0.99 for the savers. The
annual depreciation rate of the durable good is set at 4%, which pins down the value of δ = 0.01.
Both types of agents are assumed to supply one third of their total time endowment; the disutility
of labor parameters are then given by νs = 4.92 and νb = 8.23.43 The other preference parameter,
α = 0.69, is calibrated so that the total share of private spending on the durable good is 20%.
42In calibrating the model, rather than specifying the value of the scaling parameters νs and νb, the scale of the
economy is determined instead by fixing n˜b = n˜s = 1/3.
43The total time endowment for both agents is normalized to one; Hb = Hs = 1.
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Table 2.1: Table of Parameter Values for the Baseline Model
Calibrated Arbitrary
Parameter Value Parameter Value
βs 0.99 βb 0.98
δ 0.01 θ 1.00
νs 4.92 φpi 1.50
νb 8.23 ρ 0.50
j 5.00 κ 0.50
χ 0.29
α 0.69
Φc 0.75
Φd 0.50
The parameter χ = 0.29, which controls the fraction of the durable good that can be pledged as
collateral, is determined by requiring a loan-to-value ratio of 70% for the borrowers.
As for the parameters that enter the production side of the economy, Φj is chosen to match
the average price adjustment frequencies in the durable and non-durable sectors. I assume that the
durable sector can adjust prices more frequently; the durable sector adjustment frequency is set to
two quarters (Φd = 0.5) and the non-durable sector to four quarters (Φc = 0.75). To simplify the
analysis, both sectors have a price markup of 20%; which implies c = d = 5.
The rest of the agents’ parameters are fixed at arbitrarily chosen values. Following Krusell and
Smith (1998), the preference discount factor for the borrowers is set to βb = 0.98. The inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is fixed at θ = 1, which I impose so that the model more closely
resembles the one presented on Chapter 1.
Regarding the parameters that control the behavior of the monetary authority, I assume that
κ = 0.5; the durable and non-durable sectors are weighted equally in the composite inflation index.
Following standard practice in the literature, I impose the Taylor principle and set φpi = 1.5. This
assumption ensures the existence and uniqueness of a rational expectations equilibrium in a vast
class of linear New Keynesian models.
Finally, the persistence of the monetary policy shock is set to ρ = 0.5. This is perhaps the only
parameter value that is not within the range of standard values in the literature. In order to match
some second moments of the data, the persistence of the monetary policy shock is usually much
larger, ρ ∼ 0.95. In this sense, the results presented on this chapter illustrate the effect of credit
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Figure 2.2: Total Aggregate Output Response to a Negative Shock in the Taylor Rule
constraints under a mild transmission mechanism. Increasing the persistence of this exogenous
process would further enhance the effect of credit constraints on the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
2.4.2 Impulse Response functions
The main result is given Figure 2.2, which illustrates the response of real total output to a 25 b.p.
surprise decrease in the monetary policy rule. Total output measures overall production in the
economy in units of the non-durable good; it is defined as Y Tt ≡ Yc,t + qtYd,t. The baseline
economy where no agent is borrowing constrained (Ωb → 0) replicates the result of the canonical
New Keynesian model; a negative monetary policy shock stimulates the economy by inducing a
positive response in total output. This response is largest upon impact, but it remains positive
for all subsequent periods. However, as the fraction of borrowing constrained agents increases
(Ωb = 0.5), the stimulus to the economy becomes smaller. In the limiting case where all agents
in the economy are credit constrained (Ωb → 1), the negative monetary policy shock results in an
economic contraction instead of an stimulus.
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Figure 2.3: Price Response to a Negative Shock in the Taylor Rule
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider first the qualitative effect of the monetary
policy shock on prices; as shown on Figure 2.3. Recall from Chapter 1 that the credit constraint has
a rather small effect on equilibrium prices. Thus one can expect that, in the economy with credit
constraints, prices react to the monetary policy shock in the same way they do in the canonical New
Keynesian model. Sectorial inflation increases, but the increase is larger in the durables sector (the
relatively more flexible sector). Thus, the relative price q increases as well. Note that larger prices
are a consequence of higher productions costs; which is evinced in the increase of the wage rates
wc and wd. Given that the nominal wage is the same in both sectors but the price level increases
by more in the durables sector, the increase in the real wage rate in units of the durable good wd is
smaller than its counterpart in units of the non-durable good wc.
Given the effect of the monetary policy shock on prices, agents adjust their bond holdings as
shown in Figure 2.4. The adjustment is qualitatively similar in the canonical New Keynesian model
(Ωb → 0) and in the models with credit constraints (Ωb = 0.5 and Ωb → 1). However, the force
driving the adjustment is substantially different between the two models. In the canonical model,
the increase in the borrowers’ debt holdings is driven by the inter-temporal substitution effect.44 In
44Strictly speaking, the canonical New Keynesian model is given by the case Ωb = 0. Under this scenario, the
substitution effect is a consequence of the decrease in the nominal interest rate. The model with Ωb → 0 is a very “close”
approximation to the canonical model; the substitution effect also dominates in this model but the decrease in the nominal
rate happens only from the second quarter onwards.
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Figure 2.4: Bond Market Response to a Negative Shock in the Taylor Rule
the model with borrowing constraints, the increase in the borrowers’ debt holdings is driven by the
increase in the collateral’s market value; the larger relative price (qt) and inflation (pid,t) increase
the durable good’s market value. Thus the negative monetary policy shock relaxes the borrowing
constraint, evinced by the decrease in the constraint multiplier ζbt . As the constraint is relaxed, the
borrowers are able to access more debt. Note that this leads to an initial increase in the nominal
interest rate Rt; the debt market needs to clear and the increase in the nominal rate provides enough
incentive for the savers to lend the additional funds to the borrowers.
The adjustment in the remainder of the borrowers’ allocation is also qualitatively similar for
the models with and without credit constraints; durable and non-durable consumption increase in
response to the negative monetary policy shock as seen in Figure 2.5. However, in the presence
of credit constraints, the responses are driven by wealth effects rather than substitution effects. As
discussed in the previous paragraph, the borrowers’ debt holdings increase due to the relaxation of
the credit constraint. Larger debt effectively increases the borrowers’ current wealth. In addition,
the increase in the durable’s relative price qt implies a larger market value of the inherited durable
holdings. The overall larger wealth is then responsible for the increase in durable and non-durable
consumption. Note that the intuition behind this mechanism is exactly the same intuition described
in Chapter 1; except that there I considered the case of going from no credit constraint to having a
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binding credit constraint (which is equivalent to a “tightening” of the credit constraint).
The savers’ consumption allocation response is qualitatively different in the canonical New Key-
nesian model (Ωb → 0) compared to the response in the models with credit constraints (Ωb = 0.5
and Ωb → 1); as seen in Figure 2.5. As the fraction of credit constrained agents in the economy
increases, the savers’ non-durable and durable consumption responses become negative; the “ex-
pansionary” monetary policy shock can decrease overall consumption for the saver. As discussed in
Chapter 1, this is a consequence of the indirect general equilibrium effects playing a more impor-
tant role than the inter-temporal substitution interest rate effect. There are two competing indirect
wealth effects. On one hand, there is a negative wealth effect driven by the additional lending to
borrowers and the decrease in firm profits; the latter is mainly a consequence of higher production
costs due to larger sectorial wage rates. On the other hand, the general equilibrium increase in the
durable’s relative price increases the market value of the inherited durable holdings. As the frac-
tion of borrowing constrained agents increases, the negative wealth effect dominates; this explains
why durable and non-durable consumption both decrease for large enough Ωb. However, durable
consumption responds negatively to the monetary “stimulus” even for small Ωb; a consequence of
additional negative substitution effects for the durable good. The increase in the durable’s relative
price makes non-durable consumption relatively more attractive. Furthermore, the increase in the
nominal interest rate makes the nominal bond a relatively more attractive savings vehicle. Therefore,
savers decrease their durable holdings since this good is now less attractive, both as a consumption
good and as a wealth transferring device, even if they experience a positive wealth effect. Finally,
note that when the fraction of credit constraint agents is very small (Ωb → 0), the resulting posi-
tive wealth effect and the negative substitution effects cancel each other out and there is almost no
deviation in the savers’ durable consumption response.
To understand the aggregate effect of the monetary policy shock, consider first non-durable out-
put Yc. On one hand, the borrowers’ non-durable consumption response to the monetary policy
shock is similar to representative agent’s consumption response in the canonical New Keynesian
model regardless of the fraction of credit constraint agents; a negative monetary policy shock im-
plies an increase in the borrower’s consumption for all periods after impact. On the other hand,
the savers’ non-durable consumption response is similar to the representative agent’s consumption
response in the canonical New Keynesian model only when the fraction of credit constraint agents
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Figure 2.5: Agents’ Consumption Response to a Negative Shock in the Taylor Rule
is sufficiently small; a negative monetary policy shock leads to a contraction in the savers’ non-
durable consumption when Ωb is too large. In the end, the non-durable output response is similar
to the output response in the canonical New Keynesian model; the negative monetary policy shock
leads to an stimulus in the non-durable sector, as shown by the panel “Yc” in Figure 2.3. When the
fraction of credit constraint agents is small (say the cases of Ωb → 0 and Ωb = 0.5), both borrow-
ers’s and savers’ effectively behave like the representative agent in the canonical New Keynesian
model. When the fraction of credit constraint agents (borrowers) is large (say the case of Ωb → 1),
the borrowers drive the increase in non-durable output despite the savers’ experiencing a contrac-
tion in non-durable consumption. Finally, note that although the the non-durable output response
is similar to the output response in the canonical New Keynesian model, there is one feature that
is different; the non-durable output response need not be the largest upon impact (which is evident
from the cases Ωb → 0 and Ωb = 0.5). This is is a consequence of the initial increase in the nominal
interest rate; savers need this incentive to be willing to lend more funds to borrowers as their credit
constraint relaxes due to the increase in the collateral value. The larger nominal rate upon impact
has a slightly negative inter-temporal substitution effect on current non-durable consumption.
Consider next aggregate durable output Yd, which is also given in Figure 2.3. Again, the borrow-
ers’ durable consumption response to the monetary policy shock is similar to representative agent’s
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consumption response in the canonical New Keynesian model; regardless of the fraction of credit
constrained agents. A negative monetary policy shock implies an increase in the borrower’s durable
consumption for all periods after impact. However, the savers’ durable consumption response is
completely different from the consumption response of the representative agent in the canonical
New Keynesian model; as long as there are some credit constrained agents, a negative monetary
policy shock implies a contraction in the savers’ durable consumption for all periods. Recall that
when the fraction of credit constraint agents is very small (Ωb → 0), the interaction of the indirect
wealth and substitution effects lead to no adjustment in the savers’ durable consumption as these
effect cancel each other out. As the fraction of credit constrained agents increases, the indirect
general equilibrium effects imply a larger contraction in the savers’ durable consumption. Overall,
the decrease in savers’ durable consumption is responsible for the contraction in the durable output
sector, as seen in panel Yd of Figure 2.3. Note that the contraction gets worse as the fraction of
credit constrained agent increases; despite less savers in the economy, the decrease in their durable
holdings is large enough to account for the total durable output decrease. Note that the durable out-
put response is somewhat attenuated upon impact (for instance, for the cases Ωb → 0 and Ωb = 0.5,
the aggregate durable output response is positive upon impact). Again, this is a consequence of the
initial increase in the nominal interest rate; there is a slightly positive inter-temporal substitution
effect given the durable’s storability property.
Finally, the effect on total output Y T presented in Figure 2.2 is given by the combination of
the effects on non-durable (Yc) and durable (Yc) output. When the fraction of the population that
is credit constrained is relatively small (say the cases Ωb → 0 and Ωb = 0.5), the monetary policy
shock affects total output as it does in the canonical New Keynesian model. A negative monetary
policy shock leads to an expansion in total output, which is driven mostly by the increase in produc-
tion in the non-durable sector. In turn, this increase in non-durable output is mostly a consequence
of the increase in borrowers’ consumption that results from a relaxation in their credit constraint.
However, when there are enough credit constrained agents (for instance the case Ωb → 1), total out-
put response differs substantially from the output response in the canonical New Keynesian model;
a negative monetary policy shock leads to a contraction of total output. The contraction is mostly
driven by the decrease in savers’ durable consumption; a consequence of large negative wealth and
substitution effects that arise from indirect general equilibrium adjustments.
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Overall, even for the cases where the fraction of credit constrained agents is small, the monetary
policy transmission mechanism is different than the mechanism in the canonical New Keynesian
model. In the later, the consumption response is mostly driven by the inter-temporal substitution
effect arising from the adjustments in the real (nominal) interest rate. In my model with credit con-
straints, the transmission mechanism depends on the agents’ type. For borrowers, the consumption
adjustments following the monetary policy shock are mostly a consequence of the changes in the
collateral’s market value; which depends not only on the real interest rate but also on the relative
price of the durable good. For savers, the consumption adjustments are mostly driven by wealth
effects arising from the adjustment in firms’ profits (a consequence of wage rate adjustments) and
substitution effects arising from changes in the real interest rate and the durable’s relative price.
2.5 Conclusion
I investigate the effect of credit constraints on the monetary policy transmission mechanism using
a standard two-sector New Keynesian model. The model features two types of agents who differ
on their degree of patience, a durable and non-durable production sectors, nominal pricing frictions
a` la Calvo in each sector, a nominal bond, and a monetary authority which is introduced via a
Taylor rule. The credit constraint is introduced as a collateral constraint that limits borrowing via
the nominal bond; the relatively more impatient agents must use the durable good as collateral to
back their borrowing.
Given this set up, I show that the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the model with
credit constraints is significantly different from the transmission mechanism in the canonical New
Keynesian model without financial frictions. In the later, the consumption response following a
monetary policy shock is mostly driven by the inter-temporal substitution effect arising from the
adjustments in the real (nominal) interest rate. In my model with credit constraints, the transmis-
sion mechanism depends on the agents’ type. For the more impatient agents (who face the credit
constraint), the consumption adjustments following the monetary policy shock are mostly a conse-
quence of the changes in the collateral’s market value; the relative price of the durable good adjusts
in response to the monetary policy shock. For the more patient agents (who don’t face the credit
constraint), the consumption changes are driven by wealth and substitution effects arising from in-
direct general equilibrium adjustments. The wealth effects are mostly due to two factors. First, the
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change in agents’ nominal asset position; the bond market clearing implies the patient agents must
adjust their bond holdings to meet the borrowers’ adjustment in debt. Second, the change in firms’
profits; production costs change as real wages adjust to clear the labor market. Although there is
an inter-temporal substitution effect that arises due to the change in the real (nominal) interest rate,
this effect is secondary compared to the intra-temporal substitution effect arising from adjustments
in the durable’s relative price.
Furthermore, I show that this difference in the monetary policy transmission mechanism is rel-
evant from an aggregate perspective; when the number of credit constrained agents is sufficiently
large, a surprise negative monetary policy shock (traditionally associated with a monetary stimu-
lus) can have contractionary effects. When the fraction of the population that is credit constrained
is relatively small, the monetary policy shock affects total output as it does in the canonical New
Keynesian model. The increase in total output resulting from the negative monetary policy shock is
driven by the increase in non-durable output. In turn, the increase in non-durable output is mostly
a consequence of the increase in the impatient agent’s consumption that results from a relaxation in
their credit constraint. However, when there fraction of the population that is credit constrained is
sufficiently large, total output response differs substantially from the output response in the canoni-
cal New Keynesian model; a negative monetary policy shock leads to a contraction of total output.
The contraction is mostly driven by the decrease in savers’ durable consumption; a consequence
of large negative wealth and substitution effects that arise from indirect general equilibrium adjust-
ments.
Overall, the simple exercise conducted in this chapter illustrates that financial frictions (here
in the form of credit constraints) can have very important implications for the monetary policy
transmission mechanism and its effect on aggregate output.
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CHAPTER 3
An Empirical Assessment of the Transmission of Monetary Policy
Abstract
In this chapter I conduct an empirical study of the transmission of monetary pol-
icy via credit costs. I consider three channels of transmission; the term structure of
market interest rates (conventional channel), the spread over risk-free rates due to fi-
nancial frictions (credit spread channel), and the non-spread credit conditions such as
credit limits (non-spread credit channel). I am able to quantify the contribution of each
channel by using an external instrument approach for the identification of the monetary
policy surprise. I find that the credit channel can account for about 20% of the variance
of durable expenditures and about 30% of the variance of non-durable expenditures
following unanticipated monetary policy announcements. In addition, the non-spread
factors can account for as much as half of the total contribution of the credit channel.
JEL Codes: E43, E44, E52, G10
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3.1 Introduction
Over most of the post-war period, the Federal Reserve has conduced monetary policy by adjust-
ing the Federal Funds rate. The rationale being that adjustments in the Federal Funds rate would
in turn lead to adjustments in market interest rates and credit costs. Thus, with this indirect ef-
fect on credit/asset markets, the Federal Reserve could influence aggregate borrowing, saving, and
consumption outcomes. The actual mechanism by which the changes (or announcements about
changes) in the Federal Funds rate translate into changes in the credit costs is what I refer to as the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
The conventional view on the monetary policy transmission mechanism is captured in the canon-
ical New Keynesian model without financial frictions. In this instance, the transmission takes place
via the conventional channel; credit costs are entirely reflected in the expected future path of short-
term rates (Fed Funds rate). However, in the early 90’s, a strand of literature exemplified by papers
such as Bernanke (1993) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995) started inquiring about the role of credit
market frictions. A few years later, the seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999) provided a micro-founded link between
credit market frictions and the resulting credit costs. In both cases, the outcome is that credit costs
incorporate a credit spread over the short-rate which depends on the net worth (asset position) of
agents. In this context, monetary policy can be transmitted via the credit spread channel. To the ex-
tent that monetary policy can affect the net worth of agents, it can lead to changes in credit spreads.
Much of the current literature still builds upon either of these two frameworks and, as a result, most
models of policy transmission reflect only these two channels of transmission via credit costs; the
conventional and credit spread channels.
On the empirical side, a large strand of literature has been devoted to assess the importance of
each of these two channels for the transmission of monetary policy. Much of the recent work, such
as Jime´nez et al. (2012), Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2015), and Gertler and Karadi (2015),
focuses on the question of whether the credit channel is quantitatively relevant for the transmis-
sion of monetary policy. In this chapter, I revisit this question and find that, as suggested by this
literature, the credit channel’s contribution for the transmission of monetary policy is as large, if
not larger, than that of the conventional channel. In addition, I complement the existing work by
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exploring whether, within the credit channel, there is an additional transmission sub-channel (the
credit non-spread channel) that is quantitatively relevant for the transmission of monetary policy.
My motivation follows from the observation that, as pointed out earlier, most of the theory devel-
oped to explain the credit channel limits financial frictions to be solely reflected via credit spreads.
However, a considerable portion of the tightening/relaxing of credit conditions takes place through
adjustments in factors other than credit spreads. This is of particular importance for household
credit, in which credit limits, credit scores or credit score exceptions seem to be the more relevant
factors. I find that this non-spread sub-channel accounts for about half of the total contribution of
the credit channel. This would suggest that including non-spread transmission channels in the mod-
eling of monetary policy transmission is important. Furthermore, including such channels might be
a step towards resolving the critique first proposed by Kocherlakota (2000) that financial frictions
a` la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Ben S. Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1999),
although qualitatively attractive, are quantitative unimportant.45
The approach I take combines the strengths of two strands of empirical literature. First, as in
Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2015) and Jime´nez et al. (2012), I use survey data obtained from
banks in order to measure the overall credit conditions. In this sense, I allow for a more general
scope of credit costs rather than restricting them to be solely captured by credit spreads. Second, as
in Gertler and Karadi (2015), I use an external instrument identification approach for the monetary
policy shock rather than the recursive identification scheme a` la Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996). This allows me to avoid making strong a priori restrictions about the nature of the interaction
between the policy instrument and the rest of the variables in the model.
I study the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the context of a reduced form vector
autoregression (VAR) that includes three type of variables: nominal, real and financial. Within the
financial factors, I use variables constructed using data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey
(SLOOS) as well as credit spreads associated with three important credit markets: commercial and
industrial loans, mortgage loans, and commercial paper loans. I proceed in two steps. First, I show
that the SLOOS variables contain additional information about the credit conditions, which is not
reflected in the credit spreads. I attribute this additional information to the non-spread factors of
45The financial accelerator and collateral constraint type of frictions yield purely spread-based transmission mecha-
nisms.
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credit costs; credit score and collateral requirements, credit limits, etc. Second, taking advantage of
the additional information in the SLOOS variables, I quantify the contribution of the credit channel
and each of its two sub-channels (credit spread and non-spread) for monetary policy transmission.
The first result about the additional information of the SLOOS variables is reflected in two
aspects. First, following an unanticipated monetary policy announcement, the credit spreads cap-
ture mostly short-term changes in the credit conditions. However, the SLOOS variables reflect
short-term and long-term changes. Second, the credit spreads can only account for a “common”
component of credit conditions in the commercial and industrial, mortgage, and household credit
markets (with a slight bias toward the commercial and industrial loans market). There are other
credit conditions, specific to the mortgage and household credit markets, that are captured by the
SLOOS variables which are not reflected in the credit spreads. Importantly, an unanticipated mon-
etary policy announcement does significantly affect these other credit conditions.
My second result is that the changes in credit conditions that follow an unanticipated mone-
tary policy announcement play a significant role for the monetary policy transmission. This credit
channel is particularly important for the reaction of non-durable and durable expenditures. To put
it in perspective, the contribution of the credit channel can be as large as the contribution of the
conventional channel, accounting for about 20% of the transmission for durable expenditures and
30% for non-durables. Additionally, a misspecified VAR model that doesn’t include any financial
sector does not only fail to capture the credit channel, but it over-emphasizes the importance of the
conventional channel. This last observation is most relevant for non-durable expenditures, where
the contribution of the conventional channel can be overstated by as much as 20%.
Finally, my third result suggests that the composition of the credit channel is relevant. I find
that within the credit channel, roughly half of the monetary policy transmission can be attributed to
changes in credit spreads and half to changes in other credit conditions (although for non-durables
the contribution of the non-spread component can be as large as two thirds). Interestingly, most of
the contribution of the non-spread component is captured by the SLOOS credit demand variables.
However, when only the credit spreads are used as proxies of the financial sector, the effect of
the non-spread component is attributed instead to changes in the commercial paper spread. This
finding suggests that there might be an omitted common factor which affects both, commercial
paper spreads and credit demand for mortgages and household credit.
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Altogether, these results are further evidence of the importance of financial frictions in the mod-
eling of monetary policy transmission. The novel contribution of this chapter relates to the compo-
sition of the credit channel. Models that restrict financial frictions to be solely embodied by credit
spreads might fail to capture a large fraction of the transmission of unanticipated monetary policy
news to aggregate activity; specially for non-durable and durable good expenditures. Models which
explicitly incorporate the non-spread channels (credit limits, credit scores, down payments) might
have a better change of fitting the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the data for the empirical
analysis. I provide a detailed description of the relationship between the SLOOS and the credit
spreads. Section 3.3 formally introduces the econometric framework I use. I discuss the external in-
strument approach used for the identification of the monetary policy shock along with the modified
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition. I show how these tools allow me to quantify the contribu-
tion of the different channels for monetary policy transmission. Section 3.4 discusses the different
VAR specifications I estimate along with my choice of instruments. Section 3.5 discusses the main
results of the paper. Finally, Section 3.6 presents my concluding remarks.
3.2 Data
I analyze monthly data that includes economic, financial, and credit variables. The data spans the
period 1990:1 to 2012:6.46 The economic variables include measures of aggregate economic activity
and prices. In particular, I use data on industrial production (IP), durable (D) and non-durable (C)
expenditures, households’ debt (B), and the CPI as the measure of aggregate prices. When included
in the VAR specification, all these variables are logged. In addition the aggregate activity variables
are deflated using the CPI.47
For the monetary policy indicator, I use the one-year rate.48 As it will be explained in more detail
in Section 3.3, there is a difference between the policy instrument and the policy indicator. The use
of the one-year rate as the policy indicator does not imply that the Federal Reserve conducts policy
46The sample period is selected purely for reasons of data availability. The survey data used to construct the credit
variables is only available starting in 1990:1. In addition, some of the credit spreads and the external instruments used
for the high frequency identification are taken from previous studies, such as Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2012), Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack and Swanson (2005), and Gertler and Karadi (2015); and thus are available only through 2012:6.
47The IP and CPI variables were taken from FRED while C, D, and B where obtained from FRB Flow of Funds.
48The discussion presented in the paper is based on the one-year rate as the policy indicator. However, robustness
checks were done using the short-term and two-year rates and the results continue to hold.
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by directly manipulating this rate. As the general consensus dictates, I presume that the Federal
Reserve conducts policy by directly controlling the federal funds rate (i.e. the policy instrument).
However, through the usual term structure argument, any movements in the federal funds rate affect
the one-year rate. In this sense, the one-year rate is an indicator of the monetary policy stance. The
advantage of using this mid-term rate is that it, in addition to reflecting current movements in the
policy instrument, it captures movements in its expected future path.
For the financial sector, I use three different credit spreads: the excess bond premium (EBP)
constructed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsˇek (2012), a mortgage spread (SPMort) and the three-month
commercial paper spread (SPCP). These variables pertain to three important financial markets in
the U.S. The EBP reflects the long-term credit cost for the non-farm production sector. The SPMort
is a proxy for the cost of home ownership. Finally, the SPCP is relevant for the cost of short-term
business credit and consumer durable purchases.49
For the credit sector, I use data from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) to
construct seven variables that reflect the credit demand and supply conditions for the economy. I
construct credit supply variables for four different loan types: commercial and industrial (C&IS),
mortgages (MortS), households’ non-credit card (NCCS), and households’ credit cards (CCS). Sim-
ilarly, I construct credit demand variables for three different loan types: commercial and industrial
(C&ID), mortgages (MortD), and households’ loans (HHD, which include both, credit and non-credit
card).50 The credit supply variables are constructed as the net percent of banks that “tightened” the
standards for approving the different loan types during the quarter. A positive/negative value indi-
cates that it is relatively hard/easy to get this particular type of loan because, overall, banks now
require tougher/weaker standards. A larger magnitude is associated with a larger number of banks
that require tougher/weaker standards. The credit demand variables are constructed in a similar
way. For each of the three different loan types, they measure the net percent of banks that reported
a “stronger” demand for loans. A positive/negative value is associated with an increase/decrease
in aggregate demand for loans. The magnitude of the variable reflects the number of banks that
reported an increase/decrease in the demand for the different loans.
49The mortgage and the three-month commercial paper spreads are taken from Gertler and Karadi (2015).
50Although the SLOOS contains quarterly data, I convert it to a monthly frequency. For the discussion presented here,
the monthly time series is constructed by assuming that for the months within a quarter, the values are held fixed at their
quarterly level. The results are robust to alternative interpolation procedures (i.e. linear or cubic splines).
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Figure 3.1: Credit Demand and Supply Measures from the SLOOS (Quarterly, 1990:1-2012:2)
Note: SLOOS data about credit supply conditions for households’ credit and non-credit card
loans is available only from 1995:4. Data about credit demand conditions for C&I and house-
holds’s credit and non-credit card is available only from 1991:3.
Figure 3.1 displays the seven SLOOS variables. As seen in the top panel, some of the credit
supply tightening episodes coincide with recessionary periods: the savings and loans crisis of 1989
and the early 90’s recession, the global stock mini-crash of 1997 in the wake of the Asian Crisis,
the early 2000’s recession, and the 2008 financial crisis. There are some additional features of the
SLOOS data that are worth pointing out. First, the credit demand variables exhibit a much larger
volatility than their supply counterparts. Second, the credit supply variables are highly correlated
with each other. The correlation coefficients range between 0.479 and 0.879. The highest correla-
tions occur between the variables that capture the credit standards for household loans: mortgages,
credit card and non-credit card (with correlation coefficients in excess of 0.75). Note that the de-
mand side variables seem to be correlated as well, but not as strongly. The correlation coefficients
for this block are only in the range of 0.354 to 0.449. Finally, there seems to be some negative
correlation between the credit demand and supply variables.51
The large overall correlation displayed by the credit variables has some important consequences
for the way in which I perform the empirical analysis. In order to avoid multicollinearity when
estimating the different VAR specifications, I use a principal component decomposition as an or-
51Table 5.1 in Section ?? presents the corresponding correlation coefficients.
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thogonalization procedure for the credit variables. For each of the two blocks, credit supply and
demand, I extract the principal components and use those as the measures of credit supply and de-
mand conditions.52 The principal components for the credit supply block are given by PC1S, PC
2
S,
PC3S, and PC
4
S. The first principal component
(
PC1S
)
reflects the overall credit supply conditions
for all loan types, with a slight bias for the commercial and industrial loans. The second principal
component
(
PC2S
)
captures mostly the credit supply conditions for the commercial and industrial
loans and credit card loans. The third
(
PC3S
)
and fourth
(
PC4S
)
principal components reflect the
credit supply conditions for the mortgage and non-credit card loans, respectively. For the credit
demand block the principal components are PC1D, PC
2
D, and PC
3
D. Unlike the case of the supply
block, there is no common component and each principal component is mostly associated with a
specific loan type. The first
(
PC1D
)
and third
(
PC3D
)
principal components reflect the conditions for
households’ loans (mortgages, credit card and non-credit card loans); while the second principal
component
(
PC2D
)
is mostly associated with commercial and industrial loans.53
Given the survey nature of the SLOOS, there are two questions that naturally arise. First,
whether or not the SLOOS data contains relevant information about the credit conditions in the
economy. Second, if the SLOOS data is indeed relevant, the extent to which this information is
different from the information captured by other measures of credit costs, such as credit spreads. In
order to shed some light into the issue, Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present some results about the explanatory
power of the SLOOS variables on the credit spreads and vice-versa.
The results about the explanatory power of the SLOOS variables on the credit spreads are sum-
marized in Table 3.1. The table presents the output of simple regressions of each of the credit
spreads on all the non-orthogonalized SLOOS variables.54 These results suggest a very large ex-
planatory power of the SLOOS variables for the EBP and mortgage spreads. The EBP is mostly
explained by the credit supply conditions for all four different loan types and by the credit demand
conditions for the commercial and industrial loans (all these variables have coefficients that are sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level). As for the mortgage spreads, the relevant information is captured
52The results are robust to alternative orthogonalization procedures, such as using the residuals of simple regressions
within each block.
53Table 5.2 in Section ?? presents the loading factors for the principal component decomposition.
54The relatively large explanatory power of the SLOOS variables on the credit spreads is robust to the orthogonaliza-
tion procedure. Depending on how the data is orthogonalized, the Adj. R2 ranges are given by: 0.637-0.680 for the EBP,
0.472-0.634 for the SPMort, and 0.361-0.381 for the SPCP.
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Table 3.1: Explanatory Power of SLOOS on Credit Spreads (Monthly, 1995:10-2012:6)
EBP SPMort SPCP
C&IS 0.015∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(7.383) (10.077) (6.320)
MortS 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.001
(3.230) (4.873) (−0.766)
NCCS −0.013∗∗∗ −0.006∗ 0.004
(−2.855) (−1.961) (1.426)
CCS 0.010∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(3.017) (−0.808) (−0.402)
C&ID −0.008∗∗∗ −0.001∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(−5.002) (−1.802) (6.552)
MortD 0.001 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.649) (−2.519) (−2.322)
HHD 0.002 0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗
(1.091) (3.332) (−1.794)
Observations 201 201 201
Adj. R2 0.680 0.634 0.369
F-statistic 55.435 63.434 17.162
Note: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level
by the credit supply conditions for commercial and industrial and mortgage loans (with coefficients
that are significant at the 1 percent level) and the credit demand conditions for all types of household
loans (with coefficients that are significant at the 5 percent level). Finally, for the commercial paper
spread, the SLOOS variables have some explanatory power but not as much as for the other two
spreads (with an Adj. R2 of only 0.369). Interestingly, the credit demand conditions seem to be the
relevant ones in explaining this spread (all three credit demand variables have coefficients that are
significant at the 10 percent level). Overall, the information contained in the credit spreads seems
to be explained relatively well by the SLOOS variables.
Table 3.2 summarizes the results about the explanatory power of the credit spreads on the
SLOOS variables. The output presented corresponds to simple regressions of each of the non-
orthogonalized SLOOS variables on the three credit spreads. These results suggest a limited ex-
planatory power of the credit spreads. The only variable they adequately explain is the credit supply
for commercial and industrial loans, with an Adj. R2 of 0.638. For the other credit supply and
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Table 3.2: Explanatory Power of Credit Spreads on SLOOS variables (Monthly, 1990:1-2012:6)
C&IS MortS NCCS CCS C&ID MortD HHD
EBP 20.063∗∗∗ 8.872∗∗∗ 15.181∗∗∗ 19.062∗∗∗ −24.974∗∗∗ 18.381∗∗∗ −2.231
(7.696) (5.044) (8.311) (9.639) (−8.950) (5.052) (−0.863)
SPMort 18.861∗∗∗ 13.279∗∗∗ −4.365 −20.527∗∗∗ −15.633∗∗∗ −20.970∗∗ −6.799
(4.344) (2.972) (−0.762) (−3.212) (−2.659) (−2.207) (−1.196)
SPCP 22.933∗∗∗ 21.544∗∗∗ 21.220∗∗∗ 18.155∗∗∗ 17.421∗∗∗ −44.123∗∗∗ −25.798∗∗∗
(5.082) (4.937) (5.881) (4.534) (3.327) (−5.489) (−6.438)
Observations 270 267 201 201 252 264 252
Adj. R2 0.638 0.406 0.443 0.333 0.477 0.137 0.147
F-statistic 73.591 26.897 60.332 48.076 96.675 19.464 22.273
Note: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. Number of observations constrained by SLOOS data availability.
∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level
demand variables, the explanatory power of the credit spreads is only modest, with the Adj. R2
ranging between 0.137 to 0.477. Interestingly, the explanatory power of the credit spreads is the
smallest for the variables that pertain to the credit demand conditions for household loans (mort-
gages, non-credit card and credit card loans).55 In conclusion, a large amount of the information
contained by the SLOOS variables can’t be explained by the credit spreads.
From a heuristic standpoint, the results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide evidence about
the larger information content of the SLOOS variables. This additional information might stem from
other non-spread factors that affect credit conditions, such as credit limits, collateral requirements,
credit score requirements, credit score exceptions, just to name a few.
3.3 Econometric Framework
The model I use is a vector autoregression (VAR) which includes nominal, real, and credit variables.
For the identification of the monetary policy shock, I use the external instrument methodology pro-
posed by Gertler and Karadi (2015). This approach relies on the ideas of high frequency identifi-
cation (HFI) applied within the context of a VAR.56 I use this procedure for three reasons. First,
it allows me to include financial and credit variables in the VAR specification without imposing a
55When the regressions from Table 3.2 are done using the orthogonalized SLOOS variables, the credit spreads are
only able to explain one of the components of each of the credit supply and demand blocks. For both blocks, the Adj.
R2 of the “main” component regression on the credit spreads is of about 0.6. The remaining components are very poorly
explained by the credit spreads, with an Adj. R2 ranging from 0.01 to about 0.06.
56Some papers that make use of the HFI procedure in other contexts are Kuttner (2001), Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swan-
son (2005), and Hamilton (2009).
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priori restrictions on the interaction between them and the federal funds rate (or the policy instru-
ment).57 Second, depending on the choice of policy indicator and external instrument, the identified
policy surprise can include shocks to forward guidance. That is, the identified surprise is informative
not only about the current policy stance, but also about the expected future policy stance. Finally, in
conjunction with an adaptation of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD), it allows me
to quantify the contribution of each of the different channels for the monetary policy transmission.
Let Zt be the vector of endogenous nominal, real, and credit variables; A,K conformable coef-
ficient matrices; B(L) a lag polynomial (of order p) conformable matrix; and t a vector of structural
white noise innovations with identity covariance matrix. The structural VAR that I consider is given
by
AZt = K + B(L) Zt−1 + t. (3.3.1)
Assuming that the matrix A is invertible so that S = A−1, the reduced form representation of
(3.3.1) is then
Zt = K˜ + B˜(L) Zt−1 + ut, (3.3.2)
with K˜ ≡ SK, B˜(L) ≡ SB(L), and the vector of reduced form shocks ut = St. Note that the
covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks is given by
Σ = Et
[
utu
′
t
]
= Et
[
SS′
]
. (3.3.3)
Define the monetary policy indicator zpt ∈ Zt as the variable in the structural representation
(3.3.1) associated with the fundamental policy shock pt ∈ t.58 Note that one can write t = [pt ˜t]′
57Note that the identification scheme of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996) assumes that within a period the fed
funds rate responds to all the variables in the VAR but not vice-versa. For aggregate activity variables, such as prices or
real output measures, this assumption might be justified if the frequency of the data is not too low (monthly or quarterly).
However, for financial and credit variables, this assumption is less likely to hold; even for monthly or quarterly data.
58As Gertler and Karadi (2015) note, there is a distinction between the monetary policy indicator and the monetary
policy instrument. The latter is the current period federal funds rate, through which the monetary authority conducts its
policy. The former is a proxy of the stance of monetary policy. By using a policy indicator with a longer maturity than
the current period fed funds rate (such as the yield on one year government bonds) one can capture shocks to forward
guidance. This is because longer maturity indicators reflect not only shifts in the current fed funds rate but also shifts in
expectations about the future path of short rates.
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and S =
[
sp S˜
]
, so that ut = sp
p
t + S˜˜t. The column vector s
p captures the impact of the
fundamental policy disturbance in each of the reduced form errors. Therefore, I interpret spj ∈ sp as
an indicator of the contemporaneous propagation of the monetary policy shock via variable zj ∈ Z.
This interpretation will allow me to quantify the relative contribution of the different channels for
the propagation of unanticipated monetary policy news, as I show later.
Since I am interested in analyzing the response of the system in (3.3.1) to the fundamental
monetary policy disturbance only, it suffices to identify and estimate the elements in sp rather than
the entire matrix S. To this end, denote sp = [spp s˜p]
′, where spp captures the contemporaneous
propagation of the monetary policy shock via the monetary policy indicator. Consider IVt, an
external instrument satisfying the following two conditions:
E [IVt pt ] = γ 6= 0 (3.3.4)
E [IVt ˜t] = 0. (3.3.5)
That is, the external instrument must be correlated with the fundamental monetary policy distur-
bance (equation (3.3.4), the relevance condition) while being orthogonal to all the other structural
disturbances (equation (3.3.5), the exogeneity condition).
Given the instrument IVt, I proceed as follows. First, I estimate the reduced form VAR in (3.3.2)
using OLS to obtain estimates of the parameter matrices ̂˜K and ̂˜B(L), the reduced form residual
vector, uˆt =
[
uˆpt
̂˜ut]′ (where uˆpt is the reduced form residual corresponding to the equation of the
policy indicator), and its corresponding covariance matrix, Σ̂. Second, I perform a two-stage least
squares regression of ̂˜ut on uˆpt using the instrument IVt:
First Stage: uˆpt = β IVt + ν
p
t (3.3.6)
Second Stage: ̂˜ut = α(βˆ IVt)+ ν˜t. (3.3.7)
Intuitively, given assumption (3.3.4), the fitted value of the first stage regression isolates the
variation of uˆpt that is due to the fundamental policy shock 
p
t . Meanwhile, the second stage re-
gression captures the variation of the remaining residuals that is due to pt . The advantage of using
this two-stage approach is that it identifies the vector of contemporaneous propagation coefficients,
sp, up to a scaling factor. This is because the coefficient of the second stage regression is given by
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α = s˜p (spp)
−1 and its OLS estimator, α̂, is consistent and unbiased whenever assumption (3.3.5)
holds. The procedure is completed by pinning down the scaling factor spp. As Gertler and Karadi
(2015) show, the restriction on the covariance matrix, equation (3.3.3), implies that spp can be iden-
tified up to a sign convention.59
Using the estimates sˆpp, α̂,
̂˜
K, and ̂˜B(L) along with the reduced from representation (3.3.2), one
can compute the impulse response functions (IRF’s) of the system. Additionally, as I show next, one
can use a procedure along the lines of a Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) in order to
quantify the contribution of the different channels for the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Since I am only interested in studying the transmission of the fundamental monetary policy
disturbance, in what follows, I assume ˜t = 0, ∀t. For any horizon h and using the moving average
(MA) representation of (3.3.2), the forecast error for the vector Zt can be written as
Zt+h − Et [Zt+h] =
h−1∑
q=0
Ψqut+h−q =
h−1∑
q=0
Ψqs
ppt+h−q (3.3.8)
with the MA coefficients defined recursively as Ψ0 = I and Ψq =
∑q
j=1 Ψq−jBj ,∀q ≥ 1. Note
that for j > p, Bj = 0; while for 1 ≤ j ≤ p, Bj denotes the jth autoregressive coefficients in the
reduced form representation
(
i.e B˜(L) Zt−1 =
∑p
j=1 BjZt−j
)
.
Let n denote the number of variables in the vector Z and consider the variable zit ∈ Zt. Denote
by spk the k
th component of the vector sp and by ψi,kq the
(
ith, kth
)
element of the matrix Ψq. In light
of (3.3.8), the forecast error variance of variable zit+h due exclusively to the fundamental monetary
policy shock, pt , is given by
FEVi (h) ≡ Var
(
zit+h − Et
[
zit+h
])
=
h−1∑
q=0
(
n∑
k=1
ψi,kq s
p
k
)2
. (3.3.9)
Consider the monetary policy transmission upon impact (i.e. h = 1). Since ψi,k0 = 1 iff i = k
and zero otherwise, the one-step ahead forecast error variance is FEVi (1) = (s
p
i )
2. The contempo-
raneous variation of variable zit due to an unexpected monetary policy announcement is completely
59Furthermore, Gertler and Karadi (2015) provide a closed form solution that yields sˆpp as a function of the estimated
parameters α̂ and Σ̂.
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summarized by the parameter spi . Furthermore, the ratio
φi =
FEVi (1)∑n
k=1 FEVk (1)
(3.3.10)
measures the size the contemporaneous variation in variable zi relative to the total variation induced
by the unexpected monetary policy shock. In this sense, φi quantifies the contribution of variable zi
to the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
In order to extend the previous idea to a forecast horizon h > 1, define
FEVi,k (h) ≡
h−1∑
q=0
(
ψi,kq s
p
k
)2
(3.3.11)
FEVvari (h) ≡
n∑
k=1
FEVi,k (h) (3.3.12)
FEVcovi (h) ≡
h−1∑
q=0
 n∑
k=1
(
ψi,kq s
p
k
) n∑
r 6=k
(
ψi,rq s
p
r
) . (3.3.13)
With j ≥ 1, an unanticipated monetary policy shock t+ j periods ahead (t+j) results in a contem-
poraneous change in variable zkt+j . Consider in addition variable z
i ∈ Z. For h > j, a change in
variable zk at time t+j leads to variation in zi at time t+h. Therefore, FEVi,k (h) quantifies the vari-
ation in zit+h due to changes induced in variable z
k by contemporaneous monetary policy shocks
from periods t+ j to t+h. In this sense, for any variable zi, FEVi,k (h) quantifies the transmission
of the monetary policy disturbance via variable zk alone. It follows that FEVvari (h) quantifies the
variation in zit+h due to individual changes induced in all the variables of Z by contemporaneous
monetary policy disturbances from periods t+ j to t+ h.
To understand the term FEVcovi (h), consider an additional variable z
r ∈ Z. Given the nature of
the VAR, the contemporaneous change in variable zkt+j due to t+j results in a simultaneous change
in variable zrt+j as well. Therefore, for h > j ≥ 1, there is some additional variation in zit+h due to
this simultaneous joint effect of the policy disturbance in variables zk and zr. Note that, within the
current set up, there is no way of telling the direction of causality of the simultaneous joint change.
That is, whether the induced change in zkt+j leads to the change in z
r
t+j or vice-versa. Therefore,
FEVcovi (h) quantifies the total transmission of the monetary policy disturbance via this covariance
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effect.
Using the previous definitions, the forecast error variance of variable zit+h, equation (3.3.9), can
be rewritten as FEVi (h) = FEVvari (h) + FEV
cov
i (h). The first term refers to the transmission of
policy via induced contemporaneous variance on individual variables. It captures the transmission
of monetary policy that can be attributed to a specific variable in Z. The second term refers to the
transmission of policy via induced contemporaneous covariance between variables. It captures the
transmission of monetary policy that can’t be associated with a specific variable within Z.60 In light
of these observations, for variable zi at forecast horizon h, I define
γi (h) ≡
|FEVvari (h)|
|FEVvari (h)|+ |FEVcovi (h)|
(3.3.14)
γ¯i ≡
h∑
j=0
γi (j)
h
. (3.3.15)
For any variable zi ∈ Z, equations (3.3.14) and (3.3.15) provide a lower bound on the fraction of the
forecast error variance that can be associated with a specific transmission channel. While γi (h) is
a measurement at a specific forecast period h, γ¯i is an average over the entire horizon of h periods.
So far, I have used the terms “channel” and “variable” interchangeably. In what follows, I allow
a channel to be more general in the sense that it can encompass the transmission of monetary policy
via a subset of variables. I define channel “x” of monetary policy transmission by considering the
set of variables Γx ⊂ Z and letting
FEVxi (h) ≡
∑
zk∈Γx
FEVi,k (h) . (3.3.16)
Furthermore, I define the relative contribution of channel x to be given by
φxi (h) ≡
FEVxi (h)
FEVvari (h)
, and (3.3.17)
φ
x
i ≡
h∑
j=0
φxi (h)
h
. (3.3.18)
60From expressions (3.3.12) and (3.3.13), FEVvari is the sum of the variances of the reduced form errors while FEV
cov
i
is the sum of the covariances of the reduced form errors. In both cases, the variances and covariances are associated with
a one standard deviation of the structural monetary policy shock.
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Expression (3.3.17) is a generalization of the ratio given by (3.3.10). That is, φxi (h) quantifies,
in percentage terms, the contribution of channel x for the monetary policy transmission at any
forecast horizon h ≥ 1. Note that (3.3.18) captures the same idea in terms of the average percentage
contribution over the horizon h.61
3.4 Estimation
The following section describes the different VAR specifications I use. In addition, it discusses my
choice of instruments for the identification of the monetary policy shock.
3.4.1 VAR specifications
I resort to three different VAR specifications: VAR1, VAR2, and VAR3, each indlcuding twelve lags.
The choice of these different specifications is motivated by the way in which I organize the paper.
I proceed in three steps. First, I study the information content of the SLOOS. Second, I quantify
the importance of the credit channel relative to that of the conventional channel. Lastly, within the
credit channel, I quantify the contribution of the spreads and non-spreads sub-channels.
I use the VAR1 to compare the information content between the SLOOS variables and the credits
spreads. I take the baseline specification of Gertler and Karadi (2015) (henceforth VARGK) as my
standard for comparison. The VARGK includes the log industrial production (IP), the log consumer
price index (CPI), the one-year government bond rate (1YR), and three credit spreads: the excess
bond premium (EBP), the mortgage spread (MortSP), and the commercial paper spread (CPSP).
Therefore, my VAR1 includes the variables IP, CPI, 1YR and replaces the credit spreads with a
subset of the principal components of the SLOOS variables (PC1S, PC
2
S, PC
3
S, PC
4
S, PC
1
D, PC
2
D, and
PC3D). I choose the VARGK as the standard for two reasons. First, it is used in the study the monetary
policy transmission via the credit channel, which is similar to my focus. Second, it uses the same
identification scheme as I do. Therefore, I can easily compare my conclusions with any results
derived using the VARGK and attribute the discrepancies to differences in the information content
between the SLOOS and credit spreads rather than to identification assumptions.
61Note that given the definition of the ratios φxi , it is not necessary to identify s
p
p. One can just estimate α (i.e. estimate
sp up to a scaling factor). Since the scaling factor is the same for all coefficients spi ∈ sp, it doesn’t affect the relevant
ratio.
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I use the other two specifications, VAR2 and VAR3, in order to take advantage of the informa-
tion content of the SLOOS variables. The additional information of the SLOOS variables, which
is not captured by the credit spreads, is mostly related to the credit conditions for household loans
(mortgages, non-credit card and credit card loans).62 Therefore, it is natural to think that this infor-
mation is most relevant in the context of the transmission of monetary policy to measures of real
aggregate activity pertaining to household consumption rather than those related to industrial pro-
duction. Hence, instead of the IP variable, I use the log consumer durable expenditures (D), the log
consumer non-durable expenditures (C), and the log households’ debt (B) in the VAR2 and VAR3
specifications.
More specifically, I use the VAR2 to quantify the contribution of the conventional and credit
channels for the monetary policy transmission mechanism. To this end, I consider three different
variants of the VAR2, which differ on their credit block. The first variant uses the three credit
spreads (EBP, MortSP, and CPSP); the second uses the principal components of the credit supply
and demand indicators (PC1S, PC
2
S, PC
3
S, PC
4
S, PC
1
D, PC
2
D, and PC
3
D); and the third one omits credit
variables altogether. By using the different variants I can assess whether the conventional and credit
channels’ contribution differs substantially when using alternative measures of credit conditions.
The instance without credit variables is used as a counterfactual experiment to analyze whether or
not the conventional channel is over estimated in a misspecified VAR that completely shuts down
the credit channel.
Finally, I use the VAR3 specification in order to asses if, within the credit channel, the non-
spread sub-channel is important for the monetary policy transmission. Taking advantage of the
larger information content of the SLOOS variables, I include in the credit block the three credit
spreads (EBP, MortSP, and CPSP) and the principal components of the SLOOS variables that reflect
the credit conditions for household loans (PC2S, PC
3
S, PC
4
S, PC
1
D, and PC
3
D). These principal com-
ponents contain information about the credit markets which is not reflected by the credit spreads;
hence they represent the non-spread sub-channel within the credit channel. Given this setting, I can
quantify and assess the importance of both, spread and non-spread, mechanisms for the transmission
of monetary policy.
62See Section 3.2.
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3.4.2 Instrument Choice
As per the instrumental variables methodology, any valid set of external instruments must satisfy
two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. In the context of the model that I consider, these two con-
ditions are given by equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5). The former amounts to the requirement that the
external instruments must be sufficiently correlated with the fundamental monetary policy shock.
The latter implies that the external instruments need to be uncorrelated with all the other fundamen-
tal disturbances implied by the model.63
Following the literature on High Frequency Identification (HFI) of monetary policy shocks, I
consider the set of futures rates surprises on FOMC meeting dates, as proposed by Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack and Swanson (2005), as my candidate set of instruments. This set includes the surprises in
the current and three month ahead monthly fed funds futures (FF0 and FF3, respectively) and the
surprises in the six, nine and twelve month ahead futures on three month Eurodollar deposits (ED6,
ED9, and ED12, respectively). This instrument data is available at a monthly frequency for the
period 1991:1 through 2012:6, which roughly coincides with the period for which the SLOOS data
is available.64
Each of the future rate surprises is constructed as the difference between the settlement price
of the futures contract on the FOMC meeting day and the corresponding settlement price on the
previous day. Note that these instruments are constructed to meet the relevance and exogeneity
conditions. First, they reflect news only about monetary policy while being uncontaminated with
news about other unobserved fundamental shocks to the economy. This is ensured by taking the
price measurements only within a 30 minute window of the FOMC announcement. Second, they
are a strong proxy for the changes in rates due only to unanticipated monetary policy news. This is
ensured by measuring the surprises using future rate contract prices as opposed to using differences
between realized and forecasted rates. The latter can be potentially affected by other unobserved
factors, such as the risk premium. Provided that, for any of the futures contracts considered here, the
risk premium (or any other unobserved factor) remains constant during the 24 hour period preceding
the FOMC meeting, the changes in rate futures isolate the effect of unanticipated monetary policy
63For a more detailed discussion about the choice of external instruments within the High Frequency Identification
literature, refer to Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), and Gertler and Karadi (2015).
64The original set of instruments was constructed at a daily frequency. In order to use it in a VAR setting, Gertler and
Karadi (2015) use a weighting scheme to aggregate it to a monthly frequency, which is the data I use.
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news.65
From within this set of instruments, ideally, I would like to select one that captures a certain
degree of forward guidance. Unanticipated monetary policy news are relevant not only to the extent
to which they affect the current short term rates, but also due to their effect on the expected future
path of short term rates. Within the HFI framework, the persistent effect of unanticipated monetary
policy news can be captured in two ways. One is by measuring the effect of unanticipated monetary
policy news on a mid- or long-term rate which, by a simple term structure argument, reflects the
future path of short-rates. Another one is by using instruments that directly reflect expectations of
short rate movements further in the future. From this perspective, the surprises in future contracts
settled three, six, nine or twelve months ahead are better suited as external instruments than the
surprises in current futures.66
However, using an instrument that captures forward guidance is not always feasible in light of an
additional restriction I face. Given that part of my procedure requires comparing VAR specifications
that use different measures of credit costs, I need to ensure that the identification procedure is
consistent across them. If this is not the case, the differences in the predictions of the VAR’s might
stem from identification issues rather than differences in the information content of the alternative
measures. I define an instrument to be consistent when it satisfies two criteria. First, the weak
instrument problem can be safely ruled out when using both sets of credit measures. For ruling
out a weak instrument problem, I use the criteria proposed by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002),
who suggest a threshold value of ten for the first-stage regression robust F-statistic. Second, the
explanatory power of the instrument for the VAR residual of the monetary policy indicator must be
sufficiently similar under the credit spreads and the SLOOS variables.
With these considerations in mind, I contemplate using the surprise in the three month ahead fed
funds future (FF3) as the instrument and the one-year government bond rate (1YR) as the monetary
policy indicator.67 Table 3.3 summarizes some statistics for the regression of the VAR residuals
65For more on this, see Kuttner (2001), Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), and Hamilton (2009).
66Evidence that the persistent effect of monetary policy news is captured better by mid-term bond rates instrumented
by surprises in futures contracts settled further in the future than by short-term rates instrumented by surprises in current
future contracts is provided by Kuttner (2001), Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Swanson and Williams (2014),
among others.
67Since I use the baseline VAR from Gertler and Karadi (2015) as the standard for assessing the informational content
of the SLOOS, I try to remain as close as possible to their estimation procedure; which uses this combination of policy
indicator and instrument.
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Table 3.3: Effects of High-Frequency Instrument on the First Stage Residuals of the Monetary
Policy Indicator for the Different VAR Specifications
VARGK V̂ARGK VAR1 V̂AR1
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.010
(0.006-0.014) (0.007-0.013) (0.005-0.012) (0.006-0.014)
FF3 0.800 0.785 0.683 0.800
(0.459-1.071) (0.480-0.981) (0.343-0.926) (0.439-1.065)
Observations 258 258 258 258
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.050 0.065
F-statistic 16.713 21.744 11.510 16.713
VAR2
Spreads SLOOS No Credit
Constant 0.007 0.006 0.008
(0.004-0.010) (0.003-0.009) (0.002-0.011)
FF3 0.524 0.439 0.579
(0.239-0.716) (0.200-0.522) (0.185-0.881)
Observations 258 258 258
R2 0.031 0.038 0.028
F-statistic 9.892 11.597 7.273
VAR3
FF3 FF0
Constant 0.005 0.005
(0.002-0.008) (0.003-0.008)
Instrument 0.364 0.318
(0.134-0.440) (0.137-0.388)
Observations 258 258
R2 0.033 0.036
F-statistic 8.463 11.007
Note: Sample period 1990:1-2012:6. 90 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis.
1YR is used as the monetary policy indicator.
FF3 is used as the instrument.
VAR1 specification includes PC1S, PC
2
S, and PC
4
S
for the 1YR on the FF3. The statistics are presented for each of the eight VARs that I use for my
analysis: two versions of the VARGK, two versions of the VAR1, the three variants of the VAR2
(one with no credit variables -No Credit-, one with the credit spreads -Spreads-, and one using the
orthogonalized SLOOS variables -SLOOS-), and the VAR3. The total sample size, adjusted R2 and
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robust F-statistic are reported at the bottom for each VAR specification.
For the VARGK and the VAR1, all four variants have a robust F-statistic that is larger than ten,
suggesting that a weak instrument problem can be ruled out. In addition, the explanatory power of
the instrument is uniform across all of these variants. The FF3 explains about 6.5 percent of the
monthly innovation in the one-year rate when the credit costs are measured using the spreads and
about 5 percent when the SLOOS variables are used instead.68 Therefore, given that the FF3 is
consistent, I can safely use it as the instrument for the first part of my study.
For the VAR2, the FF3’s explanatory power is uniform across all three variants. It explains
about 3 percent of the monthly innovation in the one year rate when credit costs are either ignored
altogether or measured using the credit spreads; while it explains about 4 percent when the SLOOS
variables are used instead. However, the only variant that has a robust F-statistic larger than ten is
the one that uses the SLOOS variables. For the other two specifications, I can’t rule out the weak
instrument problem. Nevertheless, if I use the surprise in the current fed funds future (FF0) as the
instrument instead of the surprise in the three months ahead fed funds future (FF3), all three variants
of the VAR2 have F-statistics larger than ten and the weak instrument problem can be ruled out. In
addition, the FF0 instrument explains about 4 to 5 percent of the monthly innovation in the 1YR for
all three variants. That is, the performance of the FF0 is consistent across all three instances of the
VAR2. Therefore, for the second part of my study, I use the FF0 instead of the FF3 as the instrument
in order to ensure a consistent identification procedure.69
Finally, for the VAR3, the table presents the first stage regression results under both instruments,
FF3 and FF0. The FF3 explains about 3 percent of the monthly innovation in the one year rate.
However, since the robust F-statistic is only about eight, the weak instrument problem can’t be
ruled out. On the other hand, the FF0 has a similar explanatory power but a robust F-statistic that
is above the threshold of ten. Therefore, for the third part of my study, I choose to instrument the
VAR3 with the FF0.70
68This result is in line with Gertler and Karadi (2015), who find an explanatory power of about 7.8 percent for the
FF3. The slight discrepancy comes from the difference in sample periods.
69If the weak instrument problem is ignored and FF3 is used as the instrument, the nature of the results derived from
the VAR2 specifications remains unchanged. If anything, the relevance of the credit channel relative to the conventional
channel increases.
70As Table 3.3 suggests, the performance of both instruments (ignoring the weak instrument problem) is very similar
under the VAR3. Therefore, it is no surprise that the results about the composition of the credit channel (the contribution
of the spread and non-spread sub-channels) remain unchanged when using either of the two instruments.
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In conclusion, I use two instruments for the identification of the monetary policy shock. On one
hand, I use the surprise in the three months ahead fed funds future (FF3) as the instrument to identify
the monetary policy shock when comparing the information content between the SLOOS variables
and the credit spreads. On the other hand, when quantifying the contribution of the credit channel
and its sub-channels for the monetary policy transmission, I use the surprise in the current fed funds
future (FF0) as the instrument. This choice of instruments not only guarantees that the exogeneity
and relevance conditions hold, but it also ensures two additional properties. First, the possibility of
a weak instrument problem can be safely ruled out. Second, the instruments’ performance (in terms
of explanatory power) is consistent when using different variables to measure the credit conditions
(either the spreads or the SLOOS variables). Hence, when comparing the predictions of the VARs
under alternative credit measures, any differences can be attributed to the actual monetary policy
propagation mechanism rather than to disparities in the identification procedure.
3.5 Results
In what follows, I present the three main results of the paper. First, the SLOOS variables not only
reflect the same information as the credit spreads, but also some additional information which is
relevant for monetary policy transmission. Second, the credit channel is as important as the conven-
tional channel. It can account for a large portion (between 15% to 30%) of the variance in house-
holds’ durable and non-durable expenditures following an unexpected monetary policy announce-
ment. Finally, non-spread credit factors play a significant role for monetary policy transmission.
Roughly speaking, non-spread factors account for at least half of the credit channel’s contribution
to the variance of durable and non-durable expenditures.71
3.5.1 Information content on the SLOOS
To compare the information content between the SLOOS variables and the credit spreads I proceed
in two steps. First, I use the SLOOS data to try to reproduce the impulse response functions (IRFGK)
implied by the VARGK. I construct the linear projections of the three credit spreads onto the principal
components of the SLOOS variables and include them as the credit block in the modified version
71Examples of such non-spread factors are credit limits, collateral requirements, credit score requirements, just to
name a few.
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V̂ARGK. I use this modified version to estimate impulse responses, ÎRFGK, which I then compare
with the original set of responses, IRFGK. Second, I use the credit spreads to try to reproduce the
impulse response functions (IRF1) implied by the VAR1. As in the previous step, I construct a
vector of linear projections of the principal components onto the credit spreads. I then construct the
modified version V̂AR1 by including the projected principal components as the credit measures. I
use this modified version to estimate impulse responses, ÎRF1, which I compare with the original
set of responses IRF1. The goal of this thought experiment is to understand if, in the context of
monetary policy transmission, the information set of the credit spreads is a subset of that of the
SLOOS variables and vice-versa.
The simple linear regression analysis of Section 3.2 already provides evidence of the larger
information content of the SLOOS variables relative to the credit spreads. However, it remains to
show that this additional information is relevant for the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
As a first step towards this goal, consider the results from Table 3.3 in Section 3.4.2, which pertain to
the identification of the monetary policy shock. The first stage regression results are nearly identical
for the VARGK and V̂ARGK specifications. This is true not only in terms of the explanatory power
of the FF3 instrument, but also in terms of the point estimates for the regression coefficients. This
shows that the results obtained using the credit spreads can be reproduced using an appropriate
combination of the SLOOS variables instead. On the other hand, the outcome of the first stage
regression for the VAR1 is rather different than that of the V̂AR1. That is, the results obtained using
the SLOOS variables can’t be reproduced using the credit spreads. Furthermore, under the V̂AR1,
the regression coefficient estimates, the adjusted R2, and the robust F-statistic are all nearly identical
to those obtained using the VARGK. In other words, the projection of the SLOOS variables onto the
credit spreads and the credit spreads themselves seem to span the same space, at least in terms of
the information relevant for the identification of the monetary policy shock. Altogether, these three
observations would suggest that, in the context of monetary policy transmission, the information
contained in the credit spreads is a subset of the information contained by the SLOOS variables.72
72Further evidence is provided in Table 5.3 (in Section ??). In line with the conclusions at the end of Section 3.2, the
results from Table 5.3 suggest that the information contained in the credit spreads is entirely captured in only two of the
principal components (PC1S and PC
2
D) of the SLOOS data. These two components are labeled as the “main” components
of the credit supply and demand blocks, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: A Surprise Monetary Tightening
VARGK vs. V̂ARGK
Note: VARGK includes the three credit spreads (EBP, MortSP, and CPSP).
90 percent confidence bands given by dashed lines.
Responses are based on a one standard deviation of the fundamental monetary policy
disturbance.
As for the the impulse response functions, Figure 3.2 shows the IRFGK (the solid blue line la-
beled “Credit Spreads”, with 90 percent confidence bands given by the dashed red lines) and the
ÎRFGK (the green line labeled “SLOOS”) following a surprise monetary policy tightening. The
IRFGK show that, consistent with conventional theory, the one-year rate increases by about 20 basis
points upon impact and remains significantly positive for roughly a year. Although there is a de-
crease in the consumer price index, it is not significant (in the statistical sense) until after a year and
a half. This might be a consequence of the sluggishness in price adjustments. Note that contrary
to standard theory, there is not a significant decline in industrial production. This is not surprising
however, as there are other empirical studies, such as Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010), that have
argued that in recent decades monetary policy innovations have a more muffled effect on real ac-
tivity.73 Regarding the credit spreads, the responses in Figure 3.2 are in line with the findings of
Gertler and Karadi (2015). All three spreads increase for a period of about eight months before
73The authors in Gertler and Karadi (2015) find that the monetary policy tightening does lead to a significant decrease
in industrial production. I attribute this difference to the sample period they use (1979:7-2012:6) as opposed to the one I
consider (1990:1-2012:6).
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returning to their trend levels. The excess bond premium increases about 7.5 basis points, remains
at that level during the first eight months, and then suddenly reverts back to trend. The increase in
the mortgage spread is more modest, only about 2 basis points, and displays the same pattern as the
excess bond premium.74 The commercial paper spread increases about 5 basis points upon impact
for roughly two months, then it decreases to about 2 basis points for another 6 months, and then it
finally reverts back to trend.
It is evident from Figure 3.2 that the ÎRFGK for the one-year rate, the consumer price index, and
the industrial production are well within the 90 percent confidence bands of their IRFGK counterparts
(indeed, they are almost identical). However, this is not the case for the three credit spreads. The
SLOOS variables are unable to capture the initial increase in the excess bond premium and in the
commercial paper spreads. For the excess bond premium, they predict an increase of only about
2.5 basis points in the initial eight months when the actual increase is of 7.5 basis points. For the
commercial paper spread, they can only account for a 2 basis point increase upon impact while the
actual increase is of about 5 basis points. For the mortgage spread, although the SLOOS variables
are able to capture the increase of about 2 basis points for the eight month period after impact, they
overestimate the persistence of such increase. Overall, these results suggest that the information in
the credit spreads, at least the one relevant for monetary policy transmission to aggregate economic
activity, is also contained within the SLOOS variables.
Figure 3.3 presents the responses for the specification VARS,1, in which the credit costs are
measured using three of the principal components of the credit supply block. The IRFS,1 (solid
blue line labeled “SLOOS” with 90 percent confidence bands given by the dashed red lines) and
the ÎRFS,1 (the green line labeled “Credit Spreads”) are given following an unanticipated monetary
policy tightening. The tightening induces an increase in the one-year rate of about 20 basis points
upon impact and then it reverts back to trend after a year. The consumer price index remains at its
trend value for most of the horizon, decreasing only after about 38 months. Consistent with standard
theory, the industrial production decreases. However, the decrease in economic activity occurs with
a lag (it becomes statistically significant after roughly two years). The responses of the principal
74The response of the mortgage spread is different than the one presented in Gertler and Karadi (2015). In their case,
the mortgage spread increases about 2 basis point upon impact, then increases sharply to 7 basis points after two months,
and finally it slowly decreases until it reverts back to trend after about 8 months. Again, I attribute this discrepancy to
the different sample periods between my study (1990:1-2012:6) and theirs (1979:7-2012:6). In particular, the bulk of my
sample period consists of housing boom years, where mortgage spreads remained low for different reasons.
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Figure 3.3: A Surprise Monetary Tightening
VARS,1 vs. V̂ARS,1
Note: VARS,1 includes the 1st, 2nd, and 4th principal components of credit supply variables (PC1S ,
PC2S , and PC
4
S).
90 percent confidence bands given by dashed lines.
Responses are based on a one standard deviation of the fundamental monetary policy
disturbance.
components of the credit supply block point to a general tightening of the credit conditions. The
first and fourth principal components both experience a significant increase. The former, which is
the one most closely related to the credit spreads, increases upon impact and remains above trend
for about 38 months. The latter, which is not correlated with credit spreads and thus measures
other types of credit costs, increases upon impact and remains above trend for about 20 months.
The second principal component does not significantly deviate from its trend during the 40 month
horizon. Note that the responses presented in Figure 3.3 differ considerably from those in Figure
3.2. Although the responses for the one-year rate are similar, this is not the case for the rest of
the variables. The most significant difference is perhaps the larger persistence in the tightening of
the credit conditions when using the SLOOS variables. In Figure 3.2, the credit conditions tighten
upon impact for a period of about 8 months. However, in Figure 3.3, the first and fourth principal
components show a tightening of the credit conditions for a much larger horizon, at least 20 months.
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Figure 3.4: A Surprise Monetary Tightening
VARD,1 vs. V̂ARD,1
Note: VARD,1 includes the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd principal components of credit demand variables
(PC1D, PC
2
D, and PC
3
D).
First-stage regression Robust F-stat: 20.68.
90 percent confidence bands given by dashed lines.
Responses are based on a one standard deviation of the fundamental monetary policy
disturbance.
This persistence of the credit tightening following the unanticipated monetary innovation might be
responsible for explaining the lagged decrease in the industrial production.
It is clear that the ÎRFS,1 in Figure 3.3 do not reproduce the IRFS,1 as closely as in the previous
comparison. Although the credit spreads can reproduce the results obtained with the SLOOS for the
one-year rate, they fail in reproducing the response for the consumer price index and the industrial
production. Furthermore, the credit spreads are unable to reproduce the response for the credit
supply principal components. Most notably, the credit spreads fail to capture the persistent increase
in the first principal component and the tightening of the fourth principal component during the
initial eight months. I interpret this as evidence that there is additional information in the SLOOS
credit supply variables, which is relevant for monetary policy transmission to aggregate economic
activity, that is not captured by the credit spreads.
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The impulse responses for an alternative specification (VARD,1), in which the credit costs are
measured using the three principal components of the SLOOS credit demand block, are presented in
Figure 3.4. As in the previous cases, the IRFD,1 (solid blue line labeled “SLOOS” with 90 percent
confidence bands given by the dashed red lines) and the ÎRFD,1 (the green line labeled “Credit
Spreads”) are given following a surprise monetary tightening. Note that the responses for the one-
year rate, the industrial production, and the consumer price index, are similar to those in Figure 3.2.
The response of the demand principal components suggests a credit contraction following the first
8 months after impact. Interestingly, this contraction in the credit demand parallels the increase in
the credit spreads given in Figure 3.2. Altogether, this suggests that the short term changes in credit
conditions relevant for the monetary policy transmission are captured by both, the credit spreads
and the credit demand block of the SLOOS.
As it can be seen from Figure 3.4, the ÎRFD,1 closely resemble the IRFD,1 for the one-year
rate, the industrial production, and the consumer price index. In this sense, the credit spreads do
a better job reproducing the results obtained using the SLOOS credit demand variables relative to
those obtained using the SLOOS credit supply block. This is consistent with the previous obser-
vation that much of the relevant information about the short term changes in credit conditions is
contained in both, the credit spreads and in the demand block of the SLOOS. However, note that the
information contained in the credit spreads does not suffice to reproduce the individual responses
of the credit demand principal components. In particular, the credit spreads are only able to capture
the initial demand contraction for the second principal component. They fail to capture the initial
demand contraction for the first principal component or any of the dynamics for the third principal
component.
The previous analysis suggests that, in the context of monetary policy transmission, the infor-
mation set of the credit spreads is a subset of the SLOOS information set. The additional informa-
tion of the SLOOS variables originates from two sources. First, following an unanticipated policy
shock, the credit spreads capture only short term changes in the credit conditions. The SLOOS
variables capture both, short and long term changes. The short term changes are reflected mostly
in the credit demand block while the long term changes are captured by the credit supply block.
Second, the information in the credit spreads reflects a “common” component of the conditions in
all credit markets, which is strongly influenced by the conditions associated with the commercial
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Table 3.4: γ¯i Under the Different VAR2 Specifications
12 Month Horizon 24 Month Horizon 36 Month Horizon
Spreads SLOOS No Credit Spreads SLOOS No Credit Spreads SLOOS No Credit
1 YR Yield 81.5 92.4 97.9 75.9 92.4 97.9 72.9 90.4 96.9
CPI 78.4 92.7 61.2 77.2 89.2 58.0 80.1 87.0 56.3
Durables 80.2 78.5 74.5 83.9 75.2 65.2 82.2 81.5 61.5
Non-Durables 70.3 62.3 56.6 76.0 64.9 54.4 77.3 71.6 53.8
HH Debt 56.5 55.5 56.0 60.6 53.5 53.6 68.4 53.9 53.5
Note: Results are based on a one standard deviation of the monetary policy shock.
and industrial loans. Consequently, the credit spreads can only account for the dynamics of two (of
the seven) principal components of the SLOOS variable: PC1S and PC
2
D. The remaining principal
components, which reflect the credit demand and supply conditions for household loans (i.e. mort-
gage, credit card and non-credit card), contain information that is not reflected by the credit spreads.
Importantly, these non-spread components are significantly affected by a surprise monetary policy
innovation. Therefore, for the study of monetary policy transmission to macroeconomic indicators
that pertain to household consumption, such as durable and non-durable expenditures, using the
credit spreads might ignore some, potentially relevant, channels of transmission of monetary policy.
This is the issue to which I turn next.
3.5.2 Transmission of Monetary Policy
The results I present are obtained using the VAR2 specifications instrumented with the surprise in
the current monthly fed funds future (FF0).75 To quantify the contribution of the different channels
for the monetary policy transmission, I use γ¯i and φ¯xi as defined in (3.3.15) and (3.3.18). Intuitively,
given the total variance of variable i that results from an unexpected monetary policy announcement,
γ¯i quantifies the fraction of this variance that can be attributed to distinct channels of transmission.
From within this fraction, φ¯xi quantifies the contribution of a particular channel (channel x) of in-
terest.
Table 3.4 shows γ¯i for each of the three different VAR2 specifications for forecast horizons
of one, two, and three years. For the two specifications that include credit variables (Spreads and
75All results still hold when the three month ahead fed funds future (FF3) is used as the instrument. Furthermore,
for the real activity sector of the economy (household’s debt, durable and non-durable expenditures), using FF3 as the
instrument increases the fraction of the monetary policy disturbance that is transmitted via the credit channel. Hence,
when the instrument incorporates some forward guidance, the credit channel becomes more relevant.
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SLOOS), these results suggest that at least 54% of the variation in households’ debt, 62% of the
variation in non-durable expenditures, and 75% of the variation in durable expenditures can be at-
tributed to specific transmission channels. For the specification without credit variables, the fraction
of the variance for these three variables that can be attributed to specific transmission channels is
substantially smaller. To see why this is the case, suppose that some of the variation in the variables
(1YR, CPI, D, C, B) is transmitted via the credit variable y. When y is omitted, this variation is
attributed to the contemporaneous interaction between these variables, rather than to the common
factor y. Therefore, as the this variation can’t be associated with one particular transmission channel
it is not included in γ¯i.
Given that a reasonable amount of the variation in the VAR2 variables can be associated with
particular transmission channels, I next proceed to quantify the individual contribution of these
channels. Specifically, I am interested in measuring the contribution of four channels: price/rate
(PR), spreads (SP), credit supply conditions (PCS), and credit demand conditions (PCD). Hence, in
the definitions (3.3.16), (3.3.17), and (3.3.18), x ∈ {PR,SP,PCS,PCD}. For the price/rate channel,
I let ΓPR = {1YR,CPI}. I use the PR channel as a proxy for the conventional channel as it captures
the effect of the unanticipated monetary policy news via contemporaneous price and one-year rate
adjustments. As for the spreads channel, I let ΓSP = {EBP,MortSP,CPSP} for the variant with
the credit spreads and ΓSP =
{
PC1S,PC
2
D
}
for the specification with the SLOOS variables. There-
fore, the spreads channel captures the effect of the unanticipated policy news via contemporaneous
adjustments in spreads.76 The remaining two channels only apply to the VAR2 specification that
uses the SLOOS credit variables. For the credit supply channel, I let ΓPCS =
{
PC2S,PC
3
S,PC
4
S
}
.
The PCS channel then captures the effect of the unexpected monetary policy news via contempo-
raneous changes in credit supply conditions other than spreads. This is because the credit supply
principal components included in this channel are those orthogonal to the credit spreads. Finally,
for the credit demand channel, I let ΓPCD =
{
PC1D,PC
3
D
}
. The PCD channel encompasses the effect
of unexpected monetary policy news via contemporaneous changes in the demand for credit. This
channel is an indirect proxy for credit costs and conditions via credit demand. In this sense, a priori,
the PCD channel can’t be exclusively associated with neither the conventional channel nor the credit
76For the specification with the SLOOS variables, I use the “main” principal components, PC1S and PC
2
D, in the
definition of the SP channel given that these components are directly related to the credit spreads, as pointed out in
Sections 3.2 and 3.5.1.
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Table 3.5: Contribution of Different Channels to the Monetary Policy Transmission Under the
VAR2
Price/Rate Spreads Credit Supply Credit Demand
Spreads SLOOS No Credit Spreads SLOOS SLOOS SLOOS
12
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 98.0 88.4 99.8 1.4 0.9 0.8 1.5
CPI 84.3 78.1 92.8 8.6 7.3 3.7 5.5
Durables 19.1 31.7 19.1 8.1 9.4 3.5 2.9
Non-Durables 43.6 39.3 67.8 34.7 6.8 1.1 28.3
HH Debt 32.3 40.3 35.3 6.5 3.2 0.5 3.1
24
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 95.4 81.8 99.5 3.1 2.4 1.2 1.6
CPI 74.4 73.8 86.0 15.4 10.9 4.2 5.8
Durables 31.5 36.3 30.1 13.6 14.6 3.8 4.0
Non-Durables 40.6 40.8 61.8 39.9 17.0 3.0 20.6
HH Debt 41.5 46.5 45.0 9.9 2.7 0.5 3.9
36
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 93.3 78.2 99.2 4.2 3.3 1.3 1.7
CPI 65.4 67.9 81.6 23.1 16.6 4.6 5.5
Durables 39.0 45.1 37.4 16.0 13.9 3.6 3.8
Non-Durables 41.4 43.5 60.2 40.4 19.7 4.5 16.4
HH Debt 49.8 48.8 50.6 11.1 2.5 0.5 3.7
Note: The contribution of the each channel is measured by φ¯xi and is based on a one standard deviation of the monetary
policy shock. The three different VAR2 specifications are:
(a) Spreads: credit costs measured using the EBP, mortgage and commercial paper spreads.
(b) SLOOS: credit costs measured using the SLOOS credit supply/demand principal components.
(c) No Credit: no credit variables included in the VAR.
channel (spread and non-spread). This is because the credit costs might include the term structure
of interest rates (conventional channel), as well as credit spread and non-spread factors. However,
in the definition of ΓPCD , the included demand principal components are those orthogonal to the
credit spreads. That is, I am effectively removing the credit spread component out of credit costs
that are being indirectly proxied by the PCD channel. Thus this channel is an indirect proxy of the
conventional channel and the non-spread component of the credit channel only.
With these definitions at hand, I can evaluate the importance of the credit and conventional
channels for the monetary policy transmission. In all three specifications of the VAR2, I use the
PR channel as the proxy for the conventional channel. The credit channel, on the other hand,
is specification-dependent. For the specification that uses the credit spreads (Spreads), the credit
channel is just given by the SP channel; meanwhile, for the specification that uses the SLOOS
variables (SLOOS), the credit channel is jointly given by the SP and PCS channels. I do not include
the PCD channel as part of the credit channel because, as stated before, this channel proxies a
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mixture of the conventional and non-spread credit channels, which I can not disentangle in the
current setting. Table 3.5 presents the contribution of the price/rate (PR), spreads (SP), credit supply
(PCS), and credit demand (PCD) channels to the monetary policy transmission for some selected
VAR2 variables over horizons of one, two, and three years. The price/rate channel can be measured
for all three specifications, the spreads channel can only be measured for the two specifications
that include a credit block, and the credit supply/demand channels can only be measured for the
specification that uses the SLOOS as the credit block.
For the Spreads specification, the results in Table 3.5 suggest that the contribution of the credit
channel for the monetary policy transmission is between 6%−11% for households’ debt, 8%−16%
for durable expenditures, and 35% − 40% for non-durables expenditures. On the other hand, the
conventional channel’s contribution is around 32% − 50% for households’ debt, 19% − 39% for
durables, and 41% − 44% for non-durables. Overall, the conventional channel seems to be more
relevant for the monetary policy transmission to most measures of real activity. Its contribution is
about five times larger than that of the credit channel for households’ debt and about twice the size
for durable expenditures. However, for non-durable expenditures, both channels are roughly of the
same size.
For the SLOOS specification, the contribution of the credit channel is between 3% − 3.7% for
households’ debt, 13% − 18% for durables, and 8% − 24% for non-durables. The bulk of the
credit channel’s contribution comes from the spread sub-channel, which is between three to five
times larger than the credit supply (non-spread) sub-channel. As for the conventional channel, its
contribution is around 40%− 49% for households’ debt, 32%− 45% for durables, and 39%− 44%
for non-durables. Hence, ignoring the contribution of the credit demand channel in the SLOOS
specification has two important implications. First, the conventional channel is significantly more
relevant than the credit channel for all three measures of aggregate activity. Second, within the
credit channel, the non-spread sub-channel’s contribution is rather small.
Comparing the results under the Spreads and SLOOS specifications, it is clear that the contri-
bution of the conventional channel is robust to the choice of credit variables while that of the credit
channel is not. For the latter, both specifications agree on the size of its contribution for durable
expenditures only. For non-durable expenditures and households’ debt, under the SLOOS, the size
of the credit channel is between two and four times smaller than under the Spreads. From Table 3.5,
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this discrepancy seems to stem from changes in the composition of the credit channel. Recall that
the information contained in the commercial paper spread (CPSP) is mostly explained by the credit
demand variables.77 Consistent with this observation, at least for non-durable expenditures and
household’s debt, a large portion of the transmission through the credit spreads channel takes place
via the CPSP. Therefore, in the SLOOS specification, this effect is captured by the credit demand
variables and only very slightly reflected in the credit supply ones. Thus if, in the SLOOS speci-
fication, the credit channel is redefined as the sum of the spreads, credit supply and credit demand
sub-channels, its size becomes roughly the same as under the Spreads specification.78 Additionally,
if the credit channel is redefined in this way, the contribution of the credit spread sub-channel de-
creases, accounting for only about 40% and 60% of the credit channel (depending on the variable
under consideration).
In addition, the results for the No Credit specification in Table 3.5 suggest that the exclusion
of credit variables leads to a biased estimation of the contribution of the conventional channel.
Although the size of the conventional channel is roughly the same under the No Credit and the
Spreads/SLOOS specifications for durable expenditures and households’ debt, this is not the case
for non-durable expenditures. Under the No Credit specification, roughly 60% of the transmission
of policy to non-durable expenditures takes place via the Price/Rate channel. In contrast, under
either the SLOOS or Spreads, the contribution of this channel is only about 40%. This suggests
that when the credit conditions are ignored altogether, the importance of the conventional channel
is significantly overemphasized for non-durable expending.
To summarize, there are three main results from this analysis. First, the exclusion of credit
variables in the model leads to an overestimation of the conventional channel. Second, the credit
channel plays an important role in the monetary policy transmission for non-durable and durable
expenditures. Particularly, for non-durable expenditures, the credit channel’s contribution is about
30%; which is as large as the conventional channel’s contribution. Third, the composition of the
credit channel is relevant for monetary policy transmission. When credit costs are measured using
the credit spreads, the credit channel’s predominant transmission mechanism is via the commercial
paper spread. Meanwhile, when credit costs are measured using the SLOOS variables, most of the
77See Table 3.1 in Section 3.2.
78This is particularly true for non-durable expenditures.
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credit channel’s transmission takes place via the credit demand variables. In light of these results, I
study the composition of the credit channel next.
3.5.3 Decomposing the Credit Channel: Effect of Credit Costs Other Than Spreads
From the results in the previous section, it is clear that the credit channel is relevant for mone-
tary policy transmission. What is still unclear is which ones are the relevant sub-channels within
the credit channel. For instance, consider the case of non-durable expenditures. On one hand,
when credit costs are measured purely with credit spreads, most of the transmission occurs via the
commercial paper spread. On the other hand, when credit costs are measured just using SLOOS
variables, most of the transmission happens via credit demand conditions. The observations from
Sections 3.2 and 3.5.1 suggest that the information in the commercial paper spread is a subset of the
information in the credit demand conditions. The question is then, how much of the transmission
is actually happening via the commercial paper spread (part of the spread sub-channel) relative to
other credit factors reflected by the credit demand conditions (part of the non-spread sub-channel)?
To answer this and other similar questions about the composition of the credit channel, I use the
VAR3 with the surprise change in the current fed funds future contract, FF0, as the instrument.79
I proceed in two steps. First, using the definitions γ¯i and φ¯xi , I decompose the monetary policy
transmission into three channels: conventional channel, spread sub-channel, and non-spread sub-
channel.80 I can then compare the contribution of each of these channels to gauge their importance.
Second, I test for the statistical significance of the VAR coefficients associated with the spread and
non-spread sub-channels. I do this to show that these two sub-channels are important not only in
terms of their magnitude, but also in the sense that they are statistically significant.
Table 3.6 presents γ¯i for forecast horizons of one, two and three years. In line with the con-
clusions from Section 3.5.2, a large portion (at least 60%) of the forecast error variance can be
associated with specific transmission channels. Therefore, a decomposition of monetary policy into
the three specific transmission channels is justified. To perform this decomposition, I first quantify
the contribution of four components: price/rate (PR), spreads (SP), credit supply conditions other
79Two remarks about instrumenting the VAR3 with the FF3 instead. First, the results discussed here about the com-
position of the credit channel (contribution of spread and non-spread sub-channels) are unchanged. Second, the overall
contribution of the credit channel becomes larger.
80The overall credit channel is composed of the spread and non-spread sub-channels.
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Table 3.6: γ¯i Under the VAR3 Specification
12 Month Horizon 24 Month Horizon 36 Month Horizon
1 YR Yield 93.8 85.1 80.4
CPI 66.9 67.2 64.4
Durables 84.6 79.7 78.5
Non-Durables 63.5 64.6 73.2
HH Debt 55.6 55.5 57.3
Note: Results are based on a one standard deviation of the monetary policy shock.
than spreads (PCS), and credit demand conditions other than spreads (PCD). The sets Γx, with
x ∈ {PR,SP,PCS,PCD}, that identify each component are defined as in the previous section.81
Table 3.7 presents the contribution of each of these four components to γ¯i. The first column gives
the contribution of the Price/Rate channel. The second column refers to the transmission via the
excess bond premium, the mortgage spread, and the commercial paper spread. The third and fourth
columns refer to the contribution of the SLOOS credit supply and demand principal components,
respectively. Both, PCS and PCD, exclude the “main” principal component of each block; hence
they measure the transmission of policy via credit conditions orthogonal to the credit spreads. Note
that the PCS is part of the credit channel as it directly measures tightness of credit supply conditions.
However, the PCD indirectly measures the tightness of credit conditions via expansion/contraction
of the demand. Therefore, it is a proxy of all factors that might affect credit demand, which po-
tentially include both, the conventional channel and the non-spread credit channel. Given these
components, I proxy the conventional channel with the PR component, the credit spread channel
with the SP component, and the non-spread credit channel with the PCS component. As I argue
later, the PCD components should also be included as part of the non-spread credit channel.
The results from Table 3.7 reaffirm the conclusions about the robustness of the conventional
and credit channels. On one hand, the conventional channel is robust to the different measures of
credit. As in both of the VAR2 credit specifications, this channel’s contribution is about 44% −
52% for households’ debt, 17% − 34% for durable expenditures, and 37% − 41% for non-durable
expenditures. On the other hand, the credit channel is not robust when it does not include the PCD
component. When only the SP and PCS components are included, the credit channel’s contribution
is much smaller than under the VAR2 specifications, being of only about 4%− 5% for households’
81The VAR3 specification does not include the “main” principal components of the SLOOS credit supply and demand
blocks, PC1S and PC
2
D. Therefore, ΓSP = {EBP,MortSP,CPSP} is uniquely defined.
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Table 3.7: Contribution of Different Channels to the Monetary Policy Transmission Under the
VAR3
Price/Rate Spreads PCS PCD
12
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 93.8 3.1 0.6 2.1
CPI 64.1 5.9 6.8 11.0
Durables 17.7 9.3 4.2 7.0
Non-Durables 37.8 12.3 2.9 24.4
HH Debt 44.8 1.9 2.3 6.2
24
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 91.1 4.0 0.6 3.1
CPI 55.4 11.1 7.9 11.4
Durables 25.6 10.1 6.0 9.9
Non-Durables 41.0 14.6 8.0 17.6
HH Debt 48.3 2.3 2.7 9.2
36
M
on
th
s 1 YR Yield 88.9 4.2 1.2 4.1
CPI 55.5 13.3 8.1 9.7
Durables 33.7 10.7 7.2 9.9
Non-Durables 40.3 16.3 13.8 14.1
HH Debt 51.5 2.4 3.0 9.1
Note: The contribution of each channel is measured by φ
x
i
and is based on a one standard deviation of the monetary pol-
icy shock.
debt, 13%−18% for durable expenditures, and 15%−30% for non-durable expenditures. However,
if the PCD component is added, the credit channel’s contribution increases to 39% − 44% for non-
durable expenditures and to 10%−14% for households’ debt, much like in the VAR2 specifications.
Should the PCD component be included as part of the credit channel? The answer depends on
whether the indirect transmission mechanism captured by this component is mostly due to term-
structure adjustments (conventional channel) or changes in non-spread credit factors (credit chan-
nel). Hence, to further understand this indirect transmission mechanism, consider two important
observations from the VAR2 analysis. First, when the SLOOS variables are excluded, this indirect
mechanism is captured by the commercial paper spread. Second, when the SLOOS variables are
included, this mechanism is mostly captured by the PCD component. This suggest that this indirect
mechanism is operating via a common factor related to both, the demand for credit and the com-
mercial paper spread. Friedman and Kuttner (1993) provide some evidence about how changes in
commercial paper spreads are related to the contraction/expansion in bank lending due to monetary
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policy actions. Note that this contraction/expansion in bank lending might also be reflected in the
contraction/expansion of credit demand. If this is the case, the indirect transmission mechanism
could be operating via bank lending conditions. Therefore, this evidence suggests including the
PCD component as part of the credit channel.82
Given these three components of the credit channel, I can assess the importance of the two credit
sub-channels: spread and non-spread. The former consists of the SP component and it captures the
transmission of policy via changes in the EBP, mortgage and commercial paper spreads. The later
incorporates both, the PCS and PCD components and it captures the transmission via changes in
credit conditions other than spreads. From Table 3.7, the non-spread sub-channel accounts for more
than half of the transmission that takes place via the credit channel: roughly 83% for households’
debt, about 63%− 69% for non-durable expenditures, and between 55%− 61% for durable expen-
ditures. Overall, these results suggest that the role of the non-spread credit conditions is important
for monetary policy transmission. Considering the overall size of the credit channel, this trans-
mission mechanism (which is generally overlooked in the literature) is particularly important for
non-durable expenditures.
So far, I have discussed the importance of the credit channel and its sub-channels for monetary
policy transmission purely in terms of their size. In what follows, I briefly provide some evidence
of the relevance of this channel and its components from a statistical point of view. In particular, I
conduct some significance tests on the VAR3 coefficients for the three credit spreads (EBP, MortSP,
and CPSP) and the SLOOS credit supply and demand principal components (PC2S, PC
3
S, PC
4
S, PC
1
D,
and PC3D). Overall, these two sets of coefficient are jointly different from zero at the 1% significance
level in each of the VAR3 equations. I interpret this as evidence that both, spread and non-spread,
sub-channels are statistically relevant within the credit channel.
Table 3.8 summarizes the results of the significance tests for each of the credit channel’s com-
ponents. In particular, the tests are based on an F-statistic under the null that the coefficients, for
all lags, are jointly equal to zero. The columns represent the different credit channel components
while the rows refer to selected equations of the reduced form VAR3. For durable expenditures, all
eight components are significant at the 1% level. For non-durables, only three of the components
82This indirect transmission mechanism is more significant for non-durable expenditures and households’ debt. For
durable expenditures, most of the transmission within the spreads credit channel takes place via the EBP and the mortgage
spread rather than via the commercial paper spread.
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Table 3.8: Robust F-statistic for the VAR3 Coefficients (All Lags) of Each Component of the
Credit Channel
EBP MortSP CPSP PC2S PC
3
S PC
4
S PC
1
D PC
3
D
1 YR Yield ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
CPI ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Durables ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Non-Durables ∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
HH Debt ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1 percent level
∗∗ Significant at the 5 percent level
∗ Significant at the 10 percent level
are significant at the 1% level: the commercial paper spread (CPSP) and the credit demand com-
ponents associated with mortgages (PC1D) and households’ credit (PC
3
D). At the 5% significance
level, three other components become significant; the mortgage spread (MortSP), the credit supply
component associated with credit card loans (PC2S), and the credit supply component related to non-
credit card loans (PC4S). Note that the excess bond premium becomes significant only at the 10%
level. Interestingly, the component associated with credit supply conditions in the mortgage market
(PC3S) is not statistically significant even at the 10% level. Finally, for households’ debt, all of the
components are significant at the 1% level except for two; the credit supply component associated
with non-credit card loans (PC4S), and the commercial paper spread (CPSP). The former becomes
significant at the 5% level while the latter is not significant even at the 10% level.
The results from Table 3.8 are consistent with standard intuition. Given that durable expendi-
tures are usually financed using one or more of these three types of loans (mortgage, credit card,
and non-credit card), one can expect that the spreads, credit supply, and credit demand conditions
in these three markets are all significant for these purchases. For non-durable expenditures, if they
are mostly financed via credit card and non-credit card loans, the credit supply and demand con-
ditions in these two credit markets ought to be significant. What is somewhat unexpected is that
the credit conditions in the mortgage market (other than the spread) do not affect non-durable ex-
penditures significantly. This could be an indication that mortgages are mostly used to finance the
consumption of durable goods. Hence, the conditions in the mortgage market affect non-durable
consumption only indirectly through their effect on the price of durable goods. As mortgages are
used to finance durable consumption, the price of durables would reflect mortgage spreads but not
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other factors such as credit limits or credit score requirements. Note also that, although the credit
supply conditions for mortgages are not significant, the credit demand conditions are. This is con-
sistent with the interpretation for the credit demand conditions indirectly reflecting bank lending.83
Regarding households’ debt, note that it is defined as the sum of consumers’ credit card, non-credit
card and mortgage loans. Hence, it can easily be seen why the coefficients associated with the
credit supply and demand conditions in the mortgage, credit card and non-credit card markets are
all statistically significant.
In the end, the analysis of the VAR3 specification yields two main results. First, the credit chan-
nel is relevant, both in terms of statistical significance and size, for the transmission of monetary
policy to real activity. Although the credit channel is only about a fifth of the size of the conven-
tional channel for households’ debt, its contribution is much larger for durable and non-durable
expenditures. It accounts for about a third of the transmission for the former and as much as half
for the latter. Second, the composition of the credit channel is also important for monetary policy
transmission. In addition to the standard transmission via credit spreads, the credit channel includes
a non-spread component. This non-spread component roughly accounts for about 50% of the credit
channel’s total contribution for durable expenditures and as much as 70% for non-durable expendi-
tures. Taken together, these results would suggest that in the study of monetary policy transmission,
the credit channel can’t be ignored. Furthermore, if this channel is introduced purely via finan-
cial frictions that are reflected as spreads, a large fraction of the transmission mechanism could be
absent.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I quantify the contribution of three different channels for the transmission of mone-
tary policy; the term structure of market interest rates (conventional channel), the spread over risk-
free rates (credit spread channel), and the non-spread credit conditions (non-spread credit channel).
I am able to quantify the contribution of these channels using three key elements. First, I use data
from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS). As I show, this data contains more general
information than the credit spreads of three important loan markets; commercial and industrial,
mortgage, and commercial paper. I use this additional information to identify the non-spread credit
83However, there is also the possibility that the credit demand component, PC1D, reflects other factors such as income.
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channel. Second, I use the external instrument identification approach proposed by Gertler and
Karadi (2015). This scheme avoids making a priori restrictions on the interaction between the
policy instrument and the other variables in the VAR model when identifying the policy shock.
In turn, this allows me to quantify the contemporaneous effect (i.e. transmission) of unexpected
policy announcements for each of the model variables. Lastly, I use a modification of the Forecast
Error Variance Decomposition to be able to extend this measurement procedure to arbitrary forecast
horizons.
I find that the credit channel (spread and non-spread) can account for as much as 20%− 30% of
the variance of durable and non-durable expenditures following an unanticipated monetary policy
shock. That is, the credit channel is as large as the conventional channel. Furthermore, corroborating
the results of various recent empirical studies, I find that credit spreads are an important mechanism
within the credit channel. Additionally, I expand this result by providing evidence that the adjust-
ments in the non-spread factors play an important role too, specially for non-durable expenditures
as they account for about 70% of the credit channel’s total contribution.
Overall, my results suggest the importance of incorporating both, spread and non-spread credit
channels in the study of monetary policy transmission. Including credit spread effects alone would
leave a considerable fraction of the transmission mechanism absent, specially for non-durable pur-
chases.
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CHAPTER 4
Monetary Policy Revisited: Heterogeneous Bank Pass-Through of Credit Expansions
Abstract
This chapter implicitly accounts for heterogeneity in the pass-through of credit ex-
pansions from banks to households and assesses its impact on the monetary policy
transmission mechanism to aggregate consumption. I build a model that embeds a
financial friction in the Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) framework,
which results in banks offering differentiated credit contracts to households in the
economy. Following a credit expansion, the relaxation of credit conditions is about
three times larger for households at the top of the wealth/income distribution relative
to those at the bottom. This mechanism is able to replicate some recent empirical ev-
idence showing that households with the highest credit ratings increase borrowing by
twice as much relative to households with the lowest credit ratings after a change in
banks’ cost of funds. Incorporating this mechanism in the HANK framework reduces
the response of aggregate consumption to a monetary expansion by about five times.
This finding has potential implications for the distributional effects of monetary policy
and for its control over aggregate responses.
JEL Codes: D14, E21, E43, E44, G10
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4.1 Introduction
Two questions are central to the study of monetary policy: (i) does monetary policy affect aggregate
outcomes? and, if it does, (ii) what are the relevant mechanisms by which it affects these outcomes?
Although the affirmative answer to the first questions is relatively well establish and widely ac-
cepted, the quest for a satisfactory answer to the second question is still ongoing.84 Recent studies
have highlighted the role of heterogeneity, idiosyncratic uncertainty, and market incompleteness
as key factors influencing the transmission of monetary policy.85 Ultimately, idiosyncratic risk
and market incompleteness lead to heterogeneity in households’ marginal propensities to consume,
which in turn is the driving force behind the consumption response. My intention is to complement
this strand of literature by addressing another type of heterogenous effect present under idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty and incomplete markets; heterogeneity in credit conditions across households.
More importantly, as suggested by some empirical evidence, not only are credit conditions differ-
entiated across households but the change in such conditions following a credit expansion is largely
non-homogeneous across them.
This chapter explicitly models the pass-through of credit expansions/contractions from banks
to households and assesses whether this mechanism is relevant in the transmission of monetary
policy to aggregate outcomes. To this end, I build a model that captures market incompleteness,
idiosyncratic income risk, financial frictions, and sticky prices. The novel feature is the introduction
of debt negotiation between banks and households in the context of the Heterogeneous Agents
New Keynesian (HANK) framework of Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016). There is one asset
in the economy which households can only trade via banks; thus banks can extract some surplus
from households for offering the service. The credit conditions are negotiated between banks and
households via Nash bargaining. Ultimately, the negotiated credit conditions are a function of the
bank’s and household’s valuation of the service. The former is just a function of the amount of
resources the bank can extract from the household while the latter is a function of the household’s
preferences, wealth, and income. The resulting mechanism is simple. Banks can extract more
84See for example the chapters of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) on the Handbook of Macroeconomics
and of Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2011) on the Handbook of Monetary Economics. Both of these chapters provide
evidence of the monetary policy effects on aggregate outcomes. The second chapter also provides a discussion about the
different transmission mechanisms of monetary policy.
85See Luetticke (2015), Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016), Auclert (2016) among others.
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resources from richer households (higher wealth and income households); thus banks are willing to
“relax” more the credit conditions for these households. Similarly, households who don’t value the
service as much require more “relaxed” credit conditions in order to agree to a contract. Under the
usual assumptions about households’ preferences (in particular concavity), households’ valuation
of the service is negatively correlated with wealth and income. Overall, the interaction of these two
forces determines the pass-through of credit expansions/contractions.
As it is standard in the idiosyncratic income and incomplete markets literature, my model is able
to capture several moments of the wealth and income distributions for the United States. In addition,
the novelty of my model is that it is able to generate the distribution of changes in borrowing across
households following a credit expansion as documented by Agarwal et al. (2016).
The study of Agarwal et al. (2016) uses credit card data for the U.S. over the period January 2008
- December 2014. They group households in different FICO score bins and quantify the average
change in borrowing for each bin as the product of the Marginal Propensity to Borrow (MPB) and
the Marginal Propensity to Lend (MPL). That is, the change in households’ borrowing following a
credit expansion depends on two factors. On one hand, the way in which banks adjust the credit card
limits given the credit expansion; the MPL. On the other hand, the way in which households adjust
their borrowing given the change in credit card limits; the MPB. Table 4.1 presents a summary of
their results. First, given a $1 increase in credit limits, households on the highest FICO score bin
increase their borrowing only by about two fifths relative to households on the lowest FICO score
bin.86 Second, following a credit expansion banks increase the credit limits by about five times
more for the households in the highest FICO score bin relative to those in the lowest FICO score
bin. The main takeaway is that there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the way in which
households adjust their borrowing following a credit expansion. Furthermore, a non-trivial part of
this heterogeneity stems from the way in which banks adjust the credit conditions for households.
The end result is that following a credit expansions, households in the highest FICO score bin
increase their borrowing by about two times more relative to households in the lowest FICO score
bin.
86This is true for the debt measures that ignore portfolio effects; the Average Daily Balance and the Cumulative
Purchase Volume. For the other two borrowing measures which capture portfolio effects, Interest Bearing Debt and
Balances Across All Cards, households in the highest FICO score bin increase their borrowing by even a smaller amount
relative to the lowest FICO score bin households.
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Table 4.1: MPB, MPL, and MPB x MPL Ratios Given Different Debt Measures
Avg. Daily Balance Interest Bearing Debt Balance All Cards Cumulative Purchase Vol.
MPB 0.40 0.25 0 0.39
MPL 5.07 5.07 5.07 5.07
MPB x MPL 2.01 1.27 0 1.99
Note: The table is constructed using the results from Agarwal et al. (2016). The ratios are constructed by dividing the
average for the households with the highest FICO scores (FICO > 740) by the average for the households with the
lowest FICO scores (FICO ≤ 660).
My model is able to capture this empirical distribution of households’ borrowing adjustments;
it predicts households at the top of the model’s FICO score distribution increase their borrowing by
about 2.7 times more than the households at the bottom. The model’s ability to replicate this em-
pirical observation is a consequence of the mechanism introduced by the debt negotiation process;
what I refer to as the “heterogenous bank pass-through”. Given the model’s calibration, there is a
positive correlation between a household’s model FICO score and her level of wealth and income.
Given this correlation, the households with higher FICO scores are those who (i) have a relatively
smaller valuation of a negotiation opportunity and (ii) have a larger amount of resources that can be
extracted by a bank. These households would be willing to make adjustments in their borrowings
only if large enough incentives (in the form of more relaxed credit conditions) are offered. Further-
more, the bank is willing to offer such incentives for these households given it can extract more
resources from them. Thus, following a decrease in a bank’s cost of funds, the bank relaxes the
credit standards to all consumers but it does so more to those consumers with higher FICO scores.
Overall, this implies that the adjustments in borrowing following a credit expansion are increasing
in the FICO score, just as the empirical evidence suggests.
In the second part of the chapter, I use my model to assess the effect of the heterogeneous
bank pass-through on the monetary policy transmission mechanism to aggregate outcomes. I show
that when the heterogeneous bank pass-through mechanism is included within the standard HANK
framework, the direct effect (i.e. ignoring general equilibrium effects) of a monetary policy ex-
pansion on aggregate consumption is about five times smaller upon impact. I obtain this result by
comparing the response of consumption to a surprise change in the nominal interest rate under two
scenarios; one without the financial friction (the standard HANK) and another one with the financial
friction (HANK with the heterogeneous bank pass-through).
This result is mostly driven by the behavior of households with positive asset holdings. In
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the HANK framework, (i) consumption responds non-negatively for all households and (ii) the
consumption response is larger for households with smaller wealth and income levels. When the
heterogeneous bank pass-through is included only the latter is true. For households with sufficiently
large wealth levels, consumption responds negatively to the decrease in the interest rate. In the
standard HANK case, a decrease in the real rate maps one-to-one to a decrease in household’s cost
of credit. That is, the marginal propensity to lend to all households is one. When the heterogeneous
bank pass-through is included, the marginal propensity to lend is (i) less than one to all households,
and (ii) smaller to households with low wealth and income. Therefore, there is a much smaller
substitution effect in the model with the heterogenous bank pass-through. Effectively, this renders
the wealth effect of the decrease in the interest rate stronger, causing the decrease in consumption
for wealthier households.
The dampening of the direct effect of a monetary expansion when the heterogenous bank pass-
through is explicitly included has at least two relevant implications. The first one has to do with
the size of the indirect general equilibrium effects of policy transmission. As some recent literature
has concluded, the indirect effects are dominant under idiosyncratic uncertainty and incomplete
markets. However, the indirect effects are just a propagation mechanism for the direct effects. Thus
a dampening of the direct effects implies a smaller overall (direct plus indirect) effect of monetary
expansions. The second implication is related to the degree of control that the monetary authority
has over expansionary/contractionary policy. As emphasized in the literature that studies the indirect
effects of policy, the responsiveness of aggregate consumption may be largely outside of the control
of the monetary authority since the transmission takes place mostly via general equilibrium channels
(profit redistribution, labor market adjustments, etc.). However, as my findings suggests, even for
the direct effect on aggregate consumption the monetary authority must rely on the pass-through
from banks to households.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses how this chapter fits within
the literature. Section 4.3 presents the model and discusses in detail the outcome of the optimal
contract. Section 4.4 analyzes the heterogenous bank pass-through mechanism arising from the
contracting environment. Section 4.5 explains the calibration of the model. Section 4.6 presents the
main results of the chapter. Finally Section 4.7 concludes.
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4.2 Related Literature
In light of the previous results, this chapter contributes to the literature that incorporates market
incompleteness and idiosyncratic uncertainty into New Keynesian models.87 Relative to this liter-
ature, my paper is the first one to analyze monetary policy in a framework that explicitly models
the pass-through of credit expansions/contractions from banks to households as documented in the
empirical work by Agarwal et al. (2016).88
This chapter most closely relates to the work of Luetticke (2015) and Kaplan, Moll and Violante
(2016). Both of these papers present DGSE models to study the transmission of monetary policy
in a New Keynesian setting allowing for market incompleteness, idiosyncratic uncertainty, and a
liquid-illiquid asset portfolio choice. The focus of these papers is to emphasize that the general
equilibrium effects (the indirect effects) are far more important than the direct effect of monetary
policy transmission. In contrast, this chapter focuses on the direct effect recognizing that (i) the
indirect effect is just a propagation mechanism of the direct effect and (ii) the direct effect depends
on how policy actions are transmitted from the banking sector to the households in the economy.
Relative to these papers, one short-coming of my paper is neglecting the household portfolio
choice by focusing on the one asset case. This is important in at least two dimensions. First, this
implies that I am unable to capture the effects of the wealthy hand-to-mouth, which are documented
in Kaplan and Violante (2014). However, the wealthy hand-to-mouth consumers play an impor-
tant role for the indirect effects of policy transmission, which is not the main focus of this chapter.
Second, the portfolio choice might allow wealthy households to shield themselves from the wealth
effect arising from a decrease of the real risk free rate. However, even if households hold a portfolio
which shields them from the wealth effect, the additional credit could result in a portfolio rebalanc-
ing instead of an increase in consumption; thus dampening the response of aggregate consumption.
As a matter of fact, empirical studies such as Agarwal et al. (2016) and Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover and
87Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Oh and Reis (2012), Ravn and Sterk (2014), Haan, Rendahl and Riegler (2015),
Bayer et al. (2015), McKay and Reis (2016), McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016), Auclert (2016), Gornemann,
Kuester and Nakajima (2016), Werning (2015), Luetticke (2015), Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016), among others.
88At least to the best of my knowledge. Note that the pass-through of credit (financing) expansions/contractions has
been extensively studied on the firm side. In the early 90’s, a strand of literature started examining the role of credit
market frictions for monetary policy transmission via firms’ borrowing. This literature is best exemplified by papers
such as Bernanke (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and the seminal contributions of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) which provided a micro-founded link between credit market frictions and the
resulting credit costs.
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Rı´os-Rull (2011), have documented that households indeed rebalance their portfolio in response to
an interest rate cut. For instance, in Table 4.1, when borrowing is measured using variables that
incorporate portfolio effects (i.e. Balance Across All Cards), the households with the highest FICO
scores do not increase credit card borrowing at all in response to a credit expansion.89
Additionally, my paper expands on the existing line of work that evaluates whether empirical
micro findings about households’ consumption responses to policy are relevant from a macro per-
spective.90 In particular, I complement the empirical evidence provided by Agarwal et al. (2016).
They suggest that the negative correlation between a bank’s marginal propensity to lend and house-
holds’ marginal propensity to borrow might be important for the transmission of credit expansions
to aggregate consumption. I elaborate on this suggestion and examine it in a DSGE framework.
4.3 The Model
Time is continuous and there are no aggregate shocks. I consider a partial equilibrium economy as it
suffices for the study of the mechanism I have in mind.91 The economy is populated by three types
of agents: households, banks, and the government; all of whom are infinitely lived. Households
are risk averse and consume a non-durable good, supply labor, face idiosyncratic income risk, and
have access to a private real asset b which can be used as either a borrowing or saving instrument. I
assume there is a trade friction on the private asset market in the form of infrequent renegotiation of
the asset position.92 In particular, renegotiation happens at an exogenous rate σ. Once a bank and
a household meet for renegotiation, they contract on a new asset position b′ and a corresponding
89I am currently working on a version of my model allowing for liquid and illiquid assets. My goal is to (i) quantify the
effect of the heterogeneous bank pass through on the indirect effects of policy and (ii) be able to match the second finding
of Agarwal et al. (2016) which is that households with the highest FICO scores have the lowest marginal propensities to
borrow.
90For instance Johnson, Parker and Souleles (2006), Parker et al. (2013), or Misra and Surico (2014), among others,
document the response of consumption to transfers.
91The model can be closed using the Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian framework (HANK) as in Kaplan, Moll
and Violante (2016). I am currently working in this general equilibrium version of the model to explore the relevance
of the heterogeneous bank pass-through channel compared to other transmission channels that arise due to agent hetero-
geneity.
92On the borrowing side, this assumption is motivated by the observation that for certain types of borrowing instru-
ments (for instance credit cards), banks periodically send “upgrade” offers notifying customers they qualify for better
credit standards (i.e. increase in credit limits). On the savings side, this assumption is motivated by the observation that,
for certain types of assets, the transactions are done via a dealer. Therefore, it might be costly (in terms of search time)
to find one. Alternatively, one can interpret this assumption as capturing savings instruments (such as savings accounts)
which may require minimum balances, minimum deposit amounts, limits on the number of transactions, or fixed deposit
terms. A household who might have agreed to such conditions might violate them on occasion due to unforeseen circum-
stances (such as accidents or illness). In this sense, the asset in the model is not a purely liquid asset and should be seen
more as representing a mixture of assets of different degrees of liquidity.
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one time interest rate payment r˜ (which can be equivalently seen as a transaction fee φ) via Nash
bargaining. Banks are risk neutral and they have access to two types of assets; the private asset b
and government debt Bg. The latter is traded in a perfectly competitive market. In essence, banks
just provide financial intermediation between private agents and between the private agents and the
government. The government finances some exogenous spending G by collecting taxes/transfers τ
from the agents in addition to issuing debt.
4.3.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households with measure one who are heterogeneous
in two dimensions: their asset holdings b, and their idiosyncratic labor productivity z. While the for-
mer is a consequence of endogenous choices of the agents, the latter is assumed to be an exogenous
Markov chain, which I describe in detail in Section 4.5.1.
At each instant t, households receive a utility flow u (·) from consumption ct and work lt. The
utility function is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave in consumption and strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in work. Households are assumed to have time-separable preferences
and to be impatient with a discount rate of ρ ≥ 0. Hence the lifetime utility for a household is given
by
U = E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct, lt)dt, (4.3.1)
where the expectation is taken over the realizations of the idiosyncratic productivity process and the
renegotiation offers. Note that due to the law of large numbers there is no aggregate uncertainty and
the state of the economy is completely captured by the joint distribution gt(db, dz).
When making their choices of the consumption and hours worked, households take as given
the paths of the government’s function for taxes/transfers {τt(·)}t≥0, real wage rate {wt}t≥0, and
the net real return on government debt {rt}t≥0.93 At any instant t, households are uncertain of
whether or not they are going to be able to renegotiate their asset holdings with their bank. The
93In the HANK framework the paths of all these prices would be determined as an equilibrium outcome. In my formu-
lation, I am interested in isolating the transmission of monetary policy via the changes in borrowing/lending associated
with a change in the bank’s cost of funds (in my set up, the net return on government debt). Therefore, as in Kaplan,
Moll and Violante (2016), to isolate such effect from the general equilibrium feedback effects via taxes and wages, I keep
those prices fixed at their steady state values. This is the sense in which for my purposes, a partial equilibrium framework
suffices.
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renegotiation opportunities follow an exogenous Poisson process with rate σ. Therefore, households
make their consumption and hours worked choices contingent on renegotiation
{
cRt , l
R
t
}
t≥0 and no
renegotiation
{
cNRt , l
NR
t
}
t≥0. In addition, conditional on renegotiation, they must agree with their
bank on the new level of asset holdings and adjustment fee {b′t, φt}t≥0. The contracting environment
that determines the resulting (b′t, φt) is described in detail in Section 4.3.3.
Under this set up, a household’s net savings evolve according to
dSt =

b′t − bt + φt, if renegotiation
0, otherwise,
where it is assumed that to be able to renegotiate the asset position the household must first re-
pay/collect the existing obligations/deposits bt. The budget constraint implies that the household’s
net savings dSt must equal the household’s income stream (labor income plus asset interest income)
net of government taxes and consumption:
b′t − bt + φt = wtztlRt + rtbt − cRt − τt
(
wtztl
R
t
)
, if renegotiation.
0 = wtztl
NR
t + rtbt − cNRt − τt
(
wtztl
NR
t
)
, otherwise.
(4.3.2)
Therefore, the household’s problem is to choose the paths
{
cRt , l
R
t , c
NR
t , l
NR
t
}
t≥0 to maximize
(4.3.1) subject to (4.3.2) taking as given the paths for prices and the path of renegotiated contract
outcomes. The recursive formulation of the household’s problem is presented in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.2 Banking Sector
The banking sector consists of a main bank and a continuum of affiliated bank branches of measure
one. Each of these branches is tied to a specific consumer in the economy and acts as a financial
intermediary between the household and the main bank.
At each instant t, the branch simply transfers the interest payment rtbt from the main bank to its
corresponding household (and vice versa). If a renegotiation opportunity arises, in addition to trans-
ferring resources from the main bank to the household, the branch is able to extract some surplus
from the transaction.94 I assume the branches are risk neutral agents who instantaneously consume
94The branch has some monopolistic power since I assume this is the only vehicle by which the household can get in
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all the surplus they extract. Conditional on renegotiation, (i) a household with asset holdings bt and
productivity level zt repays the existing balance bt and requests an amount b′t(bt, zt); (ii) the branch
charges the household an associated instantaneous interest rate r˜t(bt, zt); (ii) the branch requests the
amount b′t(bt, zt) from the main bank and transfers bt; (iii) the main bank gives the branch b′t(bt, zt)
to transfer to the household and in turn requires compensation equal to the net real return rt (the
opportunity cost of the funds).
It must be noted that there are some implicit assumptions in the previous formulation. First, the
bank branch has perfect monitoring technology so that both, b′ and φ, can be made contingent on the
households asset holdings bt and productivity level zt. Second, the interbank market between the
branch and the main bank is perfectly competitive. Third, the main bank is also a risk neutral agent.
Lastly, the main bank has access to government debt. This last three assumptions imply that the
main bank charges the branch an amount equal to rt, which is the opportunity cost of the funds.95
Given this setup, the consumption cBt of a branch that is tied to an agent with asset holdings bt
and labor productivity zt is given by:
cB,Rt =
(
rt − r˜t(bt, zt)
) · b′t(bt, zt), if renegotiation
cB,NRt = 0, otherwise.
Due to the continuous time nature of the problem, if a branch in this economy is tied to a
household with holdings bt, the branch must make an instantaneous interest payment of rt · bt.
However, if the household instantaneously adjusts her asset holdings from bt to b′t, the instantaneous
interest payment the branch must make is now r˜t · b′t. With this in mind, define φt ≡ rtbt − r˜tb′t; it
is as if the branch’s interest payment to the household is rt · bt at every instant in time (whether the
assets are adjusted or not) but the branch charges and additional fee of φt when there is renegotiation
that leads to an adjustment in the asset holdings.
Similarly, the branch must get the interest payment to transfer to the household from the main
bank. For a household with asset holdings bt, the branch must get rt · bt from the main bank.
However, if the household adjusts her position, the branch must now get rt · b′t. Again, it is as if
touch with the main bank. In my model, the “main bank” is a very crude representation of the interbank lending market.
Additionally, I assume household’s can’t borrow/lend directly from each other but must do so via the banking sector.
95The main bank can have access to some other type of assets whose return is linked to rt by a no arbitrage argument.
What is important for my formulation is that the cost of funds is a function of rt.
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the branch is always getting the funds rt · bt from the main bank to transfer to the household and
whenever there is renegotiation that leads to an adjustment in the asset holdings the main bank just
charges the branch a fee of rt · bt − rt · b′t
With this alternative interpretation, the branch’s consumption is given by
cB,Rt = φ(bt, zt)− rt
(
bt − b′t(bt, zt)
)
, if renegotiation
cB,NRt = 0, otherwise.
(4.3.3)
That is, the branch behaves as if it would charge an instantaneous fee φt to the consumer for the rene-
gotiation procedure while paying the main bank the net interest it could have made on those funds
(the cost of funds). I prefer this interpretation because it emphasizes that the transaction between the
branch and the consumer is an instantaneous transaction and doesn’t have any intertemporal effects
from the branch’s perspective. Negotiating a one time fee conveys this idea better than negotiating
on an interest rate, which is usually related to intertemporal payments.
4.3.3 Contract
When a renegotiation opportunity arises at instant t, a branch and a household with asset holdings
b and productivity level z contract on (i) the adjusted level of asset holdings b′ and (ii) the instanta-
neous fee paid to the branch φ.96 Given that the branch has perfect monitoring technology, b′ and φ
can be contracted contingent on the household’s type (b, z).97
The contracting happens via Nash bargaining, where θ denotes the branch’s bargaining power
and 1 − θ the household’s bargaining power. I assume that there is perfect commitment from the
household’s side. Therefore, the no agreement outcome is simply the same as if there was no
renegotiation: the household keeps her current asset holdings b′ = b and hence pays no fee (i.e.
φ = 0).
Under this set up, for a household of type (b, z) who requests funds b′ and pays φ, the surplus
from the contract is given by:
96Completely equivalent results can be derived if instead the contract is on the adjusted level of asset holdings b′ and
the instantaneous one time interest rate r˜.
97Strictly speaking, b′ and φ are contracted contingent not only on the household’s type but also on the aggregate state
of the economy Ψt.
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CSt =
[
Vt(b
′, z; Ψt) + u(cRt , l
R
t )
]− [Vt(b, z; Ψt) + u(cNRt , lNRt )] , (4.3.4)
where cRt = c
R(b, z; Ψt, b
′, φ), lRt = lR(b, z; Ψt, b′, φ), cNRt = cNR(b, z; Ψt), and lNRt = lNR(b, z; Ψt)
are the optimal policy functions associated with the value function Vt(b, z; Ψt).98 Note that Ψt ={
rq, wq, τq(·)
}
q≥t
is an object that captures the aggregate state of the economy, which is given by
the path of prices and the government tax function. In what follows, and for notational convenience
only, I suppress the explicit dependence of the value function and associated optimal policies on Ψt.
The first term in brackets in (4.3.4) is the household’s total utility when an agreement is reached:
the household enjoys the continuation value given the adjusted asset holdings Vt(b′, z) and the utility
flow derived from her instantaneous consumption cRt (b, z; b
′, φ) and labor lRt (b, z; b′, φ). The second
term in brackets captures the household’s total utility without agreement: the continuation value is
just Vt(b, z) and the current utility flow is derived from the no renegotiation consumption cNRt (b, z)
and labor lNRt (b, z).
Note that if an agreement is reached, the only adjustments are the asset holdings b′ and the fee
φ. In particular, the household’s productivity level remains fixed. This is a consequence of the
continuous time formulation of the problem. In particular, modeling the renegotiation offer and the
income productivity processes as continuous-time Markov chains implies that for any infinitesimal
time interval only one of two events can occur: a renegotiation offer is extended or a productivity
shock occurs.
As for the branch, its surplus from the contract when extending funds b′ and charging a fee φ to
a household of type (b, z) is given by
BSt = φ+ rt
(
b′ − b) , (4.3.5)
which is straightforward and follows from (4.3.3). The resulting Nash bargaining problem is then
max
b′,φ
CS1−θt ·BSθt
s.t (4.3.6)
CSt, BSt ≥ 0
b′ > b
That is, the optimal asset adjustment quantity b′(b, z) and fee charged by the bank φ(b, z) maximize
98See Section 4.3.4 for the recursive formulation of the household’s problem.
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a weighted average of the household’s and branch’s surplus, subject to the constraint that both
parties must actually benefit from the transaction. Additionally, I assume that there is an exogenous
borrowing limit b.
4.3.4 Household’s Value Function and Optimal Policies
Let Ψt =
{
rq, wq, τq(·)
}
q≥t
capture the aggregate state of the economy. Consider a household with
asset holdings b and idiosyncratic income productivity z = ez
P+zT (where zP and zT refer to the
permanent and transitory components). Furthermore, let b′ and φ denote the outcome of the contract
if the household gets a renegotiation offer from her bank.99 Then the problem can be formulated
recursively as:
ρVt(b, z
P , zT ; Ψt) = max{cR,lR,cNR,lNR}
u(cNR, lNR) + σ
[
u(cR, lR)− u(cNR, lNR)]
+ σ
[
Vt(b
′, zP , zT ; Ψt)− Vt(b, zP , zT ; Ψt)
]
+
∑
z˜P 6=zP
λP (zP , z˜P )
[
Vt(b, z˜
P , zT ; Ψt)− Vt(b, zP , zT ; Ψt)
]
+
∑
z˜T 6=zT
λT (zT , z˜T )
[
Vt(b, z
P , z˜T ; Ψt)− Vt(b, zP , zT ; Ψt)
]
(4.3.7)
+ ∂tVt(b, z
P , zT ; Ψt)
s.t.
cR = wtzl
R − τt
(
wtzl
R)+ rtb− (b′ − b)− φ
cNR = wtzl
NR − τt
(
wtzl
NR)+ rtb
This recursive formulation can be derived from the discrete time version of the problem with
time periods of length ∆ and then taking the limit ∆ → 0.100 Intuitively, the total value flow for
the household at any instant t is derived from three sources. First is the utility flow associated with
instantaneous consumption and labor u(c, l). Within an infinitesimal instant dt, the household gets
a renegotiation offer with probability σdt so consumption and labor are cR, lR rather than cNR, lNR.
Second is the continuation value, which reflects a change in the asset position or productivity level
of the household. Since the renegotiation offer and the income productivity processes are modeled
99Note that in choosing her optimal consumption and labor, the household takes the outcome of the contract as given.
100The derivation is an application of the procedure presented in Appendix A of Achdou et al. (2015).
123
as continuous-time independent Markov chains, with probability σdt the household gets a renego-
tiation offer; with probability λP (zP , z˜P )dt the households’s permanent productivity component
goes from zP to z˜P ; and with probability λT (zT , z˜T )dt the households’s transitory productivity
component goes from zT to z˜T . However, for any infinitesimal instant dt, at most one of this three
changes can happen. Finally, is the change in value associated with the change in the aggregate
state.
Note that the stationary version of the problem (associated with the invariant distribution in the
economy) is obtained for the case Ψt = Ψ. This implies that rt = r¯, wt = w¯, and τt(·) = τ¯(·) are
fixed at their steady state levels and ∂tVt(b, zP , zT ; Ψt) = 0.
The following proposition characterizes the policy functions associated with the value function
in (4.3.7).
Proposition 4.1 Consider a household with asset holdings b, productivity level z, and contract offer
(b′, φ). Assume:
1. u(c, l) =
[c− g(l)]1−γ − 1
1− γ , with γ > 1
2. g(l) =
ψzl1+
1
ν
1 + 1ν
3. τt(x) = τ lt · x+ Tt
Define yt ≡
(
1− τ lt
)
wtzl
∗+rtb+Tt and l∗t ≡

(
1− τ lt
)
wt
ψ

ν
, then the optimal policy functions
satisfy
(a) lRt (b, z; Ψt, b
′, φ) = lNRt (b, z; Ψt) = l∗t
(b) cNRt (b, z; Ψt) = yt
(c) cRt (b, z; Ψt, b
′, φ) = yt − (b′ − b)− φ
The third assumption is just stating that the tax function is composed of a proportional labor
income tax τl and a lump sum transfer T .101 The first and second assumptions state that the instan-
taneous utility over consumption and labor is as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988),
101I choose this structure of the tax function so that I can match in the calibration the percent of the population getting
a net transfer. This is not of fundamental importance for the transmission of policy via the direct effect but does play a
role for the indirect effet.
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with the slight modification that the labor disutility depends also on the productivity level z. This
implies that the labor supply responds only to the changes in the effective (net of tax) aggregate
wage rate. Consequently, the labor supply function is independent of whether the household gets a
renegotiation offer or not.
When the household doesn’t get a renegotiation offer, her consumption cNRt is just her total
current income (labor plus interest on her asset holdings). If the renegotiation offer is extended,
the household’s consumption cRt is her total current income adjusted by her change in the asset
position b′ − b and the fee payment amount φ. Finally, given that the instantaneous utility is strictly
increasing and concave, the value function that solves (4.3.7) is a monotone non-decreasing and
concave function of b.102
4.3.5 Contract Solution
The optimal policy functions specify the household’s behavior given (i) the aggregate state of the
economy Ψt and (ii) the outcome of the contract (b′, φ). For notational convenience, in what follows
I denote the optimal labor supply function as l∗t and the consumption policy function conditional
on no renegotiation simply as cNRt . Then from Proposition 4.1, the consumption policy function
conditional on renegotiation is cRt = c
NR
t − (b′ − b)− φ.
Proposition 4.2 Consider a household with asset holdings b and productivity level z. In addition
to the assumptions in Proposition 4.1 assume:
1. −
 θ
1− θ

 1
1− γ
 = 1
Then
(a) The set of feasible renegotiated asset holdings b′ is given by
(
b, b¯.
)
for some b ≤ b ≤ b¯.
(b) The fee associated with each feasible level of asset holdings is given by
φ(b′) =
[
cNRt − (b′ − b)− g(l∗)
]−
 cNRt − (1− rt)(b′ − b)− g(l∗t )
θ
1−θ
(
Vt(b′, z)− Vt(b, z)− (1− γ)−1
[
cNRt − g(l∗t )
]1−γ)

1/γ
(4.3.8)
102I don’t have a formal proof of this statement. Intuitive (yet informal) arguments would suggest it is true, as well as
all the numerical experiments I have performed.
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The assumption is a normalization assumption. Effectively, it is controlling the branch’s bar-
gaining power and hence the extent to which the bank can extract surplus from the household via
φ.103 If both agents were risk neutral, the total utility of the match associated with the current period
utility flow would be given by:
TSt = rt(b
′ − b) + φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
bank
+ cNRt − (b′ −′ b)− φ− g(l∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
household
= cNRt − (1− rt)(b′ − b)− g(l∗t ).
That is, φ would be a transfer of funds from one agent to the other. Thus the assumption in Proposi-
tion 4.2 ensures φ reflects only a transfer of funds between agents when one of them is risk averse.
The first implication of Proposition 4.2 is that the feasible borrowing/lending amount is bounded
above and below. Given the exogenous borrowing constraint, the lower bound is obvious. However,
even in the absence of such exogenous limit, there is a lower bound on the borrowing amount. This
follows from the monotonicity of the value function and the Inada type conditions that the instan-
taneous utility satisfies. Intuitively, as b′ becomes small (very large borrowing), the household’s
current utility flow gets close to its upper bound (limc→∞ u(c, l∗) = γ − 1) while the continuation
value Vt(b′, z) keeps decreasing. At some point b the trade-off is too large and the household does
not benefit from additional borrowing. The existence of the upper bound follows a similar logic.
The instantaneous utility as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) implies that there is a
minimum (subsistence) consumption level, ct = g(l
∗
t ). As b becomes large (very large savings), for
some b¯ the household eventually reaches c and hence, not matter how large the continuation value
Vt(b
′, z) is, she finds it unattractive to increase her assets any further. That b ∈ (b, b¯) follows simply
from the fact that it is always feasible for the household to keep her current level of asset holdings
and pay no fee.
The second implication of Proposition 4.2 is about how the branch sets the menu φ(b′). One can
think of the contract in the following way. For any feasible choice of b′, the household is willing
to give the branch at most a fraction θ1−θ of the surplus (CSt) she gets. This implies the bank can
extract at most θ1−θ CSt u
−1
c current consumption units using the fee (φ); this consumption amount
evaluated at the margin would yield a utility value exactly equal to the surplus the household is
willing to give up. Therefore, the branch would set φ so as to extract this largest possible current
103For γ ∈ (1, 2] the corresponding bank’s bargaining power θ is in the range (0, 0.5].
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consumption units from the household.
Equation (4.3.8) provides a mathematical expression for the intuition provided in the previous
paragraph. To see this, note that the household’s surplus is completely independent of φ except for
the current utility flow. With this in mind, define
C˜St(b, z, b
′; Ψt) ≡ Vt(b′, z)− Vt(b, z)− u(cNRt , l∗)− (1− γ)−1, (4.3.9)
B˜St(b, z, b
′, φ; Ψt) ≡ rt(b′ − b) + φ−
(
θ
1− θ
)
u(cRt , l
∗
t )
uc(cRt , l
∗
t )
. (4.3.10)
C˜St is the portion of the household’s surplus that is independent of φ while B˜St is the effective
units of consumption the branch extracts from the household (note the effect of φ on the current
utility flow - the last term). With these adjustments, it is as if the household promises to give the
branch the fraction θ1−θ of her effective surplus C˜St while the branch effectively extracts B˜St units
from her. Hence the branch sets φ so that the marginal value of the effective consumption units
extracted from the household exactly equals the promised fraction of her effective surplus:
(
θ
1− θ
)
C˜St = B˜St · uc(cRt , l∗t ). (4.3.11)
Note that another interpretation of this expression is that, at the margin, the branch’s valuation of
the service is the same as that of the household.
The expression in (4.3.8) incorporates one further simplification. In light of the previous dis-
cussion, it can be seen that φ has two important effects. First, it directly affects the effective con-
sumption units the branch extracts from the household, B˜St. Second, it affects the marginal value
of those units, uc(cRt , l
∗
t ). The assumption in Proposition 4.2 eliminate the effect of φ on the amount
of consumption the branch can extract. In particular, with this assumption,
B˜St(b, z, b
′; Ψt) = cNRt − (1− rt)(b′ − b)− g(l∗t ), (4.3.12)
is fixed and independent of φ.
Evidently, the effective household (C˜St) and branch (B˜St) surpluses play an important role in
determining the fee set by the branch. Furthermore, as I will shortly show, the financial friction
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Figure 4.1: Comparative Statics With Respect to b′
introduces a household specific wedge in the cost of funds, f(b, z, b′; Ψt); which is directly related
to these two surpluses. With this in mind, the following proposition characterizes the comparative
statics of the effective household and branch surpluses.
Proposition 4.3 Let b denote the household’s asset holdings, z the household’s productivity, and b′
the requested amount of funds. Given the assumptions of Propositions 4.1 and 4.2, then
1.
∂C˜St
∂b′
,
∂B˜St
∂b
,
∂B˜St
∂z
≥ 0.
2.
∂B˜St
∂b′
,
∂C˜St
∂b
,
∂C˜St
∂z
≤ 0.
Although I do not provide a formal proof of this proposition, I present a numerical characterization
of these comparative statics exercises in Figures 4.1 - 4.3.
As shown in the top panels of Figure 4.1, the effective branch surplus is decreasing in b′ (left
panel) while the household surplus is increasing (right panel). The graphs correspond to a fixed
productivity level z¯ for various levels of current wealth b. As b′ increases, the branch has a smaller
incentive to extract additional resources from the household using the fee since it already gets re-
sources in the form of deposits. For the household, increasing her deposits increases her valuation
of the service since her continuation value function is non-decreasing in the level of asset holdings.
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Figure 4.2: Comparative Statics With Respect to b
Figure 4.3: Comparative Statics With Respect to z
The top panels of Figure 4.2 show, for a fixed productivity level z¯ and different desired asset po-
sitions b′, that the effective branch surplus is increasing in b (left panel) while the household surplus
is decreasing (right panel). As her wealth increases, the household’s value for the service decreases
since now she is able to have both, a larger continuation value and a larger current consumption,
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without readjusting her asset position. For the branch, meeting a wealthier household implies it can
extract more resources via the fee regardless of her desired level of deposits/borrowing.
Lastly, Figure 4.3 shows that the effective branch surplus is increasing in z (top left panel) while
the household surplus is decreasing (top right panel). The figure shows the surpluses as functions of
the permanent income component for a fixed current wealth level b¯ and fixed desired asset position
b¯′ at various levels of the transitory component. The intuition is the same as for the case of b.
Given the menu φ(b′), a household of type (b, z) must then choose her desired level of renego-
tiated asset holdings b′. The way in which the household makes her choice is characterized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.4 A solution b′(b, z; Ψt), φ(b, z; Ψt) to the contracting problem exists. Furthermore,
(a) If the household’s value function Vt(b, z; Ψt) is concave in b, such solution is unique.
(b) If the household’s value function Vt(b, z; Ψt) is differentiable in b, the optimal renegotiated
level of asset holdings b′(b, z) is characterized by
∂bVt(b
′, z; Ψt)
uc(cRt , l
∗
t )
= 1− rt (4.3.13)
Proposition 4.4 simply states the familiar marginal benefit equals marginal cost condition. The
household will choose the asset level b′ to ensure that the benefit of an additional unit of asset
(given by the derivative of the continuation value) equals its cost (which is the marginal utility of
current consumption times the number of effective consumption units foregone). Equation (4.3.13)
is written so that the marginal benefit (the left hand side) and the marginal cost (the right hand
side) are both given in terms of current consumption units. Given the continuous time nature of the
problem, for an additional unit of deposits, the household effectively gives up 1− rt units of current
consumption as the interest payment is instantaneous.
Recall that the fee menu offered by the branch implies the household’s marginal utility of current
consumption is related to the effective household’s and branch’s surpluses as given by equation
(4.3.11). One can use this relationship to rewrite (4.3.13) as:
∂bVt(b
′, z; Ψt)
uc(c˜t, l∗t )
= (1− rt) f(b, z, b′; Ψt), (4.3.14)
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where c˜t = cNRt −(1−rt)(b′−b) and f(b, z, b′; Ψt) ≡
(
θ
1−θ
)
C˜St(b, z, b
′; Ψt)·B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt)γ−1.
Note that c˜t represents the household’s consumption level if the branch simply “transfers” its cost
of funds to the household; the borrowing/lending rate equals the interest rate the branch pays to
the main bank.104 Therefore, equation (4.3.14) implies that the effect of the financial friction can
be thought of as being entirely captured by a wedge in the cost of funds, which is represented by
f(b, z, b′; Ψt). Importantly, this wedge is heterogenous as it depends on the households current
wealth b, income level z, and desired asset holdings b′. In the absence of such a wedge, (i.e.
f(b, z, b′; Ψt) = 1), the cost of funds is equal to 1 − rt for all agents in the economy; which is the
standard case of a perfectly elastic supply of funds.
What determines the size of the wedge? To answer this question note that the total household’s
surplus from the contract is given by CSt = C˜St + u(cRt , l
∗
t ) + (1 − γ)−1. Therefore, define
ĈSt ≡ C˜St+u(c˜t, l∗t )+(1−γ)−1; the total surplus the household would receive from the banking
service if the branch would simply set r˜t = rt. In essence, ĈSt captures the intrinsic value that
the banking service has for the household. It is easy to see that f(b, z, b′; Ψt) = 1 if and only if
ĈSt = 0. That is, if the banking service has no intrinsic value for the household, then the bank
can’t extract any surplus from her and thus simply charges her the prevailing market interest rate.
It follows that f(b, z, b′; Ψt) ≥ 1 if and only if ĈSt ≥ 0. Whenever the banking service has
intrinsic value for the household, the branch can extract some of this value and thus creates a wedge
that magnifies the cost of funds for the households. Note that the argument is symmetric in that
f(b, z, b′; Ψt) < 1 if and only if ĈSt < 0. When the banking service has no intrinsic value at the
prevailing market rate, the branch is willing to reduce the cost of funds the household faces in order
to make it attractive for her to engage in the service.105
I next characterize the behavior of the wedge across the different households in the economy.
The bottom left panel of Figure 4.1 shows the wedge f(b, z, b′; Ψt) as a function of the desired level
of asset holdings b′ for a household with a fixed productivity level z¯ at various levels of current
wealth b. As it can be seen from the figure, the wedge is concave in b′. From Proposition 4.3,
the household’s effective surplus C˜St is increasing in b′ while the branch’s effective surplus B˜St
104Recall the definition of φt ≡ rtb− r˜tb′. The branch simply “transferring” its cost of funds to the household implies
r˜t = rt and so φt = rt(b− b′) and BSt = 0.
105In particular, the branch can charge a lower interest rate than the prevailing market rate as long as BSt ≥ 0, which
in turn requires b′ > 0.
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is decreasing. Intuitively, the household’s value for the service increases as the asset adjustment
allows her to have a larger continuation value; hence allowing the branch to increase the wedge.
However, by increasing her asset holdings, the household is already transferring resources to the
branch via deposits; which decreases the branch’s incentive to get additional resources via the fee
and hence decreases the wedge. Due to the concavity of the value function, for relatively low values
of b′ the dominant effect is that of C˜St while the converse is true for relatively large values of b′.
The wedge f(b, z, b′; Ψt) as a function of the household’s current asset holdings b, given a fixed
productivity level z¯ and various levels of the readjusted asset position b′, is shown in the bottom
left panel of Figure 4.2. The wedge is concave in b. Again, from Proposition 4.3, the household’s
effective surplus C˜St is decreasing in b while the branch’s effective surplus B˜St is increasing.
As the wealth level of the household increases, her valuation of the service decreases. As she
is wealthier, she can have a larger continuation value and current consumption without having to
readjust her asset position. This implies a smaller wedge. For the branch, meeting a wealthier
household means it can extract more surplus via the fee, allowing for a larger wedge. For this case,
the effect of C˜St is dominant for relatively large values of b. A similar argument explains why the
wedge is also concave in the productivity level z, as show in the bottom left Figure 4.3.
Finally, given the wedge implied by the financial friction, the household’s optimal choice of
adjusted asset holdings is characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.5 Consider a household of type (b, z). Her optimal choice of adjusted asset holdings
b′(b, z) is a monotone non-decreasing function of b for all z.
Figures 4.4 - 4.6 illustrate the outcome of the optimal contract given the baseline calibration of
the model. Figure 4.4 shows the optimal level of adjusted asset holdings b′(b, z). Each panel
corresponds to a different level of the transitory income component. As stated in Proposition 4.5,
the optimal level of adjusted asset holdings is increasing in the level of current wealth regardless of
the income level. As the household gets wealthier, she can save more and consume more (i.e. the
marginal propensity to consume is less than one).106
However, for a fixed level of current wealth, whether b′(b, z) is increasing or decreasing in the
permanent income component, zP , depends on the transitory income state, zT . Given the consump-
106Note that although it is hard to see in the figure, for very small asset holdings the households might be at the
borrowing constraint.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal Renegotiated Level of Asset Holdings b′(b, z)
tion smoothing behavior of the household, a small transitory shock would increase the household’s
incentive to borrow whereas a large transitory shock makes her more prone to save. This behavior
is based on the expectation that her income would revert towards the mean in the near future (given
the transitory nature of the shock). However, the realization of a bad or good permanent income
shock can counter this incentive. On one hand, as shown in the top left panel of Figure 4.4, within
the households with a low temporary shock (prone to borrow), the ones who have a low permanent
income realization have an incentive to save (borrow less) since their income in the medium/long
term might remain low.107 On the other hand, within the households with a large transitory shock
(prone to save), those who have a low permanent income realization now have a smaller incentive
to save (the low permanent shock introduces some incentive to borrow), as shown in the bottom
left panel of Figure 4.4. In short, having a larger permanent income shock allows the households
to better adjust their behavior to smooth the transitory shocks. If they have an incentive to borrow
(lower transitory shock), they can borrow more; conversely, if they have an incentive to save (higher
transitory shock), they can save more.
The optimal fee φ(b, z) is shown on Figure 4.5. Consider first the behavior of the fee as a func-
107Given the continuous time formulation, the difference between the permanent and transitory components is not only
the magnitude of the shocks but also the frequency -and hence duration- of each of them.
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Figure 4.5: Optimal Fee φ(b, z)
tion of a household’s wealth level. For the small and medium transitory income levels (top panel),
the dominant effect is that of the effective bank surplus; the fee is increasing in the wealth level.
As the level of wealth increases, the branch can extract more resources from them and thus charges
them a higher fee. For the large transitory income level (bottom left panel), the dominant effect is
that of the effective household’s surplus; the fee is decreasing in the wealth level. Households with a
higher wealth level have a smaller valuation of the banking service and thus the branch must charge
them a smaller fee to encourage them to agree to the contract.
Consider next the behavior of the fee as a function of the income state. As the left panels of
Figure 4.5 show, the fee is increasing in the permanent income component
(
zP
)
for the small and
large transitory components. Due to the consumption smoothing incentive, households in these
two extreme transitory income states find the banking service relatively valuable. In particular,
households with a larger permanent component are those who find the service the most valuable. In
addition, a larger permanent income implies these households have more resources which the bank
can extract using the fee. The combination of these two factors explains why the fee is increasing
in zP for the small and large transitory income states. However, this is not the case for the medium
transitory income state; for this state the fee is decreasing in zP . The intuition is that households
don’t value an adjustment in their asset position as much in this state; there is no extreme transitory
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Figure 4.6: Cost of Funds Wedge Implied by the Optimal Contract f(b, z; b′(b, z))
shock to smooth out. Within the households with a medium transitory income shock, those with a
higher permanent income find the banking service particularly unattractive and the branch must in
turn charge them a smaller fee.
Finally, the cost of funds wedge f(b, z, b′(b, z); Ψt) is shown if Figure 4.6. Note first that the
wedge is always larger than one regardless of the income and wealth levels; the cost of funds is mag-
nified for all households when the financial friction is introduced. Second, for the large transitory
income state, the behavior of the fee and the cost of funds wedge is identical; both are decreasing
in the wealth level and increasing in the permanent income state. This is a consequence of both ob-
jects being determined mostly by the effective household and branch surpluses. Third, for the small
transitory income state, the fee and cost of funds wedge are both increasing in wealth. However,
while the fee is also increasing in the permanent income level, the cost of funds wedge is decreasing.
For the small transitory income state, the contemporaneous marginal utility of households plays a
non-trivial role in the determination of the fee (see equation (4.3.11)). For households with a higher
level of permanent income, the contemporaneous marginal utility is relatively small (due to their
larger consumption). This implies that the bank can extract a large amount of resources by charging
a higher fee without distorting their inter-temporal decision too much. Lastly, for the medium tran-
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sitory income state, the behavior of the fee and the cost of funds wedge is identical for sufficiently
low levels of the permanent income state; both objects are increasing in wealth and decreasing in
permanent income. However, for large enough permanent income levels the marginal utility of cur-
rent consumption plays again a non-trivial role in the determination of the contracting fee. As the
contemporaneous marginal utility is relatively small (given larger permanent income implies larger
consumption), the branch can extract a large amount of resources by charging higher fees without
distorting the household’s inter-temporal decision as much; the fee is slightly increasing in the level
of wealth while the cost of funds wedge is non-increasing.
4.4 Heterogeneous Bank Pass-Through Mechanism
My model features an heterogeneous bank pass-through of credit expansions; banks not only charge
differentiated credit conditions across households in the economy but the change in such credit
conditions following a credit expansion is non-homogenous across them. This novel feature of my
model is what allows me to match the empirical distribution of households’ borrowing adjustments
following a credit expansion as documented by Agarwal et al. (2016).
In the context of my model, a credit expansion is given by a decrease in a branch’s cost of funds.
Note that a branch’s cost of funds is just the real interest rate the branch must pay the main bank (i.e.
the opportunity cost of lending the funds to private households). With this in mind, the following
proposition characterizes the households’ borrowing adjustments following a credit expansion.
Proposition 4.6 Consider a household with asset holdings b and productivity z. The household’s ef-
fective surplus C˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt) is given by (4.3.9) and the branch’s effective surplus B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt)
is given by (4.3.12). Then
∂b′t(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
=
(
1 + Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt)
)
·
∂φt(b, z, b
′; Ψt)
∂rt
·
∂φ(b, z, b′; Ψt)
∂b′

−1
; (4.4.1)
where:
1. Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) ≡
(1− rt)(b′ − b)
B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt)
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2.
∂φt(b, z, b
′; Ψt)
∂rt
≡
1
γ (1− rt)
B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt)
C˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt)

1/γ
3.
∂φt(b, z, b
′; Ψt)
∂b′
' 1 ∀ b, z
There are two subtle points that need to be clarified about Proposition 4.6. First, it character-
izes the response of households’ borrowing to a change in a branch’s cost of funds. Therefore, it
does not incorporate the wealth effect resulting from changes in the real interest rate that affect the
households’ existing level of wealth. Given the continuous time nature of the model, households
earn (or pay) the prevailing market interest rate rt on their existing wealth at each instant in time.
However, whenever a renegotiation opportunity arises, they earn (or pay) a one-time interest rate
negotiated between the branch and the household, r˜t (b, z; Ψt). Thus, strictly speaking, a change
in the real interest rate rt affects households’ borrowing via the wealth effect and the cost of funds
effect. Proposition 4.6 just refers to the latter. Second, equation (4.4.1) is evaluated at the optimal
level of borrowing b′ = b′(b, z; Ψt).
As it is evident from Proposition 4.6, there are three factors that affect the response of house-
holds’ borrowing. First, the amount of surplus that a bank is able to extract from households; the
term 1 + Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) which I refer to as the “pass-through”. Second, the way in which the branch
adjusts the credit conditions in response to a change in its cost of funds; the branch’s marginal
propensity to lend given by the term ∂φt(b,z,b
′;Ψt)
∂rt
. Lastly, the way in which households’ adjust
their borrowing in response to the adjustment in the credit conditions; the households’ marginal
propensity to borrow given by the term
(
∂φt(b,z,b′;Ψt)
∂b′
)−1
.
Consider first the term 1 + Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt). Note that Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) is negative for all households
who are effectively withdrawing funds from the branch (i.e. b′ < b). Households must rely on bank
branches to adjust their asset position, which effectively gives the latter some monopolistic power.
Thus, for any level of desired asset holdings b′, the branches use this monopolistic power to extract
some of the surplus households would get from a decrease in the credit costs; for every $1 decrease
in its cost of funds, the branch decreases the credit costs for all households who are withdrawing
funds (effectively borrowing) by less than $1. Thus this term captures the “pass-through” of the
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Figure 4.7: Pass-Through 1 + Γ(b, z)
credit expansion. It is worth pointing out that there is some degree of heterogeneity in this “pass-
through”. On one hand, households from whom the bank is already extracting a large amount
of resources, large B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt), get a larger ”pass-through”. On the other hand, household’s
with a larger borrowing adjustment (b′ − b) get a smaller “pass-through”. Figure 4.7 shows the
“pass-through” as a function of the wealth level b for different levels of the transitory (zT ) and
permanent (zP ) income states. Given the model’s calibration, these two effects operate in opposite
directions and the result is that the “pass-through” is decreasing in wealth and income; despite
having a larger bank’s effective surplus B˜St(b, z, b′; Ψt), higher wealth/income households make
the largest borrowing adjustments resulting in a smaller “pass-through”.
Consider next the marginal propensity to lend (MPL). Most of the heterogeneity in households’
borrowing adjustments stems from the MPL. Figure 4.8 shows the MPL as a function of the wealth
level b for different levels of the transitory (zT ) and permanent (zP ) income states. As shown on the
figure, branches are willing to relax the credit conditions more (i.e. decrease the fee by more) for
households with higher wealth and income. From Proposition 4.6, the marginal propensity to lend
is positively correlated with the effective branch’s surplus B˜St(b, z, b′) and negatively correlated
with the effective household’s surplus C˜St(b, z, b′). Thus, given the discussion of Section 4.3.5, it
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Figure 4.8: Marginal Propensity to Lend MPL(b, z)
is easy to see that the MPL is an increasing function of the wealth and income levels.108 Intuitively,
the branch must decrease the fee more for those households who have the smallest valuation of
the service, small C˜St(b, z, b′), in order to make them willing to use the service. Additionally,
the branch is willing to decrease the fee more for those households with a large B˜St(b, z, b′) as
it can extract more resources from them. Thus, in light of Propositions 4.3 and 4.5, the marginal
propensity to lend is increasing in wealth and income; households with large wealth and income are
precisely those who have the smallest C˜St(b, z, b′) and largest B˜St(b, z, b′). It is important to note
that, despite the heterogeneity, the marginal propensity to lend is positive for all wealth and income
levels; a decrease in the cost of funds leads to a relaxation of the credit conditions for all households
in the economy.
The third factor affecting the adjustment in borrowing following a decrease in the branch’s cost
of funds is the households’ marginal propensity to borrow (MPB). Figure 4.9 presents the MPB as a
function of the wealth level b for different levels of the transitory (zT ) and permanent (zP ) income
states. As shown on the figure, the marginal propensity to borrow is pretty close to one for all
households in the economy. That is, households increase their borrowing almost one-for-one with a
108Note that although I abstract from modeling default in my model, including it would just enhance the mechanism
at work. The cost of default would decrease the marginal propensity to lend as it would have a negative impact on the
amount of resources the bank can extract from households.
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Figure 4.9: Marginal Propensity to Borrow MPB(b, z)
decrease in the contracting fee. For those households at (or near) the borrowing limit b, the marginal
propensity to borrow is somewhat smaller than one. Intuitively, these households can’t increase their
borrowing one-for-one given the binding borrowing limit. Thus, although the marginal propensity
to borrow affects households’ borrowing response to a change in the cost of funds, its contribution
to the heterogeneity of such response is negligible.
In the end, in my model the households’ borrowing response following a credit expansion is
mostly driven by two factors; the “pass-through” and the “heterogeneous adjustment” of the con-
tracting fee across households. The former refers to the observation that the branches decrease the
credit costs for households by less than the decrease in their cost of funds. The latter refers to the
fact that the change in the credit costs is heterogeneous across the population as it depends on fac-
tors such as households’ valuation of the banking service and the amount of resources households
can offer to banks.
4.5 Calibration
The following section details the strategy used in choosing the parameter values for the model.
There are three main objectives of the calibration strategy. First, to calibrate the exogenous id-
140
Table 4.2: Earnings Process Parameter Estimates
Parameter Transitory Component Permanent Component
j=1 j=2
Arrival rate (λj) 0.08 0.007
Mean reversion (βj) 0.76 0.009
Std. Deviation (σj) 1.74 1.530
Note: The parameter estimates correspond to those presented in Kaplan, Moll
and Violante (2016). All rates are expressed as quarterly values.
iosyncratic productivity process so that it reflects the leptokurtic nature of the U.S. income changes
recently documented by some empirical literature. Second, to develop a mapping between the vari-
ables in the model and the U.S. FICO score distribution. Third, to be able to match some key
moments of the U.S. asset distribution.
4.5.1 Idiosyncratic Productivity Process
I use the idiosyncratic productivity process estimated by Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016); which
assumes log-earnings is given as the sum of two independent components; log zt = z1t +z
2
t . In turn,
each component is given by a continuous-time continuous-state process of the form
dzjt = −βjzjt dt+ jtdN jt ; (4.5.1)
where jt ∼ N
(
0, σ2j
)
and dN jt is a pure Poisson process with arrival rate λj . The estimated
parameter values are summarized in Table 4.2.
I choose this type of idiosyncratic income process for two reasons. First, it resembles the stan-
dard discrete time specification where log-earnings is modeled as the sum of a transitory and a
permanent components; the process in equation (4.5.1) closely resembles a discrete time AR(1)
process. Second, this formulation allows for the arrival of each income innovation to be stochastic
instead of deterministic. The inclusion of the Poisson process implies that the income innovations
are stochastic with an arrival rate of λj instead of being realized at every instant in time.109
When solving the household’s problem, I approximate the continuous-time continuous-state
processes in equation (4.5.1) with a continuous-time discrete-state processes. For each of the two
109As Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016) argue, the frequency of earning shocks plays a crucial role in any model of
households’ portfolio choice.
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components (j = 1, 2) I proceed in two steps. First, I construct a grid zj with 5 grid points for
the persistent component and 3 grid points for the transitory component. The lower bound, upper
bound, and spacing between grid points, are all parameters to be determined by the calibration.
Second, I construct the associated continuous time transition matrix based on a finite difference
approximation of the continuous-state process.
I calibrate the upper bound, lower bound, and spacing between grid points so that the annual mo-
ments produced by simulating the discrete-state process match eight key annual earnings moments
from the continuous-state process as reported in Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016). These moments
are presented in Table (4.3). As it can be seen from the table, the discrete-state specification does a
fairly good job in approximating the continuous-time one in terms of matching these moments.
4.5.2 FICO Score Distribution
The results in Agarwal et al. (2016) about the distribution of changes in borrowing following credit
expansions are presented in terms of households’ FICO scores. Since I will be comparing the
predictions of my model with these results, I need to map the wealth and income distribution implied
by my model into the FICO score distribution of the U.S. The way in which I construct this mapping
is guided by the way in which I view FICO scores. First, I interpret them as just providing an
ordering among households in the population (in terms of default risk). Second, I conjecture that
the main factors that are considered when constructing FICO scores are: (i) total amount owed
by a household, (ii) household’s payment history, (iii) length of a household’s credit history, (iv)
composition of the household’s debt, and (v) new credit obtained by the household. With this in
mind, I use some of my model’s variables to construct a statistic that satisfies this two criteria; it
ranks households according to their likeliness to default and it incorporates some of these factors
that are considered when constructing the actual FICO scores (in particular (i) and (v)). I then
construct a mapping from this statistic to the U.S. FICO score distribution.
Recall that for a household of type (b, z), the optimal outcome of the contract is given by the
desired level of asset holdings b′(b, z) and the fee φ(b, z; b′(b, z).110 Suppose there was the option
of defaulting. Assume that if a household chooses to default, she does not repay her current debt
110Throughout this section, I drop the dependence of the variables on time since the calibration targets the steady state
outcomes. Instead I use the notation xss to refer to the steady state value of variable x.
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Table 4.3: Earnings Process Target Moments
Moment Data Continuous-State Discrete-State
Variance of log earnings 0.70 0.70 0.72
Variance of 1yr change 0.23 0.23 0.27
Variance of 5yr change 0.46 0.46 0.44
Fraction 1yr < 10% 0.54 0.56 0.57
Fraction 1yr < 20% 0.71 0.67 0.68
Fraction 1yr < 50% 0.86 0.85 0.83
Note: The moments corresponding to “Data” and the “Continuous-State”
model correspond to those presented in Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016).
nor the interest. In turn, the branch refuses to negotiate a new contract and the household is unable
to get any new funds. Therefore, the benefit the household gets from defaulting is given by
SD(b, z; b
′(b, z)) =
[
u
(
(1− τ lss)wsszl∗ss, l∗ss
)
+ V (0, z)
]
− [u (cR(b, z), l∗ss)+ V (b′(b, z), z)] .
(4.5.2)
The first term is simply the total utility (flow plus continuation value) if the household chooses to
default. The second term capture the total utility the household gets if she repays and hence gets
the optimal contract. The household would find default attractive as long as SD(b, z; b′(b, z)) ≥ 0. I
use this idea to construct a summary statistic that “ranks” households in the economy according to
their incentive to default:
F̂ ICO(b, z, b′(b, z)) = −
SD(b, z; b
′(b, z))
maxb,z SD(b, z; b′(b, z))
(4.5.3)
The summary statistic defined by (4.5.3) measures the incentive to default of a household of type
(b, z) relative to the household who has the largest incentive to default. Note that given this defini-
tion, F̂ ICO(b, z, b′(b, z)) ∈ [−1,M], where M ≥ −1. Therefore, for two households (b1, z1) and
(b2, z2), household 1 finds default more attractive (is more likely to default) than household 2 if and
only if F̂ ICO(b1, z1, b′(b1, z1)) < F̂ICO(b2, z2, b′(b2, z2)). The sign of the summary statistic is
not relevant for my purpose. A non-negative value of the statistic implies that the household does
not find default attractive. However, I am only interested in “ranking” the households. That is, given
two households who find default unattractive, which one finds it more unattractive. If one had to
pick the most trustworthy household out of two, one with a FICO score of 761 and another one with
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Figure 4.10: FICO Score Distribution
a score of 762, one would probably select the one with the highest FICO score although both have
“excellent” credit (score above 750).
In light of the previous discussion, the summary statistic in (4.5.3) captures a household’s default
risk. This default risk is associated only with two of the five factors that might enter the actual FICO
score calculation: the total amount owed by the household (her current holdings b) and her new
credit (her desired level of asset holdings b′). However, and to the extent that a household’s income
is a proxy for her payment history or length of credit history, I am indirectly capturing such factors
as well.
To map the model’s statistic given in (4.5.3) into actual FICO scores, I define seven threshold
values xi ∈ [−1,M], where xi ≤ xi+1. Each of these values corresponds to a FICO score cutoff:
c1 = 500, c2 = 550, c3 = 600, c4 = 650, c5 = 700, c6 = 750, and c7 = 800. Therefore, the
threshold values imply FICO score bins. I select the threshold values so that the mass of people
in each FICO score bin implied by the invariant distribution of the model matches the percentage
of the U.S. population with that range of FICO scores. That is, the threshold values are selected
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Figure 4.11: Average Wealth and Income by FICO Score Group
targeting the following moments:
Mi = P (ci−1 < FICO ≤ ci)−
∫
(b,z)
1{
xi−1<F̂ICO(b,z,b′(b,z)≤xi
}dG(b, z), i = 1, 2, ..., 8 (4.5.4)
where x0 = −1 and x8 = M, with corresponding FICO score cutoffs c0 = 300 and c8 = 850. Note
that P (ci−1 < FICO ≤ ci) denotes the fraction of the U.S. population with a FICO score between
ci−1 and ci.111
Figure 4.10 shows the distribution of FICO scores across the U.S. population (blue bars) and the
one implied by my model (red bards). Additionally, Figure 4.11 shows the average wealth level (left
panel) and the average (yearly) income level within each FICO group as implied by the model. Note
that the model predicts a positive correlation between FICO scores and income/wealth: households
with higher FICO scores are those who, on average, have a higher wealth and income.
111I use the data from the FICOTM website: http://www.fico.com/en/blogs/tag/
score-distributions/.
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4.5.3 Asset Distribution And Other Parameters
The calibration strategy follows closely Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016). This is to ensure that,
when comparing the model with the heterogenous bank pass-trough to the model without it (stan-
dard HANK), any difference in the response of aggregate consumption to a credit expansion is
attributable to the pass-through mechanism and not to the model’s calibration.
The model parameters that determine the asset distribution are the discount rate ρ, the risk
aversion γ, the renegotiation frequency σ, and the borrowing limit b. The values of these parameters
for the calibrated version of the model are shown in Table 4.5. In addition, Table 4.5 shows the
Frisch elasticity ν, the disutility of labor scaling parameter ψ, the bargaining parameter θ, the labor
income tax rate τl, and the lump sum transfer Tlump.
The parameters affecting the wealth distribution are calibrated so that the model’s invariant
wealth distribution matches three target moments of the U.S. wealth distribution: (i) the average
private (revolving) consumer debt, (ii) the average asset holdings (liquid and illiquid), and (iii) the
fraction of population with debt (non-positive asset holdings). Table 4.4 shows these moments
and their model counterparts. Note that this calibration implies that 9% of the population is at the
borrowing limit.
The other calibrated parameters are the disutility of labor ψ and the lump sum transfer Tlump.
The disutility of labor is set so that effective hours worked by households in steady state is equal to
a third. The lump sum transfer is calibrated to imply that 40% of households receive a net transfer
from the government in steady state.
Finally, the labor income tax rate is set at 25%. It must be noted that the branch’s bargaining
power θ is completely determined by the risk aversion parameter given the assumption in Proposi-
tion 4.2.
4.6 Results
The following section discusses the main results of the paper. First, I present the empirical evidence
on the distribution of borrowing adjustments across households following credit expansions as doc-
umented by Agarwal et al. (2016) and show that my model can match it. Next, I use my model
to show how this mechanism dampens the responsiveness of aggregate consumption to monetary
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Table 4.4: Target vs. Calibrated Moments of the Wealth Distribution
Target Moment Data Model
Avg. private debt -0.03 -0.07
Avg. asset holdings 3.18 3.11
Fraction of the population with debt 0.25 0.23
Fraction of the population with net transfer 0.40 0.41
Note: The average asset/debt values are expressed as ratios to an-
nual output. Data is based on SCF 2004 and the Congressional
Budget Office (2013).
Table 4.5: List of Calibrated Parameter Values
Description Value Source
r Return on asset (pa) 2% Kaplan et al. (2016)
ρ Discount rate (pa) 4.68% Calibrated
γ Risk aversion 1.05 Calibrated
ν Frisch elasticity 0.5 Kaplan et al. (2016)
ψ Disutility of labor 19 Avg. hrs worked equal to 1/3
b Borrowing limit -0.42 Equals 1 x labor income
θ Bank’s bargaining power 0.05 By assumption
σ Renegotiation rate 9 Calibrated (3 times a month)
τ l Labor income tax 0.25 Kaplan et al. (2016)
Tlump Lump sum transfer 0.05 Calibrated
Note: Except for r and ρ, all other parameters are given in quarterly terms.
policy expansions.
4.6.1 Distribution of Borrowing Adjustments After A Credit Expansion
Agarwal et al. (2016) use panel data on credit cards in the United States over the period January
2008 to December 2014 to determine the distribution of changes in borrowing across households
resulting from credit expansions. Their study groups households in different FICO score bins and
quantifies the average change in borrowing for each bin as the product of the Marginal Propensity
to Borrow (MPB) and the Marginal Propensity to Lend (MPL). On one hand, the MPL captures the
way in which banks adjust the credit card limits for different households in the economy following
a credit expansion. On the other hand, the MPB captures the way in which households react and
adjust their borrowing following a change in their credit card limits. Therefore, the total effect of a
credit expansion in borrowing is just given by the product of these two factors.
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Figure 4.12: Results from Agarwal et al. (2016) About The Distribution of Debt Adjustments
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.12 present a summary of their results. Note that the distribution of
borrowing adjustments following a credit expansion depends on the measure used in constructing
the marginal propensity to borrow. In particular, Agarwal et al. (2016) use four different measures
for “credit card debt” when constructing the marginal propensity to borrow; Average Daily Balance,
Interest Bearing Debt, Cumulative Purchase Volume, and Balance Across All Credit Cards. The
first three measures ignore portfolio effects; they reflect the total debt balance in the specific card
for which the credit limit changed. The last measure incorporates portfolio effects; it measures
debt as the net borrowing from all the credit cards owned by a household. With this in mind,
there are three important remarks about these results. First, from Figure 4.12, it is clear that when
the borrowing measure does not capture portfolio effects (i.e. debt is measured as Average Daily
Balance, Interest Bearing Debt, or Cumulative Purchase Volume) the adjustment in borrowing is
increasing in the FICO score. Additionally, for all of these three measures of debt the distribution of
borrowing adjustments across FICO scores is fairly similar. Second, when the borrowing measure
captures portfolio effects (i.e. debt is measured as the Balance Across all Cards) the adjustment in
debt is increasing in the FICO score only up to the FICO score bin of 700− 749. As Table 4.1 and
Figure 4.12 show, for the highest FICO score bin the adjustment in borrowing is zero. Households
with a FICO score of 750 and above simply readjust their portfolio; they increase the use of the
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card with the higher credit limit but decrease the use of the other credit cards.112 The result is that
there is no increase in net borrowing for these households. Finally, although the study of Agarwal
et al. (2016) focuses on credit cards, the authors argue that their results are likely to be present
in a wide array of lending/borrowing markets. In the authors’ own words: “While the credit card
market is of stand-alone interest because credit cards are the marginal source of credit for many
U.S. households, mortgage lending and small business lending are other important channels for
monetary policy transmission. We think that our finding that the pass-through of changes to banks’
cost of funds is muted for less creditworthy consumers ... is likely to apply across this broader set
of markets”.
Figure 4.13 shows that my model is able to replicate the results presented in Agarwal et al.
(2016) about the distribution of changes in borrowing following a credit expansion. The figure
shows the change in borrowing by FICO score group relative to the population average. The blue
histogram refers to the results from Agarwal et al. (2016) and the red histogram corresponds to
my model’s prediction. In light of the remarks in the previous paragraph, there are two important
observations that the reader must keep in mind. First, I interpret the results in Agarwal et al. (2016)
as applicable to the general credit market; my model is by no means a rigorous model about the
credit card market but rather a general representation of households’ access to credit. Second, my
model is a one asset model and thus ignores any portfolio effects; I am able to match the results
from Agarwal et al. (2016) when they use any of the borrowing measures that does not incorporate
such portfolio effects.
The empirical results that my model is able to replicate imply that households with higher FICO
scores adjust their borrowing by more following credit expansions; roughly speaking, households at
the top of the FICO score distribution increase their borrowing by about 2− 2.5 times more relative
to those at the bottom. The driving force behind these results can be understood from Table 4.1.
In a nutshell, the banks relax the credit conditions more for households with a higher FICO score
but these households are precisely the ones who don’t use much of the extra credit to increase their
borrowing. On one hand, the marginal propensity to borrow is decreasing in the FICO score; for a
given increase in credit limits households on the highest FICO score bin increase their borrowing
112Other studies such as Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover and Rı´os-Rull (2011) have also found evidence about this portfolio
effect.
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Figure 4.13: Model’s Implied Distribution of Debt Adjustments by FICO Score
Note: The histogram corresponding to Agarwal et al. (2016) is constructed using the Cumulative Purchase Volume as the
measure of “credit card debt”.
only by about two fifths relative to households on the lowest FICO score bin. On the other hand,
the marginal propensity to lend is increasing in the FICO score; banks increase the credit limits
by about five times more for the households in the highest FICO score bin relative to those in the
lowest FICO score bin. In the end, ignoring portfolio effects, the force that dominates is that of
the marginal propensity to lend and households with a higher FICO score end up increasing their
borrowing by more.
In my model, the mechanism that explains these results is similar; households’ borrowing re-
sponse following credit expansions is driven by the “heterogeneous bank pass-through” mechanism
arising from the contracting environment. In Section 4.4, I decomposed the households’ borrow-
ing response to a credit expansion into three terms; the “pass-through” term, a term related to the
bank’s branch marginal propensity to lend, and a term related to the household’s marginal propen-
sity to borrow. Given the model’s calibration, I showed that the “pass-through” term is decreasing
in wealth/income, the marginal propensity to lend is increasing in wealth/income, and the marginal
propensity to borrow is pretty much identical and equal to one across households. In the end, the
effect that dominates is that of the marginal propensity to lend; the way in which the bank adjusts
the credit conditions (in my model the contracting fee). Intuitively, introducing the contracting
150
environment gives the bank some market power over the household; the bank then uses the con-
tracting fee as a tool to extract surplus from households. Two factors affect the way in which the
bank makes adjustments to the contracting fee. First, the amount of surplus the bank can actually
extract from the households (i.e. the bank’s value of the banking service). Second, the amount of
surplus that households get from the transaction (i.e. the households’ value of the banking service).
In my model, the households with high wealth and income are those from whom the bank can ex-
tract the most resources. Additionally, it is precisely these households who value the service the
least. As a consequence, the bank needs to relax the credit conditions more for the high wealth and
income households (in order to make the service attractive for them) and the bank is willing to do
so (since these households give the bank the largest surplus). The combination of these two effects
implies that the marginal propensity to lend is increasing in wealth and income. Finally, in Section
4.5.2 I showed that the mapping from my model to the U.S. FICO score distribution implies that
my model’s FICO score is increasing in wealth and income. Thus, households with a higher FICO
score are precisely those whose borrowing increases the most, just like the evidence in Agarwal
et al. (2016) suggests.
4.6.2 Effect on Aggregate Consumption Response
In the previous section, I showed that the “heterogeneous bank pass-through” mechanism that arises
in my model allows me to replicate the empirical evidence in Agarwal et al. (2016). I now proceed
to analyze the effect that this “heterogeneous bank pass-through” has on the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism to aggregate consumption. In other words, I use my model as a laboratory to
study how the monetary policy transmission mechanism is affected when financial institutions are
able to adjust the credit conditions non-homogeneously across different households in the economy.
Figure 4.14 compares the effect of a monetary policy shock on households’ interest rate elas-
ticity of consumption for two versions of the economy; one that includes the heterogeneous pass-
through mechanism and one that doesn’t. The blue histogram illustrates the consumption response
across households for the economy that incorporates the heterogeneous pass-through; which is the
economy described in Section 4.3. For the version of the economy that does not include the het-
erogeneous pass-through, given by the red histogram, households can adjust their asset holdings
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Figure 4.14: Consumption Elasticity Upon Impact by FICO Score
at any instant in time and get/pay an interest rate equal to the prevailing market rate rt (i.e. the
banking sector can’t extract any surplus). In other words, this frictionless version of the economy
corresponds to the one (liquid) asset version of the HANK model presented in Kaplan, Moll and
Violante (2016). Both versions of the economy are calibrated to target the moments described in
Section 4.5.
The interest rate elasticity of consumption measures the percentage change in consumption
relative to the percent change in the real interest rate at the instant the initial monetary policy shock
hits the economy. I introduce the monetary policy shock following Kaplan, Moll and Violante
(2016). In particular, I assume monetary policy is given by a Taylor rule of the form rt = rss +
(φ− 1) · pit + t; where rss denotes the steady state real interest rate, pit denotes the inflation rate at
instant t, φ > 1 determines the strength of the monetary authority’s response to inflation, and t is
an unexpected (but deterministic) temporary monetary policy shock. As in the HANK framework,
when a surprise monetary policy shock hits the economy there is a general equilibrium response
in the path of prices Ψe =
{
ret , w
e
t , τ
e
t (·), piet
}
t≥0
. However, as Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016)
note, the direct effect of the change in the real interest rate on consumption can be isolated from the
general equilibrium effects by considering the alternative price path Ψ̂ ≡
{
ret , wss, τss(·), piet
}
t≥0
;
where wss and τss(·) are the steady state wage rate and tax functions. That is, by solving the
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recursive formulation of the households’ problem under the price path Ψ̂, one can focus on the
adjustment in households’ behavior purely due to changes in the real interest rate and exclude the
general equilibrium effects implied by changes in the wage rate and tax functions. Furthermore,
given the nature of my exercise, I do not need to close the model to solve for the path of inflation
rates
{
piet
}
t≥0
.113 Again, appealing to the results presented in Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2016), the
equilibrium path of the real interest rate (in their model the return on the liquid asset) is qualitatively
identical and quantitatively close to the exogenous path of the Taylor rule innovation t. Therefore,
I just assume that the “equilibrium” time path for the prevailing market rate is given by ret =
rss + e
−ηt0, where 0 is the initial surprise monetary policy shock.
As seen from Figure 4.14, the consumption elasticity is negative across all FICO score groups
when the heterogeneous pass-through is not included; a decrease in the real rate leads to an increase
in consumption across all FICO groups. However, when the heterogenous pass-through is included,
the consumption elasticity is negative only for households with a FICO score below 750. For house-
holds with a FICO score above 750, a decrease in the real rate leads to a decrease in consumption.
In a nutshell, the heterogeneous pass-through enhances the consumption response for households
with low FICO scores (i.e. low wealth and income) while muting (even reversing) the consumption
response for households with high FICO scores (i.e. high wealth and income).
This result hinges on the effect that the heterogeneous bank pass-through has on the substitution
effect of a decrease in the real rate. As in most standard models, the change in the real rate has
two effects; an inter-temporal substitution effect and a wealth effect. On one hand, the wealth effect
depends on a household’s asset position. For households with negative wealth, a decrease in the
real rate reduces past debt obligations; their wealth effectively increases providing an additional
incentive to consume. For households with positive wealth, a decrease in the real rate reduces the
interest accrued on past savings; their wealth effectively decreases leading to a smaller incentive to
consume. On the other hand, the inter-temporal substitution effect refers to a household’s incentive
to increase consumption due to a smaller real rate; which is qualitatively the same for all households
(regardless of their wealth and income levels). When the heterogeneous pass-through is included,
the substitution effect is enhanced for households with a negative asset position and dampened
for households with a positive asset position. Therefore, for households with negative wealth the
113Note that the households’ and banking sector problems are both entirely cast in real terms.
153
consumption response is enhanced; the larger substitution effect and the wealth effect both tend to
increase consumption given the decrease in the interest rate. For households with positive wealth
the consumption response is dampened due to the smaller substitution effect. Furthermore, for large
enough wealth levels, the wealth effect becomes dominant and drives the decrease in consumption
given the decrease in the interest rate.
To see how the heterogeneous pass-through affects the substitution effect, consider the house-
holds’ consumption response to a change in the real rate in the model with the heterogeneous pass-
through:
∂cRt (b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
=
∂(1 + rtb)
∂rt
−
∂b′(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
+
∂φ(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
 . (4.6.1)
The first component, ∂(1+rtb)∂rt , refers to the wealth effect; part of the consumption change is directly
proportional to the household’s level of wealth. It must be noted that this wealth effect is indepen-
dent of the heterogeneous pass-through and thus identical in the two versions of the economy. The
second component corresponds to the substitution effect; it depends on the way households adjusts
their asset position, ∂b
′(b,z;Ψt)
∂rt
, and on the way the bank relaxes the credit conditions for households,
∂φ(b,z;Ψt)
∂rt
. Note that from Proposition 4.6, the substitution effect can be approximately written as
∂b′(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
+
∂φ(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
'
(
2 + Γ(b, z; Ψt)
)
·
∂φ(b, z; Ψt)
∂rt
. (4.6.2)
Recall that Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) is a term that captures the “pass-through” from banks to households. In
the version of the economy with the heterogeneous pass-through, households must rely on banks to
adjust their asset position; banks effectively have monopolistic power over households and are able
to extract some of the households’ surplus generated by a credit expansion. In other words, for every
$1 decrease in a bank’s cost of funds, the bank decreases the credit costs for all households who
are effectively borrowing (i.e. b′ < b) by less than $1. The term Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) captures the surplus
the bank is able to retain for every dollar decrease in its cost of funds; that is why I refer to it as
the “pass-through” term. Note that the pass-through is negative, Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) < 0, for all effective
borrowers. In the version of the economy without the heterogenous pass-through, households can
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adjust their asset position at any time and need not rely on a bank. Since households can trade with
each other and with the government, banks have no monopolistic power. Therefore, banks can’t
extract any surplus from households; they just adjust the credit conditions one-for-one with the real
interest rate and it is as if Γ(b, z, b′; Ψt) = 0. Therefore, the effect of the “pass-through” is to
dampen the substitution effect across all households in the economy, as seen from equation (4.6.2).
The second term, ∂φ(b,z;Ψt)∂rt , refers to the way in which banks adjust the credit conditions for
households in the economy. From Section 4.4, recall that this term is mainly driven by two factors.
First, it is driven by the effective consumer surplus C˜St(b, z; Ψt); a measure of the value of the
banking service for a household. Second, it is driven by the effective branch surplus B˜St(b, z; Ψt);
a measure of the amount of resources (surplus) the bank branch can extract from a household.
In short, banks are willing to relax the credit conditions more for households who have a small
valuation of the banking service (in order to make it attractive for them) and for households from
whom they can extract a larger amount of surplus.
When the wealth effect is taken into account, the banking service becomes less valuable for
households who are currently borrowing (i.e a positive wealth effect) as C˜St(b, z; Ψt) decreases.
Additionally, these households now have more resources the branch can extract as B˜St(b, z; Ψt)
increases. The converse is true for households with positive wealth (i.e a negative wealth effect);
they have less resources for the branch to extract and their valuation of the service increases. That
is, due to the wealth effect banks are willing to relax more the credit conditions for households
with negative asset holdings. From equation (4.6.2), this adjustment in the credit conditions across
households introduces heterogeneity in the substitution effect; this effect is enhanced for households
with negative assets and dampened for households with positive assets.
The combination of these two terms, the “pass-through” and the adjustment in credit conditions,
results in the substitution effect being dampened for households with positive wealth and enhanced
for households with negative wealth. Recall, from Section 4.5.2, that the FICO score distribution
in the model is positively correlated with the level of asset holdings. Note first that households
with a FICO score below 650 are those who have negative wealth holdings (see Figure 4.11). For
these households, the elasticity of consumption is negative in both versions of the economy as seen
in Figure 4.14; a decrease in the real interest rate (monetary expansion) increases consumption.
However, the elasticity of substitution is more negative when the heterogeneous bank pass-through
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is included due to the enhanced substitution effect. Second, households with a FICO score above
650 are those who have positive wealth holdings; the substitution effect is dampened. Figure 4.14
shows how for these households the consumption elasticity is “less” negative when the heteroge-
neous pass-through is included. Furthermore, for large enough FICO score (i.e. wealth level), the
wealth effect dominates and the consumption response becomes positive for the model with the
heterogenous pass-through.
Overall, my model shows that the heterogeneous bank pass-through does affect the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy; it enhances the transmission for low wealth and income households
while dampening it for high wealth and income ones. The effect of the heterogenous pass-through
on monetary policy transmission to aggregate consumption depends on the distribution of house-
holds across the economy and their consumption share. Given my model’s calibration, the consump-
tion share of high wealth and income households is dominant; the heterogenous bank pass-through
decreases the aggregate consumption response to a monetary stimulus by about 5 times, relative to
the “direct” aggregate consumption response in the one-asset HANK framework.
4.7 Conclusion
I show that the way in which banks change credit conditions across households after a change in
their cost of funds has important implications for the transmission of monetary policy. My paper
incorporates this heterogeneous bank pass-through channel via a financial friction in a New Keyne-
sian continuous-time model that features idiosyncratic income uncertainty and incomplete markets.
I show that the model’s prediction about the degree of heterogeneity across households’ borrowing
adjustments arising from the bank pass-through is in line with some recent empirical evidence; fol-
lowing a change in banks’ cost of funds, households at the top of the FICO score distribution adjust
their borrowing by about twice as much relative to households at the bottom of the FICO score
distribution.
The heterogenous bank pass-through mechanism arising from the model hinges on two factors.
First, it hinges on the bank’s ability to extract surplus from households; a consequence of house-
holds relying on the bank to make any asset adjustments. This is the “pass-through” part of the
mechanism; for every unit decrease in the bank’s cost of funds, the bank decreases the credit costs
for households but by less than a unit. Second, it hinges on the fact that the bank’s ability to extract
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surplus from households depends on the specific characteristics of the latter. This is the heteroge-
nous part of the mechanism. In order to extract surplus from households, the bank adjusts its credit
conditions taking into account two points. On one hand, the household’s available resources; the
bank is willing to relax the credit conditions more for households with a large amount of resources
as it can extract more surplus from them. On the other hand, the household’s valuation of the bank-
ing service; the bank must relax the credit conditions more for households with a relatively small
valuation of the service in order to make the service more attractive for them.
When the heterogeneous bank pass-through is explicitly included, the aggregate consumption
response to a change in the real rate is about five times smaller compared to the aggregate con-
sumption response in the standard one-asset Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model.
This difference is mostly driven by the consumption response of wealthy households. In the HANK
framework, the consumption response across households is characterized by two observations. First,
consumption responds non-negatively for all households; a decrease in the real rate leads to an in-
crease in consumption. Second, the consumption response is larger for households with smaller
wealth and income levels. When the heterogeneous bank pass-through is included, only the lat-
ter observation holds. For households with sufficiently large wealth levels, a decrease in the real
rate leads to a decrease in consumption. The intuition behind this results is as follows. Given the
decrease in the real rate, the wealth effect implies that households with positive asset holdings are
“effectively” poorer and value the banking service more. Given the heterogenous bank pass-through
mechanism, banks end up relaxing the credit conditions by less for these households; which exac-
erbates the negative impact of the wealth effect on consumption. For households with large enough
wealth levels, the wealth effect dominates and the decrease in the real rate leads to a decrease in
consumption.
My results contribute to the literature that incorporates idiosyncratic uncertainty, incomplete
markets, and financial frictions to study the transmission of monetary policy. My findings reaf-
firm two observations stressed by this literature. First, financial frictions are important for policy
transmission. Second, there is a highly heterogeneous impact of monetary policy across house-
holds. Importantly, I show that even if financial frictions enhance the monetary policy transmission
for some households and dampen it for some others, these effects do not undo each other on the
aggregate.
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Appendices
A.1 Appendix To Chapter 1
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
Let Rd ≡ R0 − (1− δ)pid,1 ≥ 0, W a−1 ≡ q0 (1− δ) da−1 − R−1ba−1pi−1c,0 , Ac,t ≡ (1−∆c,tωc,t),
Ad,t ≡ (qt −∆d,tωc,t), and P1 ≡ βb (1 + (1− α)κb). Since the FOC’s are necessary and suffi-
cient, the solution for the no constraint case is characterized by the following equations:
ca0 = α (1− α)−1 q0R−10 Rdda0 (A.1.1)
ca1 = βaα (1− α)−1 q0pi−1c,1Rdda0 (A.1.2)
na0 = ωc,0ν
−1
a (1− α)R0 (q0Rdda0)−1 (A.1.3)
ba0R0
pic,1
= q1 [(1− δ) da0 − da1]− ca1 + ωc,1na1 + Πa1 (A.1.4)
na1 = ωc,1 (νaβa)
−1 (1− α)pic,1 (q0Rdda0)−1 (A.1.5)
da1 = βa (1 + κa)pi
−1
d,1Rdd
a
0 (A.1.6)
ba0 = c
a
0 + q0d
a
0 − ωc,0nb0 −W a−1 −Πa0 (A.1.7)
Note that Πat denote the profits from firm ownership; thus for borrowers Π
b
t = 0 while for savers
Πst = Ω
−1
s (Yc,tAc,t + Yd,tAd,t). For an agent of type borrower, using equations (A.1.1), (A.1.2),
(A.1.3), (A.1.5), and (A.1.6) in the consolidated budget constraint, one obtains a second degree
polynomial in cb0. Then c
NC
b,0 is a solution to the borrower’s problem iff it satisfies
α−1 (1− α)
[
(1 + βb) (1− α)−1 + κbβb
] (
cb0
)2 −W b−1 cb0 − αν−1b [ω2c,0 + β−1b (ωc,1pic,1R−10 )2] = 0.
(A.1.8)
Note that equation (A.1.8) has two solutions, denote them x1 and x2.
Given α ∈ (0, 1), (1 + βb) (1− α)−1 +κbβb > 0 and αν−1b
[
ω2c,0 + β
−1
b
(
ωc,1pic,1R
−1
0
)2] ≥ 0 =⇒
x1, x2 ∈ R, with x1 ≤ 0 ≤ x2. Therefore, given Rd ≥ 0 and R0, q0 > 0, there is a unique solution
cNCb,0 ∈ R+ that satisfies (A.1.8) and it is given by
cNCb,0 = α 2
−1 (P1 + 1)−1
[
W b−1 +
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4 (P1 + 1) ν
−1
b
(
ω2c,0 + β
−1
b
(
ωc,1pic,1R
−1
0
)2)]
(A.1.9)
The remaining variables for the optimal allocation for the borrower are given by (A.1.1)-(A.1.4).
Trivially, this allocation is unique given the unique value of cNCb,0 . Now, given an allocation for
the borrower,
(
cb0, d
b
0, c
b
1
)
, define for the saver W s−1 ≡ W s−1 − (1− δ)Ad,0
(
ds−1 + ΩbΩ−1s db−1
)
,
A
b
d0 ≡
[
Ad,0 −R−10 pic,1 (1− δ)Ad,1
]
, Abc1 ≡ R−10 pic,1
[
Ac,1 + (α q1)
−1 (1− α) (1 + κb)Ad,1
]
,
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Ksd0 ≡
[
∆d,0ωc,0 −R−10 pic,1 (1− δ) ∆d,1ωc,1
]
,
Ksc1 ≡ ωc,1
[
∆c,1 + (α q1)
−1 (1− α) (1 + κs) ∆d,1
]
, W sF ≡ ΩbΩ−1s
(
cb0Ac,0 + d
b
0A
b
d0 + c
b
1A
b
c1
)
,
and
Ks ≡ ∆c,0ωc,0+βsKsc1+(α q0)−1 (1− α)R0 [R0 − (1− δ)pid,1]−1Ksd0 . Using equations (A.1.1),
(A.1.2), (A.1.3), (A.1.5), and (A.1.6) in the lifetime budget constraint, one obtains a second degree
polynomial in cs0. Then c
NC
s,0 is a solution to the saver’s problem iff it satisfies
Ks (cs0)
2 − (W s−1 +W sF ) cs0 − αν−1s [ω2c,0 + β−1s (ωc,1pic,1R−10 )2] = 0. (A.1.10)
As it was the case for the borrower, this equation has two solutions, denote them x1 and x2. Provided
Ks ≥ 0 =⇒ x1, x2 ∈ R, with x1 ≤ 0 ≤ x2. Therefore, given Rd ≥ 0 and R0, q0 > 0, there is a
unique solution cNCs,0 ∈ R+ that satisfies (A.1.10) and it is given by
cNCs,0 = (2K
s)−1
[(
W
s
−1 +W
s
F
)
+
√(
W
s
−1 +W sF
)2
+ 4αKsν−1s
(
ω2c,0 + β
−1
s
(
ωc,1pic,1R
−1
0
)2)]
(A.1.11)
The remaining variables for the optimal allocation for the saver are given by (A.1.1)-(A.1.4). Triv-
ially, this allocation is unique given the unique value of cNCs,0 .
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
DefineRd, P1, andW a−1 as in the proof of Proposition 1.1,R
χ
d ≡ q0R−10 [R0 − (1− χ) (1− δ)pid,1],
R˜d ≡ q0R−10 Rd, A1 ≡ χ−1
(
R0 (1− δ)−1 pi−1d,1 − 1
)
, A2 ≡ β−1b
(
ωc,1pic,1R
−1
0
)2
(1 +A1)
2,
and A3 ≡ 4 ν−1b
(
ω2c,0 +A2
)
(1 + P1).
Note that since I assume that the agents of type saver face no constraint, given an allocation(
cb0, d
b
0, c
b
1
)
, the proof for existence an uniqueness of the solution for the saver’s problem is exactly
the same as in Proposition 1.1. The same is true for the borrower’s problem in an economy with
non-binding credit constraints. Hence, in what follows, I consider only the problem for agents of
type borrower and I treat the constraint as binding.
Let Rd ≥ 0. Since χ ∈ (0, 1) =⇒ Rχd ≥ 0. The necessary and sufficient FOC’s for the
borrower’s problem are given by:
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R0b
b
0 = (1− χ) (1− δ) q0pid,1db0 (A.1.12)
αR˜dd
b
0 = c
b
0
(
1− α+ χ (1− δ) q0pid,1ζ0db0
)
(A.1.13)
αcb0 = pic,1c
b
1β
−1
b
(
αR−10 − ζ0cb0
)
(A.1.14)
nbt = αωc,t
(
νbc
b
t
)−1
, for t ∈ {0, 1} (A.1.15)
db1 = (1− α) (1 + κb) (αq1)−1 cb1 (A.1.16)
q0d
b
0 − bb0 = W−1 + ωc,0nb0 − cb0 (A.1.17)
bb0R0
pic,1
= q1
[
(1− δ) db0 − db1
]
− cb1 + ωc,1nb1; (A.1.18)
where ζ0 > 0 denotes the multiplier for the credit constraint. Define the functions
f1
(
cb0
)
= ω2c,0αν
−1
b +W
b
−1c
b
0 −
(
cb0
)2
(A.1.19)
f3
(
cb0
)
= ω2c,0αν
−1
b +W
b
−1c
b
0 − α−1
(
cb0
)2
(A.1.20)
f2
(
cb0
)
=
αω2c,0
νb
+W b−1c
b
0 −
(P1 + 1)
(
cb0
)2
α
(A.1.21)
g
(
cb0
)
= [χ (1− δ) q1]2
[
f1
(
cb0
)]2
f2
(
cb0
)
+ α (βbνb)
−1 (ωc,1Rχd)2 [f3 (cb0)]2 . (A.1.22)
The system of equations (A.1.12)-(A.1.18) can be simplified to a single equation in cb0, which is
given by g
(
cb0
)
= 0. In addition, using the definitions (A.1.19)-(A.1.21), db0, c
b
1 and ζ0 can be
written as functions of cb0:
cb1
(
cb0
)
= βbχ (1− δ) q1cb0
[
Rχd · f3
(
cb0
)]−1 · [f1 (cb0)] (A.1.23)
ζ0
(
cb0
)
= α
(
R0c
b
0
)−1 [
1− (1 +A1) f3
(
cb0
)
f−11
(
cb0
)]
(A.1.24)
db0
(
cb0
)
=
[
f1
(
cb0
)]
·
(
Rχd c
b
0
)−1
(A.1.25)
The remaining allocation variables
(
bb0, n
b
0, n
b
1, d
b
1
)
are given by (A.1.12), (A.1.15) and (A.1.16),
respectively. Hence cCb,0 is a solution to the borrower’s problem iff c
C
b,0, f1
(
cCb,0
)
, f3
(
cCb,0
)
≥ 0
and g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0.
First, from (A.1.19), (A.1.20) and α ∈ (0, 1), f1 ≥ f3 ∀cb0 ≥ 0. Second, let xf31 and xf32 denote
the roots of f3. Since f3 (0) = ω2c,0αν
−1
b ≥ 0 and f ′′3 = −2α−1 < 0 ∀cb0 ≥ 0 =⇒ xf31 , xf32 ∈ R+,
with xf31 ≤ 0 ≤ xf32 . Hence f3
(
cb0
)
< 0 ∀cb0 ∈
(
−∞, xf31
)
∪
(
xf32 ,+∞
)
and f3
(
cb0
) ≥ 0
∀cb0 ∈
[
xf31 , x
f3
2
]
. Hence cCb,0, f1
(
cCb,0
)
, f3
(
cCb,0
)
≥ 0⇐⇒ cCb,0 ∈
[
0, xf32
]
.
In addition, if g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0 =⇒ f2
(
cCb,0
)
< 0. Let xf21 and x
f2
2 denote the roots of f2. Since
f2 (0) = ω
2
c,0αν
−1
b ≥ 0 and f ′′2 = −2α−1 (P1 + 1) < 0 ∀cb0 ≥ 0 =⇒ xf21 , xf22 ∈ R+, with xf21 ≤
0 ≤ xf22 . Hence f2
(
cb0
) ≤ 0 ∀cb0 ∈ (−∞, xf21 ] ∪ [xf22 ,+∞) and f2 (cb0) > 0 ∀cb0 ∈ (xf21 , xf22 ).
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Therefore, g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0 , cCb,0 ∈
[
0, xf32
]
⇐⇒ g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0 , cCb,0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f3
2
]
; where
xf22 = α [2 (P1 + 1)]
−1
[
W b−1 +
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4ω2c,0ν
−1
b (P1 + 1)
]
(A.1.26)
xf32 = α2
−1
[
W b−1 +
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4ω2c,0ν
−1
b
]
. (A.1.27)
Note that xf22 < x
f3
2 since P1 > 0 by definition.
Finally, f2
(
xf22
)
= f3
(
xf32
)
= 0 =⇒ g
(
xf22
)
> 0 and g
(
xf32
)
< 0. By noting that g
(
cb0
)
is
a continuous function, the Intermediate Value Theorem ensures the existence of cCb,0 ∈
(
xf22 , x
f3
2
)
s.t. g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0.
I show next that if P1 > 1 and
(
W b−1
)2 ≥ max{A3 − 8ν−1b ω2c,0 (1 + P1) , A3 (P 21 − 1)−1},
then this solution is unique. To this end, let
f4
(
cb0
)
= α−1 (P1 + 1)
(
cb0
)2 −W b−1cb0 − αν−1b (ω2c,0 +A2) . (A.1.28)
Now, for cb0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f3
2
)
, we have g
(
cb0
)
< − [χ (1− δ) q1]2 ·
[
f3
(
cb0
)]2 · f4 (cb0), where I have
used the fact that f1 > f3. So that, for cb0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f3
2
)
, if f4
(
cb0
) ≥ 0 =⇒ g (cb0) < 0. Denote
the roots of f4 by x
f4
1 and x
f4
2 . From (A.1.28) and since P1, A2 > 0, it is clear that f4 (0) < 0
and f ′′4 > 0, ∀cb0 =⇒ xf41 , xf42 ∈ R+, with xf41 ≤ 0 ≤ xf42 . Therefore, f4
(
cb0
) ≥ 0 ∀cb0 ∈(
−∞, xf41
]
∪
[
xf42 ,+∞
)
and f4
(
cb0
)
< 0 ∀cb0 ∈
(
xf41 , x
f4
2
)
. It follows that if g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0 with
cCb,0 ∈
(
xf22 , x
f3
2
)
=⇒ cCb,0 ∈
(
xf22 ,min
{
xf32 , x
f4
2
})
; where
xf42 = α [2 (P1 + 1)]
−1
[
W b−1 +
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4ν−1b
(
ω2c,0 +A2
)
(P1 + 1)
]
(A.1.29)
Trivially xf22 < x
f4
2 .
Given P1 > 1, W b−1 ≥ 0, and
(
W b−1
)2 ≥ A3 (P 21 − 1)−1
=⇒ (W b−1)2 P 21 ≥ (W b−1)2 + 4ν−1b (ω2c,0 +A2) (P1 + 1)
=⇒W b−1 (P1 + 1) ≥ W b1 +
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4ν−1b
(
ω2c,0 +A2
)
(P1 + 1) =⇒ α2−1W b−1 ≥ xf42 =⇒
from (A.1.27), xf32 ≥ xf42 . Thus cCb,0 ∈
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
. Also, xf3max ≡ α2−1W b−1 is the value at which
f3 attains its maximum. Clearly, x
f3
max ∈
[
0, xf32
]
=⇒ f ′3 ≥ 0 for cb0 ∈
[
0, xf3max
]
=⇒ f ′1, f ′3 > 0
and f1, f3 > 0 for cb0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
, since, from (A.1.19) and (A.1.20), f1 ≥ f3 and f ′1 ≥ f ′3,
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∀cb0 ≥ 0. Define the function
f5
(
cb0
)
= 2
[
α (βbν)
−1
b
(
ωc,1R
χ
d
)2
+ f2 [χ (1− δ) q1]2
]
+f1
(
f ′1
)−1
f ′2 [χ (1− δ) q1]2 , (A.1.30)
and note that f ′5 < 0, ∀cb0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
since f ′2, f ′′2 , f ′′1 < 0 and f1, f ′1 > 0 on this interval.
Consider now g′,
g′
(
cb0
)
= 2
[
f3f
′
3α (βbνb)
−1 (ωc,1Rχd)2 + f1f ′1f2 [χ (1− δ) q1]2]+ f21 f ′2 [χ (1− δ) q1]2 , cb0 ∈ [xf22 , xf42 ] .
(A.1.31)
So that, for cb0 ∈
[
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
, g′ ≤ f1f ′1f5. It follows that, if f5 < 0 on
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
=⇒ g′ <
0 on
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
. Thus, to show g′ < 0 on
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
, it suffices to show f5,∗ ≡ f5
(
xf22
)
≤ 0.
Consider
f ′2,∗ ≡ f ′2
(
xf22
)
= −
√(
W b−1
)2
+ 4ν−1b ω
2
c,0 (1 + P1) (A.1.32)
f ′1,∗ ≡ f ′1
(
xf22
)
=
1− α
1 + P1
W b−1 +
 α
1 + P1
 f ′2,∗ (A.1.33)
(f1 · f2)∗ ≡ f1 · f ′2
(
xf22
)
= −
α
(
W b−1
)2
2 (1 + P1)
[
f ′1,∗ − f ′2,∗
]−
2αω2c,0
νb
 f ′1,∗ + αω2c,0νb
1 + α
1 + P1
 f ′2,∗
(A.1.34)
=⇒ f5,∗ = [χ (1− δ)]2
(
f ′1,∗
)−1 [
2αν−1b A2f
′
1,∗ +
(
f1f
′
2
)
∗
]
≤ [χ (1− δ)]2 (f ′1,∗)−1
2αν−1b A2f ′1,∗ − αW 2−12 (1 + P1)f ′1,∗ −
2αω2c,0
νb
 f ′1,∗

= [χ (1− δ)]2 2−1α (1 + P1)−1
[
A3 − 8ν−1b ω2c,0 (1 + P1)−
(
W b−1
)2]
≤ 0.
The first inequality follows since since f ′2,∗ ≤ 0. The second inequality is a consequence of the
assumption
(
W b−1
)2 ≥ max{A3 − 8ν−1b ω2c,0 (1 + P1) , A3 (P 21 − 1)−1} . Hence g′ (cb0) < 0 on(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
. Since cCb,0 ≥ 0 is a solution to the borrower’s problem ⇐⇒ g
(
cCb,0
)
= 0 and cCb,0 ∈(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
, this solution is unique.
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A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
Given PˆNC , define W−1 ≡ W b−1, P1, and A1 as in the proof of Proposition 1.2. Also, let xf22 ,
xf42 , f1
(
cb0
)
, f3
(
cb0
)
, and ζ0
(
cb0
)
be given by (A.1.26), (A.1.29), (A.1.19), (A.1.20), and (A.1.24).
Recall that ζ0
(
cb0
)
refers to the multiplier on the credit constraint. In addition, define
B1 ≡ β−1b
(
ωˆ NCc,1 pˆi
NC
c,1
(
Rˆ NC0
)−1)2
, B2 ≡ 4ν−1b
(
ωˆ NCc,0
2
+B1
)
(1 + P1),
and B3 ≡ 4ν−1b A1 (A1P1 − (1− α))−1B1 (1 + P1)2.
Therefore, the credit constraint is binding for the allocation AˆNCb ⇐⇒ ζ
(
cˆNCb,0
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ f1
(
cˆNCb,0
) ≥ (1 +A1) f3 (cˆNCb,0 ) , since cˆNCb,0 ∈ (xf22 , xf42 ) and f1, f3 ≥ 0 on this interval,
⇐⇒ (1 +A1) f3
(
cˆNCb,0
)− f1 (cˆNCb,0 ) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ A1W−1cˆNCb,0 +A1αν−1b
(
ωˆ NCc,0
)2 − α−1 (1 +A1 − α) (cˆNCb,0 )2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒
[
A1 − (1− α+A1) (1 + P1)−1
](
W−1 +
√
W 2−1 +B2
)2
≤ 4ν−1b A1B1 (1 + P1)
⇐⇒
(
W−1 +
√
W 2−1 +B2
)2
≤ B3 whenever A1P1 > (1− α)
⇐⇒ W1 ≤ (B3 −B2)
(
2
√
B3
)−1
whenever A1P1 > (1− α)
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Note that given the definition of U (·), one has
∂U
∂c0
,
∂U
∂c1
,
 ∂U
∂d0
 ≥ 0 and
∂2U
∂c0
2
,
∂2U
∂c1
2
,
 ∂2U
∂d0
2
 ≤ 0.
A note on notation first. Let x =
{
cbt , d
b
t , n
b
t
}t=1
t=0
. Since U (x) is assumed to be additively sep-
arable in all its arguments, then
∂U
∂xi
for xi ∈ x is only a function of xi. Therefore, for simplic-
ity, let
∂U
∂xi
(a) ≡
∂U
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
xi=a
. Also, I let
{
pi NCc,t , pi
NC
d,t , ω
NC
c,t , ω
NC
d,t , q
NC
t , R
NC
0
}1
t=0
∈ PˆNC and{
c NCb,t , d
NC
b,t , n
NC
b,t , b
NC
b,0
}1
t=0
≡ AˆNCb , and omit the ‘xˆ’ notation for convenience.
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Note that given
(
db0, b
b
0
)
, an allocation
(
cbt , d
b
t , n
b
t , b
b
0
)
can be constructed as follows. Let
A0
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= bb0 − qNC0
[
db0 − (1− δ) db−1
]
−RNC−1 bb−1
(
piNCc,0
)−1
(A.1.35)
A1
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= qNC1 (1− δ) db0 −RNC0 bb0
(
piNCc,1
)−1
(A.1.36)
cb0
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= 2−1
[
A0
(
db0, b
b
0
)
+
(
A20
(
db0, b
b
0
)
+ 4
(
ωNCc,0
)2
α ν−1b
)1/2]
(A.1.37)
nbt
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= ωNCc,t α
[
νb c
b
t
(
db0, b
b
0
)]−1
(A.1.38)
db1
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= (1− α) (1 + κb)α−1
(
qNC1
)−1
cb1
(
db0, b
b
0
)
(A.1.39)
cb1
(
db0, b
b
0
)
= 2−1 [1 + κb (1− α)]−1 ·[
A1
(
db0, b
b
0
)
+
(
A21
(
db0, b
b
0
)
+ 4 [1 + κb (1− α)]
(
ωNCc,1
)2
ν−1b
)1/2]
(A.1.40)
Where (A.1.35) and (A.1.36) refer to the total non-labor income of an agent of type borrower in pe-
riods 0 and 1, respectively. The non-durable consumption for each period, expressions (A.1.37) and
(A.1.40), are obtained using the budget constraints and the labor FOC’s. The corresponding labor
supplied is given by (A.1.38), where t ∈ {0, 1}. Finally, the durable good consumption for period 1,
expression (A.1.39), is obtained via the FOC for durable consumption for period 1. Note that for any
allocation for which the constraint is binding we have bb0 = (1− χ) (1− δ) qNC0 piNCd,1
(
RNC0
)−1
db0.
Hence expressions (A.1.35) - (A.1.39) are functions of db0 only. In particular c
b
0
(
db0
)
, cb1
(
db0
)
and
∂cb0
∂db0
= −cb0 qNC0
(
1− Γχ,δ piNCd,1
(
RNC0
)−1 )(
A20
(
db0
)
+ 4
(
ωNCc,0
)2
α ν−1b
)−1/2
(A.1.41)
∂cb1
∂db0
= χ (1− δ) cb1 qNC1
(
A21
(
db0
)
+ 4 [1 + κb (1− α)]
(
ωNCc,1
)2
ν−1b
)−1/2
(A.1.42)
where Γχ,δ ≡ (1− χ) (1− δ). Given this, for an allocation in which the constraint is binding,
define the function
F
(
db0
)
=
∂U
∂cb0
 qNC0
RNC0
(
RNC0 − Γχ,δ piNCd,1
)
−
∂U
∂cb1
χ (1− δ) · qNC1 − ∂U∂db0. (A.1.43)
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Then,
∂F
∂db0
=
∂2U
∂cb0
2

∂cb0
∂db0
 qNC0
RNC0
(
RNC0 − Γχ,δ piNCd,1
)
−
∂2U
∂cb1
2

∂cb1
∂db0
χ (1− δ) · qNC1 − ∂2U
∂db0
2.
(A.1.44)
For the binding constraint case and given the no constraint prices, the choice of db0, and its corre-
sponding allocation constructed using (A.1.35)-(A.1.39), is optimal iff F
(
db0
)
= 0. This follows
since F
(
db0
)
= 0 is the FOC with respect to durable consumption in period 0. Given the as-
sumptions on U , the FOC’s are necessary and sufficient to characterize the solution. Furthermore,
∂cb1
∂db0
≥ 0 from (A.1.42) and given
∂2U
∂c0
2
,
∂2U
∂c1
2
,
 ∂2U
∂d0
2
 ≤ 0, from (A.1.44) we have
If
(
RNC0 − Γχ,δ piNCd,1
)
≥ 0 =⇒
∂cb0
∂db0
≤ 0 from (A.1.41) =⇒
∂F
∂db0
≥ 0. (A.1.45)
Next, construct an allocation for the borrower
(
cIb,t, d
I
b,t, n
I
b,t, b
I
b,0
)
by setting dIb,0 = d
NC
b,0 and
bIb,0 = (1− χ) (1− δ) qNC0 piNCd,1
(
RNC0
)−1
dIb,0, which corresponds to letting the borrower hold
the maximum allowed level of debt. Then AIt ≡ At
(
dIc,0, b
I
b,0
)
, cIb,t ≡ cbt
(
dIc,0, b
I
b,0
)
, nIb,t ≡
nbt
(
dIc,0, b
I
b,0
)
, and dIb,1 ≡ db1
(
dIc,0, b
I
b,0
)
. Similarly, for the allocation
(
cNCb,t , d
NC
b,t , n
NC
b,t , b
NC
b,0
)
we have ANCt ≡ At
(
dNCc,0 , b
NC
b,0
)
, cNCb,t = c
b
t
(
dNCc,0 , b
NC
b,0
)
, nNCb,t = n
b
t
(
dNCc,0 , b
NC
b,0
)
, and dNCb,1 =
db1
(
dNCc,0 , b
NC
b,0
)
.
Given the no constraint prices, the allocation
(
cNCb,t , d
NC
b,t , n
NC
b,t , b
NC
b,0
)
satisfies the FOC’s for durable
consumption and debt holdings for the no constraint case,
FOC debt:
∂U
∂cb0
(
cNCb,0
)
−
∂U
∂cb1
(
cNCb,1
)
·RNC0 ·
(
piNCc,1
)−1
= 0 (A.1.46)
FOC durable:
∂U
∂cb0
(
cNCb,0
)
· qNC0 −
∂U
∂cb1
(
cNCb,1
)
· (1− δ) · qNC1 −
∂U
∂db0
(
dNCb,0
)
= 0. (A.1.47)
Now, consider the allocation
(
cIb,t, d
I
b,t, n
I
b,t, b
I
b,0
)
. Using (A.1.46) and (A.1.47), one can write
F
(
dIb,0
)
as follows:
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F
(
dIb,0
)
=
∂U
∂cb0
(
cIb,0
)
−
∂U
∂cb0
(
cNCb,0
) qNC0
RNC0
(
RNC0 − (1− δ)piNCd,1
)
+
χ (1− δ) qNC1

piNCc,1
RNC0
∂U
∂cb0
(
cIb,0
)
−
∂U
∂cb0
(
cNCb,0
)−
∂U
∂cb1
(
cIb,1
)
−
∂U
∂cb1
(
cNCb,1
)

≥ 0. (A.1.48)
To see why we have the inequality, note that
∂U
∂c0
,
 ∂U
∂d0
 ≥ 0 along with (A.1.46) and (A.1.47)
imply that(
RNC0 − (1− δ)piNCd,1
)
≥ 0 =⇒ from (A.1.45), we have that
∂F
∂db0
≥ 0. Furthermore, by defini-
tion bIb,0 ≤ bNCb,0 and dIb,0 = dNCb,0 =⇒ AI0 ≤ ANC0 from (A.1.35) and AI1 ≥ ANC1 from (A.1.36)
=⇒ cIb,0 ≤ cNCb,0 from (A.1.37) and cIb,1 ≥ cNCb,1 from (A.1.40). So that
∂2U
∂c0
2
,
∂2U
∂c1
2
 ≤ 0
imply that
∂U
∂cb0
(
cIb,0
)
−
∂U
∂cb0
(
cNCb,0
) ≥ 0 and
∂U
∂cb1
(
cIb,1
)
−
∂U
∂cb1
(
cNCb,1
) ≤ 0. Hence (A.1.48)
follows.
The allocation
(
c˜bt , d˜
b
t , n˜
b
t , b˜
b
0
)
is optimal given the no constraint prices, so that from (A.1.48)
we have
F
(
dIb,0
)
≥ F
(
d˜b0
)
= 0. Since
∂F
∂db0
≥ 0 =⇒ dIb,0 = dNCb,0 ≥ d˜b0. Given the binding constraint, it
follows that
b˜b0 = (1− χ) (1− δ) qNC0 piNCd,1
(
RNC0
)−1
d˜b0 ≤ (1− χ) (1− δ) qNC0 piNCd,1
(
RNC0
)−1
dNCb,0 < b
NC
b,0 .
This concludes the proof of part a).
For part b), given PˆNC , define xf22 , x
f4
2 , g
(
cb0
)
, f1
(
cb0
)
, f2
(
cb0
)
, f3
(
cb0
)
as in (A.1.26), (A.1.29),
(A.1.22), (A.1.19), (A.1.21) and (A.1.20); respectively. In addition, let P1, A1, B1, B2, and B3 be
given as in the proof of Proposition 1.3. Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 1.2 hold
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and note that, since AˆNCb is an allocation for which the constraint binds, we also have W1 ≤
(B3 −B2)
(
2
√
B3
)−1 whenever A1P1 > (1− α).
Then c˜b0 ∈
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
is unique and must satisfy g
(
c˜b0
)
= 0. Furthermore, f1, f3 > 0, g′ < 0
on this interval. Hence, to show that c˜b0 ≤ cNCb,0 it suffices to show g
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ 0. From Proposition
1.1, cNCb,0 is given by (A.1.1) and must satisfy (A.1.8) =⇒ f2
(
cNCb,0
)
= −αν−1b B1 =⇒ g
(
cNCb,0
)
=
α (βbνb)
−1B4 h
(
cNCb,0
)
, where h
(
cNCb,0
)
= (1 +A1)
2
[
f3
(
cNCb,0
)]2 − [f1 (cNCb,0 )]2 and B4 ≡(
ω NCc,1 q
NC
0
(
R NC0
)−1)2 [
χ (1− δ)pi NCd,1
]2
.
Therefore, if h
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ 0 =⇒ g
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ 0. Now, h
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ 0⇐⇒ (1 +A1) f3
(
cNCb,0
)
≤
f1
(
cNCb,0
)
, since cNCb,0 ∈
(
xf22 , x
f4
2
)
and f1, f3 ≥ 0 on this interval. Now
(1 +A1) f3
(
cNCb,0
)− f1 (cNCb,0 ) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ A1W−1cNCb,0 +A1αν−1b
(
ω NCc,0
)2 − α−1 (1 +A1 − α) (cNCb,0 )2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒
[
A1 − (1− α+A1) (1 + P1)−1
](
W−1 +
√
W 2−1 +B2
)2
≤ 4ν−1b A1B1 (1 + P1)
(A.1.49)
Note that since P1, A1, B1 ≥ 0, then (A.1.49) is trivially satisfied whenever A1P1 ≤ (1− α).
If A1P1 > (1− α), then (A.1.49) is satisfied ⇐⇒
(
W−1 +
√
W 2−1 +B2
)2
≤ B3 ⇐⇒ W1 ≤
(B3 −B2)
(
2
√
B3
)−1.
This shows that h
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ 0 =⇒ g
(
cNCb,0
)
≤ g (c˜b0) = 0 =⇒ cNCb,0 ≥ c˜b0. From (A.1.38) it follows
immediately that n˜b0 ≥ n NCb,0 . This concludes the proof of part b).
For part c), note that cNCb,0 ≥ c˜b0 ⇐⇒ ANC0 ≥ A˜0 ⇐⇒ bNCb,0 − b˜b0 ≥ q NC0
(
dNCb,0 − d˜b0
)
≥ 0;
where the first equivalence follows from (A.1.37) and part b), the second from (A.1.35), and the last
inequality from part a). Using (A.1.36), we can write
ANC1 − A˜1 = −
(
bNCb,0 − b˜b0
)(
pi NCc,1
)−1(
R NC0 − q NC0
(
dNCb,0 − d˜b0
)(
bNCb,0 − b˜b0
)−1
(1− δ)pi NCd,1
)
≤ 0.
Finally, from (A.1.40) we have ANC1 ≤ A˜1 ⇐⇒ cNCb,1 ≤ c˜b1. To conclude the proof of part c), note
that (A.1.38) and (A.1.39) imply nNCb,1 ≥ n˜b1 and dNCb,1 ≤ d˜b1, respectively.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Given the pricesPE , let the allocationAEa satisfy the budget constraint for a ∈ {s, b} and t ∈ {0, 1}.
In addition, suppose that ΩbR−1bb−1 + ΩsR−1bs−1 = 0. Note that the profits derived from firm
ownership are given by Πst = Ω
−1
s [(Yc,t − ωc,tNc,t) + (qtYd,t − ωc,tNd,t)] for an agent of type
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saver and Πbt = 0 for an agent of type borrower. Finally, for notational convenience, let BC
a
t
denote the budget constraint of agent of type a in period t.
Note that ΩbBCb0 + ΩsBC
s
0 is given by
Ωbc
b
0 + Ωsc
s
0 + q0
[
Ωb
(
db0 − (1− δ) db−1
)
+ Ωs
(
ds0 − (1− δ) ds−1
)]
=
Ωbb
b
0 + Ωsb
s
0 + ωc,0
(
Ωbn
b
0 + Ωsn
s
0
)
+ Πs0
⇐⇒ Yc,0 + q0Yd,0 = Ωbbb0 + Ωsbs0 + ωc,0
(
Ωbn
b
0 + Ωsn
s
0
)
+ (Yc,0 − ωc,0Nc,0) + (q0Yd,0 − ωc,0Nd,0)
⇐⇒ 0 = Ωbbb0 + Ωsbs0 + ωc,0
(
Ωbn
b
0 + Ωsn
s
0 −Nc,0 −Nd,0
)
(A.1.50)
A similar argument for the final period implies,
0 = ωc,1
(
Ωbn
b
1 + Ωsn
s
1 −Nc,1 −Nd,1
)
−R0pi−1c,1
(
Ωbb
b
0 + Ωsb
s
0
)
(A.1.51)
From (A.1.50) and since wc,0 > 0, Ωbnb0 + Ωsn
s
0 = Nc,0 +Nd,0⇐⇒ 0 = Ωbbb0 + Ωsbs0.
From (A.1.51) and since wc,1, R0pi−1c,1 > 0, Ωbn
b
1 + Ωsn
s
1 = Nc,1 +Nd,1⇐⇒ 0 = Ωbbb0 + Ωsbs0.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Fix z0, (q−1,∆c,−1,∆d,−1), and
(
R−1ba−1, da−1
)
a∈{s,b}.
First, it is a simple exercise to find an expression of q0 = f (pic,1) using the FOC for the
intermediate firms’ pricing in the final period =⇒All the period 1 prices are functions of (pid,0, pic,0)
via Implicit Function Theorem (IFT).
The borrower’s optimal non-durable consumption level for period 0 is given implicitly via
g
(
cˆCb,0
)
, where g
(
cb0
)
is defined in (A.1.22).
=⇒ cˆCb,0 = cˆCb,0 (pic,0, pid,0, ωc,0) via IFT
=⇒ AˆCb = AˆCb (pic,0, pid,0, ωc,0) via (A.1.12)-(A.1.18).
The saver’s optimal durable consumption can be directly obtained
=⇒ cˆCs,0 = cˆCs,0 (pic,0, pid,0, ωc,0)
=⇒ AˆCs = AˆCs (pic,0, pid,0, ωc,0) via the equivalent to (A.1.12)-(A.1.18).
In turn, this implies that the aggregate variables are given by Yj,t = Yj,t (pic,0, pid,0, ωc,0) for
a ∈ {s, b} and j ∈ {c, d}.
Thus using the FOC’s for the optimal pricing for the intermediate firms in the first period and
combining them with (1.3.5) we get:
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pic,0 = (φc)
−1/(j−1)
{
1−
[
Φc
(
1 + βsφcDcpi
c−1
c,1
)(
ωc,0 + βsφcDcpi
c
c,1ωc,1
)−1](c−1)}1/(c−1)
(A.1.52)
pid,0 =
{
φd +
[
Φd q−1 pi−1c,0
(
1 + βsφdDdpi
d−1
d,1
)(
ωc,0 + βsφdDdpi
d
d,1ωc,1
)−1](d−1)}1/(d−1)
(A.1.53)
where, Φj ≡ (1− φj)1/(j−1) (j − 1) −1j , Dj ≡ (Yj,1 cs,0) (Yj,0 cs,1)−1.
=⇒ pic,0 = pic,0 (ωc,0) and pid,0 = pid,0 (ωc,0) by using the previous results and the IFT once again.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.7
Given the price vector PˆNC, for t ∈ {0, 1} and a ∈ {b, s} , let
(
c˜at , d˜
a
t , n˜
a
t , ζ˜
b
0
)
and
(
cˆNCa,t , dˆ
NC
a,t , nˆ
NC
a,t
)
denote the optimal allocations of an agent of type a in an economy with and without credit con-
straints, respectively. Consider, NE0 (ωc,0) = D
E
N,0 (ωc,0) − SEN,0 (ωc,0), the excess demand func-
tion for labor in the initial period for economy E ∈ {NC,C}. Then DEN,0 (ωc,0) = NEc,0 (ωc,0) +
NEd,0 (ωc,0) refers to the aggregate demand of labor by the firms in each sector, and S
E
N,0 (ωc,0) =
Ωsn
E
s,0 (ωc,0) + Ωbn
E
b,0 (ωc,0) refers to the aggregate supply of labor by the agents. Given the price
vector PˆNC, define Q0 ≡ α−1 (1− α) RˆNC0
(
RˆNC0 − (1− δ) pˆiNCd,1
)−1
. Thus one can write
DNCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
= ∆ˆNCd,0
[
Ωs
(
dˆNCs,0 − (1− δ) ds−1
)
+ Ωb
(
dˆNCb,0 − (1− δ) db−1
)]
+ ∆ˆNCc,0
(
Ωscˆ
NC
s,0 + Ωbcˆ
NC
b,0
)
and DCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
= ∆ˆNCd,0
[
Ωs
(
d˜s0 − (1− δ) ds−1
)
+ Ωb
(
d˜b0 − (1− δ) db−1
)]
+ ∆ˆNCc,0
(
Ωsc˜
s
0 + Ωbc˜
b
0
)
.
The difference in the labor demand functions between the credit constraint and unconstrained
economies is given by:
DCN,0 −DNCN,0 = ∆ˆNCd,0
[
Ωs
(
d˜s0 − dˆNCs,0
)
+ Ωb
(
d˜b0 − dˆNCb,0
)]
+ ∆ˆNCc,0
[
Ωs
(
c˜s0 − cˆNCs,0
)
+ Ωb
(
c˜b0 − cˆNCb,0
)]
= Ωb
[
∆ˆNCd,0
(
d˜b0 − dˆNCb,0
)
+
(
c˜b0 − cˆNCb,0
)]
+ Ωs
[
∆ˆNCc,0 +
(
qˆNC0
)−1
Qˆ0∆ˆ
NC
c,0
] (
c˜s0 − cˆNCs,0
)
;
(A.1.54)
where I have used equation (A.1.1) to substitute for ds0.
Similarly using equation (A.1.15), one can write the difference in the labor supply functions
between the credit constraint and unconstrained economies as:
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SCN,0 − SNCN,0 = αωˆNCc,0
[
ν−1s Ωs
(
cˆNCs,0 − c˜s0
) (
cˆNCs,0 c˜
s
0
)−1
+ ν−1b Ωb
(
cˆNCb,0 − c˜b0
)(
cˆNCb,0 c˜
b
0
)−1]
.
(A.1.55)
Given Qa0, Q
a
1, W
s
−1, KaR, K
a
C , Ac,t, Ad,t, Bζ , Dζ , ∆K,d0 , ∆K,c1 , and ∆K ; proceed as in
Proposition 1.1 and let A¯bd0 ≡
[
Ad,0 −
(
RˆNC0
)−1
pˆiNCc,1 (1− δ)Ad,1
]
,
A¯bc1 ≡
(
RˆNC0
)−1
pˆiNCc,1
[
Ac,1 +
(
α qˆNC1
)−1
(1− α) (1 + κb)Ad,1
]
,
and W sF ≡ ΩbΩ−1s
(
cb0Ac,0 + d
b
0A
b
d0 + c
b
1A
b
c1
)
.
Hence, for the allocations
(
c˜b0, d˜
b
0, c˜
b
1
)
,
(
cˆNCa,0, dˆ
NC
a, , cˆ
NC
a,1
)
and using equations (A.1.1), (A.1.2),
(A.1.13), (A.1.14), one can write W˜ sF = ΩbΩ−1s c˜b0
(
KˆbR − KˆbC + ∆K
)
and W sF = ΩbΩ−1s cˆNCb,0
(
KˆbR − KˆbC
)
.
=⇒W sF − W˜ sF = ΩbΩ−1s
[(
KˆbR − KˆbC
)(
cˆNCb,0 − c˜b0
)
− c˜b0∆K
]
(A.1.56)
Now, given PˆNC, W s−1, and since
(
KbR −KbC
) ≥ 0, we have
1. Case 1: cˆNCs,0 ≥ c˜s0 ⇐⇒ W
s
F ≥ W˜ sF ⇐⇒ cˆNCb,0 ≥ c˜b0
(
KbR −KbC
)−1 (
KbR −KbC + ∆K
)
. The
first equivalence relation follows from (A.1.11) and the second from (A.1.56). Then from
Proposition 1.4, equations (A.1.54), (A.1.55), and noting that NNC0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
= 0; it follows
that NC0
(
ωˆNCc,0
) ≤ 0.
2. Case 2: cˆNCs,0 < c˜
s
0 ⇐⇒W sF < W˜ sF ⇐⇒ cˆNCb,0 < c˜b0
(
KbR −KbC
)−1 (
KbR −KbC + ∆K
)
. Note
that
(a) From (A.1.11) it follows that 0 ≤
(
c˜s0 − cˆNCs,0
)
≤
(
W˜ sF −W
s
F
)
(KsC)
−1.
(b) From (A.1.56),
(
W˜ sF −W
s
F
)
> 0 is not a function of κs and limκs→+∞KsC = +∞.
Furthermore,
(
d˜b0 − dˆNCb,0
)
and
(
c˜b0 − cˆNCb,0
)
are not functions of κs either.
(c) W s−1 ≥ Ω−1s cˆNCb,0
[
ΩsK
s
C + Ωb
(
KbC −KbR
)] ⇐⇒ (W s−1 +W sF ) (KsC)−1 ≥ cˆNCb,0 . So
that given (A.1.11) =⇒ cˆNCs,0 ≥
(
W
s
−1 +W
s
F
)
(KsC)
−1 ≥ cˆNCb,0 .
(d) From Proposition 1.4 and given ∆K > 0
=⇒W s−1 ≥ Ω−1s cˆNCb,0
[
ΩsK
s
C + Ωb
(
KbC −KbR
)] ≥ Ω−1s c˜b0 [ΩsKsC + Ωb (KbC −KbR −∆K)]
=⇒ c˜s0 ≥ c˜b0.
Hence, from observations (a), (b), Proposition 1.4 and equation (A.1.54), it follows that for
κs large enough
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DCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
−DNCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
≤ 0.
Similarly, from observations (a)-(d), Proposition 1.4 and equation (A.1.55), for κs large
enough
SCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
− SNCN,0
(
ωˆNCc,0
)
≥
αωˆNCc,0
cˆNCb,0 c˜
b
0
[ν−1s Ωs (W sF − W˜ sF) (KsC)−1+ ν−1b Ωb (cˆNCb,0 − c˜b0)] ≥ 0.
So that NC0
(
ωˆNCc,0
) −NNC0 (ωˆNCc,0 ) ≤ 0; and noting that NNC0 (ωˆNCc,0 ) = 0, the desired result
follows.
171
A.3 Appendix To Chapter 3
A.3.1 Additional Tables
Table 5.1: Correlation Coefficients for Credit Variables
C&IS MortS NCCS CCS C&ID MortD HHD
C&IS 1.000 0.642 0.661 0.497 -0.643 -0.042 -0.338
MortS 0.642 1.000 0.761 0.558 -0.376 -0.197 -0.457
NCCS 0.661 0.761 1.000 0.879 -0.480 -0.062 -0.465
CCS 0.497 0.558 0.879 1.000 -0.368 0.078 -0.342
C&ID -0.643 -0.376 -0.480 -0.368 1.000 -0.175 0.354
MortD -0.042 -0.197 -0.062 0.078 -0.175 1.000 0.449
HHD -0.338 -0.457 -0.465 -0.342 0.354 0.449 1.000
Note: Based on quarterly data for the period 1990:1-2012:2
Table 5.2: SLOOS Principal Component Loading Factors
Credit Supply Block
PC1S PC
2
S PC
3
S PC
4
S
C&IS 0.608 0.734 -0.280 -0.118
MortS 0.454 -0.100 0.842 -0.275
NCCS 0.481 -0.271 -0.018 0.834
CCS 0.440 -0.615 -0.462 -0.463
Credit Demand Block
PC1D PC
2
D PC
3
D
C&ID -0.161 0.945 -0.285
MortD 0.918 0.037 -0.395
HHD 0.362 0.325 0.873
Note: Sample period 1995:10-2012:6.
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Table 5.3: Effects of High-Frequency Instrument on the First Stage Residuals of the Monetary
Policy Indicator for Alternative Specifications of the VAR1
VAR∗1
Spreads Ŝpreads SLOOS ŜLOOS
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
(0.006-0.014) (0.006-0.013) (0.006-0.014) (0.005-0.015)
FF3 0.800 0.785 0.817 0.831
(0.450-1.082) (0.473-0.996) (0.468-1.157) (0.439-1.184)
Observations 258 258 258 258
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.058 0.058
F-statistic 16.713 21.744 15.081 12.736
VAR†1
Spreads Ŝpreads SLOOS ŜLOOS
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
(0.006-0.014) (0.006-0.013) (0.006-0.014) (0.006-0.015)
FF3 0.800 0.785 0.808 0.834
(0.445-1.056) (0.471-0.969) (0.469-1.084) (0.452-1.161)
Observations 258 258 258 258
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.058 0.063
F-statistic 16.713 21.744 16.826 14.654
VAR‡1
Spreads Ŝpreads SLOOS ŜLOOS
Constant 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.011
(0.006-0.014) (0.007-0.014) (0.006-0.013) (0.006-0.014)
FF3 0.800 0.785 0.784 0.814
(0.444-1.077) (0.480-0.999) (0.463-1.021) (0.445-1.126)
Observations 258 258 258 258
Adj. R2 0.065 0.065 0.059 0.063
F-statistic 16.713 21.744 17.241 15.695
Note: Sample period 1990:1-2012:6. 90 percent confidence intervals in parenthesis.
1YR is used as the monetary policy indicator.
The surprise in the three month ahead fed funds future (FF3) is used as instru-
ment.
∗ SLOOS includes only the “main” principal component of credit supply block.
† SLOOS includes only the “main” principal component of credit demand block.
‡ SLOOS includes the credit demand and supply “main” principal components.
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A.4 Appendix To Chapter 4
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Given the recursive formulation of the household’s problem given by equation 4.3.7, the FOC’s for
cNRt , l
NR
t , c
R
t , and l
R
t are given by
cNRt : uc
(
cNRt , l
NR
t
)
(1− σ)− κNR = 0
lNRt : ul
(
cNRt , l
NR
t
)
(1− σ) + κNR [wtz − τt′ (wtzlNRt )] = 0
cRt : uc
(
cRt , l
R
t
)
σ − κR = 0
lRt : ul
(
cRt , l
R
t
)
σ + κR
[
wtz − τt′
(
wtzl
R
t
)]
= 0;
where κNR is the multiplier of the budget constraint conditional on no renegotiation, κR is the
multiplier of the budget constraint conditional on renegotiation, and τt′ (·) is the derivative of the
tax function. Given the assumptions that τt(x) = τ lt + Tt, u(c, l) =
[c−g(l)]1−γ−1
1−γ , with γ > 1, and
g(l) = ψzl
1+ 1ν
1+ 1
ν
; the previous conditions imply lNRt = l
R
t =
(
(1−τ lt)wt
ψ
)ν
.
Using the budget constraint, it is easy to see that cNRt =
(
1− τ lt
)
wtzl
NR
t + rtb+ Tt. Similarly,
for the renegotiation case cRt =
(
1− τ lt
)
wtzl
R
t + rtb+ Tt − (b′ − b)− φ. Thus the desired results
follow.
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
I first show that there exist a b such that b′ > b for any feasible b′. Given the bargaining problem
(4.3.6), if the constraint b′ > b is binding then the lower bound is trivial. Assume that b is suffi-
ciently small so that this constraint never binds. Given u(c, l) = [c−g(l)]
1−γ−1
1−γ , with γ > 1, then
limc→∞ u(c, l) = 0. Therefore, the household’s surplus is bounded above
CSt =
[
Vt(b
′, z; Ψt) + u(cRt , l∗t )
]− [Vt(b, z; Ψt) + u(cNRt , l∗t )] ≤ Vt(b′, z; Ψt)− [Vt(b, z; Ψt) + u(cNRt , l∗t )] .
Given that the value function is continuous and increasing in the asset holdings, as long as
limb′→−∞ Vt(b′, z; Ψt) < Vt(b, z; Ψt) + u(cNRt , l∗t ), there exists b such that
Vt(b, z; Ψt)−
[
Vt(b, z; Ψt) + u(c
NR
t , l
∗
t )
]
< 0. Thus any feasible b′ must satisfy b′ > b.
I next show that there exists a b¯ such that b′ < b¯ for any feasible b′. Given that BSt = φ +
rt(b
′ − b) ≥ 0, let φ = −rt(b′ − b) so that cRt (b′) =
(
1− τ lt
)
wtzl
R
t + rtb+ Tt − (b′ − b)(1− rt).
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Note that due to the GHH utility specification, cRt (b
′) is bounded below; cRt (b′) ≥ g(l∗t ). Define
b¯ so that cRt (b¯) = g(l
∗
t ). Assume further that rt < 1 so that c
R
t (b
′) is decreasing in b′. Thus,
u
(
cRt (b
′), l∗t
)
= −∞ for any b′ ≥ b¯. As long as Vt(b¯, z; Ψt) < ∞, the desired result follows by
noting that CSt ≥ 0 for any feasible b′.
That b ∈ (b, b¯) follows by noting that b is always a feasible choice since CSt = BSt = 0
whenever b′ = b.
Finally, I derive expression (4.3.8). The FOC of the contracting problem (4.3.6) with respect to
φ implies that
θ
(
CSt
BSt
)1−θ
− (1− θ)uc
(
cRt , l
∗
t
)(CSt
BSt
)−θ
= 0. (A.4.1)
Given the definitions of CSt and BSt, equation (A.4.1) can be written as
[φ+ rt(b
′ − b)]uc
(
cRt , l
∗
t
)− θ1−θu (cRt , l∗t ) = θ1−θ [Vt(b′, z; Ψt)− Vt(b, z; Ψt)− u (cNRt , l∗t )]
=⇒ [cRt − g(l∗)]−γ [φ+ rt(b′ − b)]+ [cRt − g(l∗)]1−γ = C˜St
=⇒ [cRt − g(l∗)]−γ [cNRt − cRt − (1− rt)(b′ − b)]+ [cRt − g(l∗)]1−γ = C˜St
=⇒ [cRt − g(l∗)]−γ B˜St = C˜St
=⇒ φ = [cNRt − (b′ − b)− g(l∗)]−
(
B˜St
C˜St
)1/γ
;
where C˜St ≡ Vt(b′, z; Ψt)− Vt(b, z; Ψt)− u(cNRt , l∗)− (1− γ)−1 and B˜St ≡
[
cNRt − (1− rt)(b′ − b)− g(l∗t )
]
.
The second line uses the assumptions that u(c, l) = [c−g(l)]
1−γ−1
1−γ and −
(
θ
1−θ
)(
1
1−γ
)
= 1. Addi-
tionally, note that I use the fact that cRt = c
NR
t − (b′ − b)− φ.
A.4.3 Proof of Proposition 4.4
I first derive expression (4.3.13). The FOC of the contracting problem (4.3.6) with respect to b′
implies that
θ rt
(
CSt
BSt
)1−θ
+ (1− θ) [∂bVt(b′, z; Ψt)− uc(cRt , l∗)](CStBSt
)−θ
= 0. (A.4.2)
Using equation (A.4.1) to substitute for CStBSt one gets the desired result;
∂bVt(b
′,z;Ψt)
uc(cRt ,l
∗
t )
= 1− rt.
Given that u(·) is concave and differentiable, the assumption that Vt(b, z; Ψt) is concave and
differentiable ensures that the FOC’s given by equations (A.4.1) and (A.4.2) are necessary and
sufficient to characterize the solution to the contracting problem.
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A.4.4 Proof of Proposition 4.5
I show that ∂b
′(b,z)
∂b ≥ 0. Note that the contracting problem can be solved in two steps. First solve
for b′(b, z) by combining equations (4.3.8) and (4.3.13). Second, use (4.3.8) to get φ(b′(b, z), b, z).
That is, the optimal fee in the contract can be seen as a function of b′, b, and z.
Differentiating (4.3.13) with respect to b one gets
∂b′
∂b
=
[
1 + rt − ∂φ
∂b
]
·
[
Vbb(b
′, z; Ψ)
ucc(cRt , l
∗
t )
+ 1 +
∂φ
∂b′
]−1
; (A.4.3)
where ∂φ∂b′ and
∂φ
∂b can be obtained from equation (A.4.1) as
∂φ
∂b′
= −
[
rt − θ · CSt ·
(
ucc(c
R
t , l
∗
t )
uc(cRt , l
∗
t )
)]
·
[
1− θ · CSt ·
(
ucc(c
R
t , l
∗
t )
uc(cRt , l
∗
t )
)]−1
∂φ
∂b
= 1 + rt − γ−1 ·
(
B˜St
C˜St
)1/γ
·
(
C˜St
)−2 · ( θ
1− θ
)
· [Vb(b, z; Ψt) + uc(cNRt , l∗t )rt]
Given that ucc(·) < 0, uc(·) > 0, CSt ≥ 0, γ > 1, and
(
B˜St
C˜St
)
≥ 0:
1. As long as rt < 1; it follows ∂φ∂b′ ∈ (−1, 0).
2. As long as the value function V (·) is an increasing function of b; it follows that
(
1 + rt − ∂φ∂b
)
≥ 0.
Therefore, from equation (A.4.3) it follows that ∂b
′(b,z)
∂b ≥ 0 as long as the flow utility and value
functions are concave (i.e. Vbb(·), ucc(·) < 0).
A.4.5 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Trivial. Use (4.3.8) to substitute for φ in equation (4.3.13). The resulting expression gives b′ as an
implicit function of rt. Appealing to the Implicit Function Theorem, differentiate this expression
with respect to rt. A little bit of algebra and rearrangement of the terms yields expression (4.4.1)
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